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Control Station (CS) – FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 16 (FAA, 2017) defines as the structure or 
system (ground, ship, or air-based) that controls the UAS and its interface to the aircraft and external 
systems.  
 
Emergency – According to the FAA Pilot/ Controller Glossary, an emergency occurs during a 
distress or urgency condition FAA, 2017.  Usually the result of a systems failure or environmental 
effects. Distress emergencies are immediately perilous, such as engine failure. An urgent condition is 
potentially catastrophic in the near future, such as low fuel condition or hazardous weather. (AIM, 
Chapter 6, para. 6-1-2, FAA, 2016.)  For the purposes of this research, the term "abnormal" (or "off-
nominal") is included under the definition of an "emergency", as only distress or urgent "abnormal" 
conditions are considered. Also included is the term "contingency operations" – operations of UA 
following an emergency. Coordination with ATC is expected to be conducted in the same manner as 
for manned aircraft during these events. (UAS Contingency Operations Literature Review, FAA, 
2016.) 
 
Pilot-in-Command (PIC) – a pilot-in-command will always have responsibility for the 
unmanned aircraft while it is operating. (UAS Roadmap, para. 1.4.3, FAA, 2013.)  The PIC has 
final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the flight. (14 CFR 1.1(1).)   
 
Procedure – a preplanned series of actions (steps) to accomplish a specific end task. Generally, 
amplified checklist procedures contained in the operator's manual identify procedures for each 
aircraft.  
 
Standards (Pilot and Crew) - the minimum degree of proficiency to which the task must be 
performed. 
 
Task – a specific operation that a crewmember is responsible to be able to successfully perform,  
as exemplified by the FAA's task list in its Practical Test Standards (PTS). Tasks may be divided 
into two subtypes: 1) Technical tasks – measure the crewmember's ability to plan, preflight, brief, 
run-up and operate onboard systems and sensors. Flight conditions are not required as a prerequisite. 
2) Performance tasks – measure the crewmember's ability to perform in-flight tasks, under specific 
conditions by control manipulation or control station input.  
 
Unmanned aircraft - an aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention 
from within or on the aircraft. (14 CFR 107.3). For the purposes of this research, the UA will include 
those aircraft that exceed the weight of the small UA category or has the capability for beyond visual 
line-or-sight or IFR operations. A small unmanned aircraft weighs less than 55 pounds on takeoff, 
including everything that is on-board or otherwise attached to the aircraft. (14 CFR 107.3).  
 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) - An unmanned aircraft system (UAS), comprises of an 
unmanned aircraft system, control equipment including the control station and data terminal, and 
support equipment including launcher (if required) spares and consumables.  
 






The Alliance for System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE) conducted 
research focused on minimum operational procedures used by Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) operators. ASSURE project A10: Human Factors Considerations in UAS Procedures and 
Control Stations was developed to investigate pilot procedures and operating practices for the 
purpose of developing recommendations.  
 
This research addressed a need regarding the identification of tasks and procedures used in 
performing larger than 55 lbs civil UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). A 
literature review identified current and past practices for developing per-phase-of-flight 
minimum operating procedures. The entire ASSURE A10 project examined the information 
needs, environmental needs, and minimum pilot and operational procedures for control stations 
based upon human factors design considerations and anticipated UAS operations. The research 
further examined the operational needs control stations must support including the execution of 
pilot procedures, and how those procedures differed from manned aircraft operations. 
The research in this report addresses the portion of A10 related to recommendations for potential 
operational requirements and pilot procedures. Two research questions supported our 
investigation of these tasks. They were: 1) What are the minimum pilot procedures needed to 
operate a UAS in the NAS safely? and 2) What are the potential minimum operating 
requirements applicable to the operation of a UAS larger than 55 lbs. in the NAS? 
 
The approach used in this research included an examination of existing UAS and manned 
requirements, practices, and procedures. The team investigated commonalities and differences in 
procedures, practices, and requirements among different UAS systems and between UAS and 
manned aircraft operations. Past and current practices were used to develop initial recommended 
minimum pilot and operating requirements and procedures. Validation of procedures using a 
universal mission simulator with Multiple Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE) software 
replicated the Vehicle Control Software (VCS) for control station functionality of unmanned 
aircraft (UA) control, payload control, communications, data dissemination, and mission 
planning. The validation considered three types of observations, including: 1) Normal and 
abnormal procedural performance observations to validate if the recommended procedures were 
comprehensive and accounted for all potential minimum requirements needed; 2) Contingency 
procedural observations to validate the completeness of recommended contingency procedures; 
and 3) User interface observations to validate control station controls, layout, and command and 
data entry sequences supported all minimum recommended procedures. 
 
This report presents the key results comprised of four pilot and 46 operational minimum 
recommended procedures necessary for a control station to operate a civil single-engine, fixed-
wing, single-pilot-configured UAS flying in beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) conditions.  
 




This research provides recommended guidance toward the development of pilot requirements, 
practices, and operational procedures. Currently, there is no standard for UAS minimum 
operational requirements and pilot procedures for Control Stations (CS). Based on varying levels 
of UAS CS automation and design, there is a significant lack of knowledge and understanding 
regarding a common set of tasks and conditions for UAS pilots performing civil UAS operations 
in the NAS, and how those procedures may differ from manned aircraft pilot procedures. 
Operation of UAS from control stations creates new concerns including, control station handoff 
procedures; lost link control procedures; lost link troubleshooting procedures; establishing 
procedural roles and responsibilities of crewmembers; duty and rest requirements; minimum 
flight crew requirements; operations during data link degradation and loss; and operations during 
periods of decreased sensory cues from aircraft and environment. A common set of operational 
procedures must be established to safely integrate UAS into the National Airspace System with 
the same level of safety assurance, which currently exists in the operation of manned aircraft 
today. 
 
This research was organized into three research tasks as depicted in Figure 1. Research task 1, 
referred to as PC-1, provided a literature review. Research task 2, referred to as PC-2, served as 
the development phase of the recommended pilot and operational procedures. Research task 3, 
referred to as PC-3, validated the recommended operational procedures using a representative 
human-factor-designed CS capable of operating a UAS applying the research assumptions. The 
findings from PC-1 became initial recommendations for PC-2. PC-3 validated the procedures 




Figure 1. Research tasks flow diagram. 
Section 2 describes the assumptions considered for this research. Assumptions were developed to 
establish a framework for which common recommendations could be made. Section 3 
acknowledges limitations of the study to indicate risks that potentially influenced the 
recommendations for minimum operational needs and pilot procedures. The research questions 
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presented in Section 4, were identified from knowledge gaps about common operational 
procedures necessary for the development of minimum standards for UAS control stations. 
 
The findings for each component are communicated in this report. Section 5 provides 
information about existing UAS and manned requirements, practices, and procedures collected 
during the literature review. Section 6 organizes the minimum recommended pilot and 
operational procedures, which used current and past practices discovered from the literature 
review to develop initial recommended minimum pilot and operating requirements and 
procedures. Section 7 describes the validation processes used in a simulated environment to 
examine three types of observations including, 1) Normal and abnormal procedural performance 
observations to validate if the recommended procedures were comprehensive and accounted for 
all minimum recommendations needed, 2) Contingency procedural observations to validate the 
completeness of recommended emergency operations, and 3) User interface observations to 
validate that control station controls, layout, and command and data entry sequences supporting 
all minimum recommended procedures. 
 
Research 
Task Topic Section 
PC-1 Literature Review of Pilot Procedures & Operational Requirements   5 
PC-2 Standard Operating Procedures Framework 6 
PC-3 Validation Process for the Operating Procedures 7 
Table 1. Research task breakout. 
Appendices depict information according to research task. The information contained within 
these appendices comprises individual PC reports previously submitted to the FAA. This 
information was organized and presented to provide details within a consolidated report, rather 
than referencing previously submitted reports.  
 
The data provided in Appendix A, collected during the literature review phase of the PC-1 
research task, describes commonalities and differences in procedures and practices among 
different UAS systems and between UAS and manned aircraft. Tasks are organized by phase of 
flight. Each task was analyzed by 1) common requirements between UAS, 2) common 
requirements between unmanned and manned aircraft, and 3) unique differences between UAS 
or UAS and manned aircraft.  
 
The data presented in Appendix B was also collected during the literature review phase of the 
PC-1 research task. Tasks were aligned with requirements according to the phase of flight. The 
phase of flight method was selected as a logical approach based on a natural order of flight tasks, 
which began prior to take-off and completed at engine shutdown after landing.  
 
Appendix C was developed during the validation of requirements and procedures phase of the 
PC-3 research task. The appendix is organized as an operational procedures matrix with the 46 
operational procedures aligned to the 13 flight test cards used in the validation process. 
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Appendix D presents each of the 13 flight test cards. Each of the flight test cards has four 
observations. Observations were initially hand written during the data collection process; 
however, these were transcribed into electronic format in this appendix to communicate observer 
remarks in this report. 
 
Appendix E presents the results of the validation. Not all operational requirements or procedures 
were validated using the representative device in a simulated environment because they were 
independent of the control station. These requirements or procedures were compared to manned 
and unmanned aircraft requirements and procedures. The recommended minimum operational 
requirements and procedures focus on high-level needs for UAS pilots such as roles and 
responsibilities, duty and rest considerations, and minimum recommended requirements served 
by the role of PIC.  
 
Research 
Task Topic Appendix 
PC-1 Comparisons by Phase of Flight A 
PC-1 Initial Recommendations by Task B 
PC-3 Operational Procedures Matrix C 
PC-3 Flight Test Cards with Observed Results D 
PC-3 Validation Results E 
Table 2. Appendix by research task to support recommendations in section 6. 
 
2. ASSUMPTIONS 
A series of assumptions relating to a generic fixed-wing unmanned aircraft (UA) with a 
maximum takeoff weight greater than 55 pounds was considered during this research for 
defining proposed operational requirements and procedures that apply to a broad set of UAS 
operations for full-integration into the NAS. These assumptions helped establish proposed 
operational requirements and subsequent procedures that were derived. 
 
All elements of the system and flight operations were based upon several broad assumptions as 
to what makes up a UA that is capable of fully integrating into the NAS. These assumptions were 
as follows: 
• The UA had a maximum takeoff weight greater than 55 pounds. 
• The UA was a fixed-wing aircraft. 
• The UA had a single power plant. 
• A crew with a single pilot was required for flight. 
• The pilot using the CS controlled a single unmanned aircraft. 
• Flight operations were conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR). 
• Flight operations were conducted day or night, as dictated by required equipage. 
• Flight operations were conducted over people. 
• Flight operations took place in airspace classifications D, E, and G, including both 
towered and non-towered airports. 
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• Flight operations may take place under varying levels of traffic conditions. 
 
With the above assumptions, additional inferences were made such that the system met 
requirements to operate in the NAS. Equipage, operating limitations, and operational scenarios 
were extrapolated from the initial assumptions listed above. This context was used to derive 
basic operational requirements. 
 
3. LIMITATIONS 
The focus of the operational procedures was on civil aircraft operations; however, several public-
use UAS were reviewed because of the lack of existing civil UAS operations for aircraft 
weighing greater than 55 pounds. The primary limitation of the research was the availability of 
documentation for UAS weighing greater than 55 pounds that were not deemed proprietary by 
the manufacturer or restricted by International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or Export 
Control requirements. 
 
UAS tasks and standards were compared only to FAA Airplane Single-Engine Land Commercial 
Practical Test Standards (PTS), Aircraft Certifications Standards (ACS), and relevant tasks in the 
Instrument ACS. Where there were gaps in the literature that precluded a review of a specific 
area or type of UAS, future research was suggested. Recommended requirements and procedures 
for additional crewmembers, such as crew chiefs, visual observers (VOs), and other essential 
crew were not included in this research. 
 
Based on the assumptions for operations in class D, E, and G airspace varying levels of traffic 
conditions may require additional requirements or procedures to be developed; however, the 
procedures recommended in this research were considered the minimum recommendations for 
varying levels of class D, F, and G airspace with consideration of the PTS and ACS reviewed.   
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Consistent with the FAA’s goals for safe integration of civil UAS into the national airspace 
system, the following research questions were the focus of this investigation to support 
identification of tasks necessary to identify operational procedures for minimum standards for 
CSs.  
 
1. What are minimum pilot procedures that a RPIC must execute to operate in the NAS? 
2. What are the minimum operating requirements applicable to the operation of a UAS 
larger than 55 lbs. in the NAS? 
 
5. PC-1 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The purpose of PC-1 was to conduct a literature review. The literature review surveyed practices 
and procedures, developed from industry and the military, to provide direction toward the 
development of procedures related to unmanned operations. Details supporting the outcomes of 
the literature review can be found in Appendices A through C.  
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In reviewing existing procedures, certain characteristics for successful procedures were 
considered. Research by Degani and Wiener (1997) suggested that a procedure consists of the 
following: 1) Stating the end task, 2) When the task is conducted, 3) How the task is done (the 
action steps), and 4) By whom it is conducted (e.g. pilot vs. sensor operator, etc.).  
 
Standardized procedures were essential to store the collective wisdom of the organization and 
should be logical and efficient. Even though preplanned procedures cannot cover the unimagined 
emergency, good procedures were the most effective method of disseminating knowledge of 
proper system operation. In most cases, at a minimum, the pilot must have been able to correctly 
diagnose the malfunction and apply the appropriate emergency procedure. Also see AC120-71B, 
Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers, 
(2017). 
 
PC-1 sampled public and civil use UAS capable of flight under IFR and beyond visual line of 
sight. Procedures obtained from nine different UAS manufacturers were compared against 
manned procedures contained in the FAA Airplane Single-Engine Land Commercial Practical 
Test Standards (PTS), Aircraft Certifications Standards (ACS), and relevant tasks of the 
Instrument ACS. Each phase of flight was reviewed. The reviewed requirements and procedures 
available for each selected task were described using the following three statements for clarity: 
1) Common practices among UAS, 2) Common practices among UAS and manned aircraft, and 
3) Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems.  
 
5.1 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
The literature review was organized according to phase of flight (i.e. preflight, taxi, takeoff, en-
route, landing, and after landing) for nominal procedures, and abnormal and emergency 
procedures. Review of the extant literature indicated many procedures common among the 
unmanned platforms surveyed as well as many notable differences. Similarities and differences 
were compared between UAS-to-UAS and UAS-to-manned and it was noted that procedures 
varied widely between phases of flight. A common observation from the literature review is that 
unmanned aircraft pilots have adapted to manned standards and procedures as closely as possible 
when technology and safety have made it possible to do so. However, under circumstances 
where technology is needed to address the lack of an onboard human pilot, the procedures 
deviated. Details regarding the UAS-to-UAS and UAS-to-manned procedures can be found in 
Appendix A. 
 
The research included procedures obtained from manufacturers and operators as well as 
information from FAA advisory circulars, orders and manuals. Military operational procedures 
were included because of the lack of existing procedures for the integration of UAS weighing 
more than 55 pounds in the NAS. Where applicable, foreign sources were included. Effort was 
made to maintain a civilian vernacular instead of using terms familiar to military operations. 
 
As part of the literature review for commonalities and differences between UAS-to-UAS and 
UAS-to-manned procedures, a study of other recent publications was conducted. The following 
four publications were found to beneficial in information and theory: 
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1. SAE International had published research titled, "Pilot Training Recommendations for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations". (APR5707, 2010, reaffirmed 2016.)  
Although this document concerned training and civil pilot certification, it was interesting to 
note its assumption that final pilot certification standards (even for larger-than-small UAS) 
did not require any manned aircraft experience. The document stated: 
 
Unlike manned flight, the sensory cues upon which pilots relied for information about the 
state of the aircraft were absent in UA Ground Control Stations (GCS) (Williams, 2008). 
Seagle (1997, as cited in Thompson, Tvaryanas, & Constable) reported that the lack of 
sensory feedback may contribute to launch and recovery accidents. In their discussion of 
sensory feedback as a factor in UA mishaps, Thompson, Tvaryanas, &  Constable 
(2005) suggested that pilots with prior flight experience were more likely to note  the 
absence of sensory feedback. Furthermore, in their investigation of the effects prior flight 
experience on UA pilot skills, Schreiber, Lyon, Martin, and Confer (2002) stated that 
their military pilot participants reported that the landing task was quite difficult. The 
authors suggested that training to “unlearn” some previously acquired piloting skills may 
be required for experienced pilots transitioning to unmanned aircraft. 
 
2. A review of control station research pursuant to NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project was presented by Fern, Rorie and 
Shively at the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 58th Annual Meeting (2014). They 
had used the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Vigilant Spirit Control Station 
(VSCS) as a prototype control station display suite because it offered the necessary 
sophistication and was a highly flexible and changeable test bed. Three simulations were 
completed consisting of: 1) Determining a baseline performance of UAS pilots operating in 
civil airspace under current instrument flight rules for manned aircraft. 2) Examining the 
effect of currently employed UAS contingency procedures on Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
participants. 3) Comparing three CS command and control interfaces on UAS pilot response 
times in compliance with ATC clearances.   
 
3. A recent study by Hobbs and Lyall (2015) entitled "Human Factors Guidelines for 
Unmanned 
Aircraft System Ground Control Stations" and conducted under NASA’s integration project 
was released in September, 2015 for review and comment. The study provides preliminary 
guidelines for control station design for beyond line-of-sight UAS. 
 
The Hobbs & Lyall study relied upon the assumptions in the FAA UAS roadmap (2013) 
which had been used to define the responsibilities that were assigned to the pilot of a UAS 
operating in the NAS. These responsibilities were used to define the tasks that UAS pilots 
must perform with the CS, and therefore dictated the minimum features a CS must contain. 
The points of difference between UAS and manned aviation had been used to further focus 
the guidelines.  
 
4. Another valuable report was "A Review of Training Requirements for UAS, sUAS, and 
Manned Operations" (Gildea, Williams, and Roberts, 2015). This report was in draft at the 
time of this review and may change before final release by the FAA. The report was directed 
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to the study of training requirements, but the methods of comparing training requirements to 
the FAA Practical Test Standards was useful as tasking and training are crossover areas.  
 
5.2 UAS-TO-UAS OBSERVATIONS 
Not all UAS have the same capabilities or design purposes and therefore differences in software 
complexities and cockpit designs were observed. Despite varying technologies to achieve 
acceptable levels of safety, recommended minimum operational procedures and minimum 
requirements were provided. These recommended minimums were considered minimal tasks the 
UAS pilot needed to perform for safe integration into the national airspace. Details regarding the 
UAS-to-UAS observations can be found in Appendix A. 
 
UAS control stations varied as widely in operation and configuration as did manned cockpits of 
the early 20th century. As stated by Hobbs & Lyall (2015), 
a CS contained controls and displays sourced from diverse commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
providers was likely to suffer from a lack of consistency and potential integration issues. This 
may result in increased crew training requirements, reduced efficiency, and an increased 
potential for operator errors.  
 
5.3 UAS-TO-MANNED OBSERVATIONS 
There were considerable differences in autonomy assumptions between manned and unmanned 
aircraft. Although elevated levels of autonomy had been achieved in the "glass cockpits" of 
manned aircraft, the designs were based on the pilot being able to manually fly the aircraft in the 
event of electronics failure. This was not a valid assumption for some UAS, as the pilot cannot 
simply turn off the autopilot and hand-fly the aircraft. There may be no "joystick" or other 
method of manual control. The removal of the pilot as a backup system to the automated systems 
was seen as an inherent risk associated with autonomy failure and a difference between manned 
and unmanned operations. (See Beth Lyall of Research Integrations, Inc., Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, 56th Annual Meeting, 2012.) Details regarding the UAS-to-manned aircraft 
observations can be found in Appendix A. 
 
The Preflight procedures were similar across manned and unmanned platforms. This was logical 
because the difference in platforms was of no concern when it came to good airmanship. 
Unmanned pilots performed planning similar to manned pilots, such as gathering all information 
available prior to flight to support go/no-go decisions, complete flight planning, as well as 
ensuring safety was observed. In contrast, large variations were discovered in en-route 
navigation methods for unmanned aircraft. This may present a potential challenge for operating 
in the NAS. Differing sources of altitude information were noted (i.e. GPS vs barometric, 
electronic-map-embedded elevation data). Unless a requirement was set, it was important for 
pilots to understand what internal and external awareness tools were available and these tools 
varied compared to manned aircraft operations. 
 
Designation of a single PIC was consistent between all platforms, manned and unmanned; 
however, crew-changeover procedures presented the unique possibility of the incoming PIC 
having not been present for, nor having participated in, all phases of flight such as preflight, taxi, 
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takeoff, transfer of control, or en-route operations, while still executing the responsibilities of 
PIC for the flight’s later procedures such as landing. Control Station Handoff procedures among 
UAS were found to commonly include a requirement for briefings which included current 
aircraft performance, navigation plan, current ATC clearance, command and control status, and 
fuel remaining. Some of these hand-over procedures were unique to UAS. 
 
While evaluating the landing phase, the commonality of automated landings appeared unique to 
UAS as opposed to the literature reviewed for manned aircraft where this concept was less 
utilized. Missed approaches and go-arounds were assessed to be similar between manned and 
unmanned aircraft in intent and execution. 
 
There were differences between manned and unmanned operations during failure of navigation 
systems. UAS technology and platform reliance on internal navigation varied widely, to include 
redundancy and back-up systems, such that no commonality could be assessed. BLOS aircraft 
had few operations to bring the aircraft safely back to a landing airfield in the case of loss 
navigation capability. Another unique difference was noted in that given visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC), this emergency procedure concluded for manned aircraft upon successfully 
reaching a landing field. Because of UAS dependence on internal navigation for landing, the 
same procedures were not observed in unmanned aircraft operations.  
 
There were minimal differences between manned and unmanned operations during taxi 
operations. After-landing ground support procedures are similar except for the remote 
communication element often associated with unmanned aircraft operations. After-landing taxi 
procedures appeared common across manned and unmanned aircraft capable of taxi, because of 
requirements to coordinate with tower and ground control during these phases. UAS procedures 
relied upon ground support in many instances adding risk to any taxi operation that a manned 
pilot may not incur. 
 
5.4 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
Manned and unmanned emergency procedures were similar when technology differences were 
minimal. For example, manned aircraft procedures varied from unmanned procedures during 
periods of intermittent or degraded downlink. In this situation, common considerations among 
unmanned aircraft included the use of payload video, if available, to confirm uplink health, or in 
emergency procedures, to navigate the aircraft to a better location, return to home, or navigate to 
a flight termination location. Another notable difference was a lack of abnormal procedures in 
unmanned operations compared to manned operations. For unmanned procedures, the procedure 
was either normal or emergency.  
 
This research highlighted characteristics of some UAS platforms during an emergency based on 
autonomy design and level of technology. Though both unmanned and manned systems 
standards and procedures call for the PIC to understand and operate within the performance 
envelope of their aircraft for an emergency, a unique difference among unmanned aircraft 
demonstrated the additional need to consider automated triggers. One reviewed UAS 
automatically shut down the engine upon reaching the Initial Approach Point (IAP) when set in 
an emergency condition, eliminating the ability to execute a missed approach. Another unique 
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consideration among unmanned aircraft was a potential for a PIC during the en-route phase to be 
non-current and/or not certified to land the aircraft if an emergency arose.  
 
There were no flight termination procedures or standards for manned aircraft. Commonality was 
found in emphasis for aircraft ditching locations and the concern about the safety of other 
aircraft, resources, and people on the ground. This was observed frequently within emergency 
procedures for unmanned aircraft. It was acceptable to terminate or ditch a UAS that might have 
been recoverable if indications of any harm were possible to property or lives. 
 
For the most catastrophic emergency, propulsion failure, all UAS’s reviewed had an engine 
failure/engine out checklist or procedure. Most maintained electrical power for aircraft control, 
navigation and communication. Unlike manned aircraft, most unmanned platforms did not 
appear to have an in-flight engine restart capability. 
 
Following the advent of federal regulation in aviation, Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM) and 
Pilots Operating Handbooks (POH) had encapsulated a standard format for FAA approved crew 
procedures and other information critical for the safe operation of civil aircraft in the NAS. 
Unmanned operations documentation was subsequently lacking in commonality between 
manned and unmanned operations as well as variance between UAS. Some UAS lacked an AFM 
or POH for standardized flight procedures. 
 
6. RECOMMENDED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND PILOT PROCEDURES (PC-
2) 
This section proposes the recommendations for potential operational requirements and pilot 
procedures. Operational requirements and procedures were derived following the conclusion of 
the PC-1 literature review. Using the assumptions and information gathered from PC-1, along 
with input from subject matter experts, the research team generated a series of tasks and 
associated operational requirements for each phase of flight. The research team then generated 
the recommended operational procedures for each requirement associated with the tasks within 
each phase of flight. Procedures were organized under normal, abnormal, and emergency 
procedure categories where appropriate. The research team then identified minimum 
requirements and procedures for each task. These recommendations for potential operational 
requirements and pilot procedures were then validated as part of PC-3. The results from the 
validation are shown in Appendix F.    
 
For this research, a minimum crew was considered for flight operations. The minimum crew 
consisted of a RPIC in a single-pilot flight operation without any required support crew. These 
proposed minimum operational requirements and procedures focused on tasks performed by the 
RPIC throughout the various phases of flight, from takeoff through landing and final taxi. 
Proposed requirements and procedures for additional crewmembers, such as crew chiefs, visual 
observers (VOs), and other essential crew are outside of the scope of this research and were not 
considered.  
 
6.1 PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO UAS PILOTS 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The RPIC has the final authority in the safe operation of the UAS per 14 CFR Part 91.3. 
➢ The RPIC must be able to communicate using standardized aviation phraseology and 
protocol. 
➢ The RPIC must perform all procedures required for the safe operation of the UA in 
accordance with all applicable regulations. The RPIC must also maintain positional 
awareness to ensure that right-of-way rules are followed. 
➢ The RPIC must be knowledgeable of and be able to execute emergency procedures. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Exercise final authority in the safe operation of the UAS. 
➢ Use standardized phraseology and protocol when communicating. 
➢ Comply with applicable regulations. 
➢ Execute emergency procedures when required. 
 
6.2 DUTY REQUIREMENTS 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Flight time limitations must be in accordance with the following portions of 14 CFR Part 
91.1059: 
- A normal pilot duty period must not exceed 14 hours within a 24 hour period. 
- Flight time for one pilot must not exceed 12 hours within a 24 hour period. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Adhere to established duty and rest requirements. 
➢ Do not exceed a 14 hour duty period within 24 hours. 
➢ Do not exceed 12 hours of flight time within a 24 hour period. 
 
6.3 REST REQUIREMENTS 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Rest requirements must be in accordance with the following portions of 14 CFR Part 
91.1059: 
➢ Rest period is defined per 14 CFR Part 91.1057: 
 
“Rest period means a period of time required pursuant to this subpart that is free of all 
responsibility for work or duty prior to the commencement of, or following completion 
of, a duty period, and during which the flight crewmember or flight attendant cannot be 
required to receive contact from the program manager. A rest period does not include 
any time during which the program manager imposes on a flight crewmember or flight 
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attendant any duty or restraint, including any actual work or present responsibility for 
work should the occasion arise.” 
 
➢ A minimum of 10 hours of rest is required preceding a normal duty period. 
➢ A minimum of 10 hours of rest is required following a normal duty period. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Observe rest requirements in accordance with 14 CFR §91.059. 
➢ Rest period is defined in 14 CFR §91.1057. 
➢ Comply with the requirement to get, at minimum, 10 hours of rest prior to the start of a 
normal duty period. 
➢ Comply with the requirement to get, at minimum, 10 hours of rest following the end of a 
normal duty period. 
 
6.4 MINIMUM FLIGHT CREW 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The RPIC shall possess the following qualifications: 
- The RPIC must possess a current UAS airman certification or the equivalent FAA 
approved airmen certification is required to act as PIC. 
- The RPIC must possess ratings appropriate to the UAS being flown, with a 
minimum of an instrument rating or an equivalent certification.  
- The RPIC must maintain currency in the same category of UAS being operated 
and be proficient in the planned phase of flight as well as landing. 
- The RPIC must have instrument currency per 14 CFR Part 61.57(c) and/or 
61.57(d). 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ The RPIC must meet all operational requirements outlined above.  
 
Minimum operational requirements and procedures related to flight operations were presented, 
organized by phase of flight. Since they were minimum recommendations in nature, they form 
the basis for addressing operational scenarios, from normal flight operations to emergency and 
abnormal scenarios. Tasks were organized according to phase of flight (i.e. preflight, taxi, 





6.5.1 Before Entering the Control Station 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be familiar with all available information concerning each flight, 
including but not limited to, weather, alternate landing sites, ditching locations, flight 
termination points, NOTAMs, required communication and clearances, and alternate 
airport fuel requirements. 
➢ During the flight planning process, the pilot is required to take terrain masking into 
account to prevent loss of the primary command and control link. Lost-link procedures 
must take terrain into account. 
➢ The pilot must verify that the control station has the required power and reserve that is 
appropriate for the flight. 
➢ Prior to flight, the pilot should ensure that all control station environmental controls are 
functioning properly. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Consult all relevant weather sources, including but not limited to those in the 
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) 7.1. Consider a preflight weather briefing.  
➢ Determine alternate landing sites. 
➢ Determine acceptable ditching locations that do not pose a risk to persons and/or 
property. 
➢ Determine flight termination points along the route of flight. 
➢ Determine fuel/power supply requirements for the route of flight, accounting for the 
required reserve. 
➢ List alternate airfields along the route. 
➢ Ensure the aircraft mission plan matches the mission plan filed with ATC. Thoroughly 
review all elements of the aircraft flight plan, including fail-safe contingency mission 
plans.  
➢ Ensure adequate fuel/power supply for the planned mission, including requirements for 
weather alternates as required. 
➢ Review entire route of flight for appropriate divert, alternate, and emergency airfields and 
ditch points. 
➢ Consider terrain masking as part of flight planning. This includes lost-link contingencies. 
➢ Ensure sufficient CS power is available for entire duration of operations. 
➢ Ensure functionality of all equipment as required. 




Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must inspect the control station for damage and ensure required equipment is 
functional prior to initiating startup procedures. 
➢ Require the pilot to have all documentation required for flight present and accessible 
within the control station. 
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➢ Any additional ground control equipment required for flight must be powered on and has 
sufficient reserve power as required prior to the start of preset verification. 
➢ The pilot will verify that the system powered up correctly. 
➢ Maps and navigation data required for flight must be loaded and verified. 
➢ The pilot must finalize the flight plan as part of the preset check and control station 
configuration. 
➢ The flight plan and any emergency flight plans or contingencies must be verified. 
➢ The pilot must ensure that all command and control equipment is correctly configured for 
communication with the aircraft. 
➢ The pilot must set voice communication radios to the appropriate frequencies. 
➢ Instrument approach plates, en-route charts, and any required supplements must be in the 
control station and accessible to the pilot while the UA is in flight. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Review CS maintenance logs. 
➢ Resolve open discrepancies, as required. 
➢ Inspect the control station. 
➢ Conduct an inventory of all appropriate publications to include but not limited to: 
- Pilot operating handbook (POH), 
- Checklists, 
- Regulations, 
- Standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
- Aircraft weight and balance, 
- Current FAA chart publications, and 
- Full FAA chart coverage for the route. 
➢ Apply power to all required ground control equipment. 
➢ Verify that the control station and aircraft powered up correctly in accordance with the 
applicable POH. 
➢ Ensure sufficient CS power is available for entire duration of operations. 
➢ Ensure functionality of all equipment, as required. 
➢ Load and verify all maps and navigation data that are required for flight. 
➢ Create, upload, and set mission plans. 
➢ Ensure that all command and control link equipment, both in the control station and 
onboard the aircraft is correctly configured for flight. 
➢ Tune all voice communication radios to the appropriate frequencies. 
➢ Verify that all required approach plates, en-route charts, and any required supplements 
are in the control stations and accessible. 
 
6.5.3 Preflight Checks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be proficient in checklist usage and have the ability to properly identify 
aircraft discrepancies. The pilot must also be knowledgeable with procedures for 
deferring inoperative equipment and proper fuel and aircraft servicing. 
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➢ The successful completion of any built-in test (BIT) must be verified by the pilot. 
➢ The correct function of the throttle must be verified as part of preflight procedures. 
➢ The pilot must set and verify the altimeter to the correct setting as part of preflight 
procedures. 
➢ Inertial Measurement Unit(s) (IMU) function checks must be conducted as part of 
preflight procedures. 
➢ The correct function of any flight-critical sensors must be verified. 
➢ The command link, including any redundancies, must be verified to function at the 
required signal strength(s) required for safe operation. 
➢ Two-way communication radios must be checked for correct function. 
➢ Flight controls must be checked for free and correct operation. 
➢ The pilot must verify any inoperative equipment items in the MEL are functional prior to 
flight. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Verify successful completion of any built-in test (BIT). 
➢ Verify the correct function of the throttle control(s) as applicable. 
➢ Set/verify the altimeter. 
➢ Perform IMU function checks. 
➢ If applicable, perform payload function checks. 
➢ Perform a function check on all redundant command link systems. Ensure that all systems 
function and are able to do so at the levels required for flight. 
➢ Verify correct function of two-way communication radios by performing a radio check 
with a controlling agency, crew, or visual observer as required. 
➢ Verify flight controls and flight control surfaces are free and correct. 
➢ Verify any inoperative items found on MEL during preflight have been cleared and 
signed off.  
 
6.5.4 Engine Start 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Prior to engine start, the pilot must verify that the proper safety equipment, such as a fire 
bottle, is present and that the area is clear of hazards and/or non-essential personnel. 
➢ Engine starting procedures must be communicated and coordinated between the pilot, 
applicable ground control element, and any required ground crew. 
➢ The pilot or other required crewmember must be able to properly perform the engine start 
procedures. 
➢ Engine health indications must be monitored by the pilot during and after the completion 
of the engine start procedure. 
➢ Prior to takeoff, the pilot must verify proper operation of the engine and engine indication 
instrumentation/displays. 
➢ The pilot must be knowledgeable on how to perform abnormal engine start procedures. 
➢ The pilot and ground crew must have a means to command the immediate shutdown of 
the UA engine in the event of an emergency. 




Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Coordinate with crew/applicable personnel to ensure that required safety equipment is 
present and that the area is clear of hazards and non-essential personnel. 
➢ If applicable, establish communication with appropriate ground control element and 
ground crew to coordinate engine start procedure. 
➢ Ensure that the system is properly configured for engine start and begin engine start 
procedures. 
➢ Monitor engine health throughout the engine start procedure. 
➢ Verify proper operation of the engine and all engine instrumentation. 
➢ If applicable, perform abnormal engine start procedures. 





Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ If applicable, the pilot must coordinate with ground crews to ensure the airframe is free of 
frost and/or ice prior to taxi. 
➢ At airports with an operating control tower or ground control element, or where 
separation from ground traffic cannot be ensured by the pilot, a crewmember must 
communicate with ATC to receive taxi instructions. 
➢ At airports without an operating control tower, the pilot must communicate with other 
aircraft and/or utilize observers (as required) to ensure adequate traffic separation during 
taxi. 
➢ Prior to the start of taxi, all flight-critical avionics must be correctly set and configured. 
➢ All essential crewmembers must be aware of the following: 
- Taxi route, 
- Known hazards along the route, and 
- Contingencies. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Verify that the UA is free of frost and/or ice. 
➢ If applicable, contact ATC and request taxi clearance/instructions. If at a non-towered 
airport, communicate with other traffic on common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) 
and/or utilize visual observers or other available means to ensure separation from traffic 
during taxi.  
➢ Check all critical instrumentation for correct settings including but not limited to the 
altimeter, navigation equipment, radios, etc. 
➢ Ensure all flight displays are correctly set and configured for flight. 
➢ Brief any participating crewmembers on the following: 
- Taxi route, 
- Known hazards along the route, and 
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6.6.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must verify that command and control data links are functioning within 
operational limits for taxi. 
➢ If brakes are installed, the pilot must perform a brake check to verify proper function of 
aircraft brakes and brake indications. 
➢ If the UA is capable of being taxied, a loss of data link during taxi operations shall result 
in the autonomous stopping of taxi operations until the link can be regained. 
➢ If the UA is so equipped, the pilot must be able to taxi with the assistance of visual aids 
or markers to indicate the correct route. 
➢ If a marshaller is used, the pilot must maintain two-way communications with the 
marshaller, and if possible, maintain visual contact. 
➢ If a marshaller is used, taxi operations must be conducted at a pace to be set by the 
marshaller. 
➢ The pilot must be able to recognize and react to hazards on the taxiway, such as other 
traffic and personnel with the help of a visual observer. 
➢ If the pilot uses full motion video to taxi and no visual observer is utilized to assist, the 
pilot must bring the UA to a stop if visual contact with the taxiway centerline is lost and 
cannot be regained in a reasonable amount of time. 
➢ The UA must be taxied at a speed that will allow the pilot to stop the aircraft within a 
safe distance of traffic and obstacles. 
➢ The pilot must maintain communication with ground control (when applicable) and any 
applicable ground crew to be able to bring the UA to a stop at any time with a command. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Verify that command and control data links have the required signal strength and 
reliability required for taxi. 
➢ If brakes are installed, perform a check of brake function to ensure the UA may be 
stopped at any point during taxi. If applicable, utilize ground crew to verify brake 
function. 
➢ If applicable, contact the ground control element if link is lost during taxi. 
➢ Utilize visual aids and markers to assist with taxi operations to the maximum extent 
possible. 
➢ If possible, maintain two-way communication with a marshaller, if one is used. 
➢ Conduct taxi operations at the pace of the marshaller or visual observer. 
➢ When using full-motion video, stop UA if runway centerline is lost and contact cannot be 
regained in a reasonable amount of time. 
➢ Set taxi speed such that the UA is able to be brought to a stop within a safe distance of 
obstacles and other traffic. 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ All communications must be accomplished using standard aviation phraseology. 
➢ Upon starting taxi operations, the pilot must maintain a sterile cockpit, restricting 
communication to that which is directly related to the operation of the UA. 
➢ The pilot should have an alternative means of communication available to them within 
the control station (cellular phone, backup radio system, etc.). 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Communicate using standard aviation phraseology. 
➢ Maintain sterile cockpit while taxiing. 
➢ Use backup communications during primary communications failure. 
 
6.6.3 Pre-Takeoff Checks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Checklists required for takeoff must be completed by both the pilot and any required 
supporting crew prior to takeoff. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 






Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ All communication with ATC or controlling agencies must utilize standard aviation 
phraseology and adhere to standard ATC "read-back" requirements. The pilot must also 
demonstrate understanding of takeoff, line up and wait, and hold clearances. 
➢ Communication and coordination with ATC is required prior to takeoff. Standard 
instrument flight communication protocols apply as appropriate. 
➢ Contingencies for the loss of communication and the command link must be in place and 
able to be executed autonomously or by the pilot prior to initiating a takeoff procedure. 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Obtain ATC clearance in accordance with procedures in AIM Section 4. 
➢ Record clearances in accordance with AIM 4-4-7a. 
➢ Use backup communications during primary communications failure. 
 
6.7.2 Takeoff Run/Launch 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Prior to takeoff, the pilot must perform a final check of all flight critical systems such as 
the control surfaces, communication system(s), data link(s), engine instrumentation, and 
other essential systems to ensure proper configuration for takeoff. 
➢ A takeoff must not be performed unless it can be verified that the flightpath is clear of 
traffic. 
➢ Pilots must acknowledge takeoff clearances using standardized ATC communication 
protocols. 
➢ The following must be monitored during the UA takeoff run: 
- The UA maintains the runway heading. 
- The UA power plant is operating at takeoff power and within normal operating 
parameters. 
- There are no failures with the navigation system, communications, command and 
control link, or any other flight-critical systems. 
➢ A refused takeoff should be considered in the event of a flight-critical system failure. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Perform flight checks of any critical systems. Verify proper setting and strength of 
required command link(s). 
➢ Verify traffic is clear. 
➢ Acknowledge receipt of clearance using standard phraseology and read-back practices. 
➢ Maintain runway centerline and  runway heading at rotation. 
➢ Maintain takeoff power and monitor critical power plant operating parameters. 
➢ Monitor flight-critical systems, including by not limited to: 
- Navigation system, 
- Two-way communications, 
- Detect, sense and avoid equipment, as applicable 
- Command and control link, and 
- Any other flight-critical systems/equipment. 
➢ Consider takeoff abort if an emergency situation develops. 
 
6.7.3 Initial Climb Out 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be knowledgeable of UA takeoff and climb speeds as they apply to the 
performance of the UA. Climbs must be performed as appropriate for obstacle clearance. 
➢ When applicable, takeoff climbs must conform to ATC clearance. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Rotate at rotation speed (VR or VROT). 
➢ Maintain the appropriate V-speed during climb out. 
➢ Maintain ATC-instructed departure altitudes and headings, as applicable. 
 
6.7.4 Aborted Takeoff 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be able to recognize and properly react to safety-critical failures during 
takeoff and initial climb. 
➢ The pilot must not fly below the minimum required airspeed at which the UA may be 
controlled. 
➢ Obstacles and hazards in and surrounding the airport environment must be known to the 
pilot, which must include at a minimum, the available runway and obstacles within 30° of 
the runway heading. 
➢ Aborted takeoffs must be communicated to ATC as soon as practical. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Maintain an airspeed that allows positive control of the UA. 
➢ Maintain a heading that is clear of obstacles. 
➢ Communicate the aborted takeoff to ATC as soon as practical. 
 
6.8 CLIMB TO ALTITUDE 
 
6.8.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must operate two-way radio equipment as required. 
➢ The pilot must verify the aircraft is configured properly for climb. 
➢ The pilot must maintain assigned heading. 
➢ The pilot must level off at the assigned altitude. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Maintain contact with ATC and perform frequency changes as requested. 
➢ Ensure that the aircraft is configured for climb. 
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➢ Maintain heading assigned by ATC unless cleared to deviate or climb/maneuver at pilot's 
discretion. 
➢ Level off at the assigned altitude. 
 
6.9 EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS 
 
6.9.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must use proper communication procedures when utilizing radar services.  
➢ The pilot must comply with ATC clearance and advise if unable to do so. 
➢ The pilot must respond to ATC clearances using standard readback procedures. 
➢ The pilot must obtain an ATC clearance, as required. 
➢ The pilot must communicate using standard aviation phraseology. 
➢ The pilot must set navigation systems and transponder codes in compliance with the ATC 
clearance. 
➢ The pilot must establish two-way communication with the proper controlling agency. 
➢ The pilot must identify, assess, and mitigate risks encompassing icing conditions. 
➢ The pilot must perform operations checks as required. These checks will include fuel 
level, oil temperature, engine operation (or propeller pitch operation), electrical, datalink, 
and other engine parameters. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Use proper communication procedures when using radar services (as applicable). 
➢ Obtain ATC clearance. 
➢ Respond to ATC clearance. 
➢ Comply with ATC clearance. 
➢ Use standard aviation phraseology when communicating with ATC. 
➢ Set navigation systems, and transponder codes to ensure compliance with ATC 
clearances. 
➢ Conduct any required communication frequency changes. 
➢ Use available systems (if equipped) to detect icing conditions. 
➢ Monitor aircraft electrical, propulsion, and datalink performance. 
 
6.9.2 Navigation (Including GPS Availability) 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must maintain awareness of the airplane’s position using the available and 
appropriate navigation system(s). 
➢ The pilot must intercept and track a given course, radial, bearing, or navigational 
reference as equipped.  
➢ The pilot must recognize navigation signal loss and take appropriate action.  
➢ The pilot must maintain the assigned altitude(s) and heading(s).  
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
21 
➢ The pilot should follow the preplanned course by reference to steerpoints/waypoints or 
other available navigational references as appropriate.  
➢ The pilot should identify landmarks by relating surface features to chart symbols, if 
equipped.  
➢ The pilot should navigate by means of precomputed headings, groundspeeds, and elapsed 
time, as applicable.  
➢ The pilot should account for the effect of wind on maintaining desired route of flight and 
its effect on performance. 
➢ The pilot should verify the aircraft's position with respect to the planned flight route. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Monitor aircraft's position throughout the flight and maintain course in accordance with 
ATC instructions/clearance. 
➢ Intercept and track a given course, radial (if equipped), or bearing, as appropriate. 
➢ Determine loss of GPS or primary navigation if it occurs. 
➢ Maintain the appropriate altitude and headings.  
➢ Maintain course by reference to established waypoints/steerpoints or other navigational 
references, as applicable. 
➢ If equipped, be able to identify surface features to chart symbols. 
➢ If applicable, navigate by means of precomputed headings, groundspeeds, and elapsed 
time. 
➢ Correct for wind to maintain desired route and performance. 
➢ Remain within planned route described in the flight plan. 
 
6.9.3 En-route Climb 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ UA climb performance information must be known to the pilot, must be published in the 
UAS POH, and available in the control station. This information must include: 
- Absolute ceiling, 
- Service ceiling, 
- Climb performance based upon pressure altitude and temperature, and 
- Time, fuel, and distance to climb 
➢ ATC must be notified if unable to climb at a specified rate/gradient or to an assigned 
altitude. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Conduct en-route climbs according to ATC clearance. 
➢ Conduct climbs with respect to UA performance limitations, including but not limited to: 
- Absolute ceiling, 
- Service ceiling, 
- Altitude and temperature, and 
- Time, fuel, and distance to climb. 
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➢ Notify ATC if the UA is unable to climb at a specified rate or gradient in accordance with 
AIM 4-4-10(d). 
 
6.9.4 En-route Course Change 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Course changes must conform to ATC clearance, as required. 
➢ The pilot must command the UA to fly the assigned heading to achieve a desired course. 
➢ The pilot must verify the UA is flying the correct heading to achieve the desired course. 
➢ The pilot must make corrections to maintain a desired course, as required. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Obtain and/or acknowledge clearance to change course from ATC. 
➢ Command the UA to fly the desired heading or course. 
➢ Verify the UA is flying the commanded heading and/or course using available flight data. 
➢ Make corrections to maintain heading and/or course as required. 
 
6.9.5 En-route Descents 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ UA descent performance limitations must be known to the pilot. This information must 
be published in the UAS POH and available to the pilot in the control station. 
➢ UA performance and operating limitations must be known to the pilot. This information 
must be published in the POH and available to the pilot in the CS. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Conduct descents in accordance with ATC clearance. 
➢ Conduct descents with regard to UA limitations. 
➢ Do not exceed UA performance limitations in descents. 
 
6.9.6 Cruise Power Settings 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Aircraft fuel levels must be monitored while in flight, and power at cruise must be set to 
achieve the desired performance for the planned flight. 
➢ Computations for propulsion power settings at cruise must take the required fuel/battery 
reserve into account. 
➢ Cruise performance and fuel levels must be re-computed should airspeed, altitude, and 
other variables be changed en-route. 
➢ The pilot must be able to determine new performance capabilities/limitations if a flight 
plan is altered due to change in purpose of flight or emergency. 




Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Monitor UA fuel/battery status while in flight. 
➢ Adjust power settings as required to maintain desired performance. 
➢ Perform fuel burn/battery life calculations such that the destination is reached with the 
required fuel/battery reserve remaining. 
➢ Re-evaluate performance data as required to reach the destination at the required time 
with the required fuel/battery reserves. 
➢ Determine any new performance capabilities or limitations that may result from 
alterations in the flight plan or an in-flight emergency. 
 
6.9.7 Weather Monitoring 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be aware of weather conditions along the route of flight. 
➢ The pilot must be aware of meteorological conditions that allow for the formation of 
airframe icing and utilize anti/de-icing systems as required. 
➢ Hazardous weather along the route of flight must be avoided whenever possible. The 
pilot must coordinate to avoid potentially hazardous weather wherever possible. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Monitor weather conditions along the route of flight, establishing communications with 
in-flight weather services as required. 
➢ Determine if icing conditions exist and utilize anti/de-icing equipment as appropriate. 
➢ When necessary, alter the flight plan to avoid weather that poses a hazard to the safety of 
flight. 
➢ Notify ATC if a flight plan must be altered to avoid hazardous weather. 
 
6.10  DESCENT FROM CRUISE 
 
6.10.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must conduct descents in a manner that does not impede or decrease the safety 
of other air traffic 
➢ The pilot must coordinate with ATC if using non-standard approach procedures. 
➢ If applicable, the pilot must adhere to ATC clearances during descent. 
➢ The pilot must ensure that the UA is configured for descent. 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Descend to pattern altitude or an approach fix/initial approach waypoint in a manner that 
does not impede or decrease the safety of other air traffic. 
➢ If unable to perform a published instrument approach, coordinate approach procedures 
with ATC prior to arrival at the initial approach fix. 
➢ If applicable, comply with ATC clearance to descend. 
➢ Ensure that the UA is configured for descent. 
 
6.11  APPROACH 
 
6.11.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Airspeed, altitude, heading, and system health parameters must be monitored while on 
approach.  
➢ Instrument approaches must be performed per the published approach procedures unless 
a standardized alternative is available.  
➢ If a visual observer is the sole means of verifying and clearing the landing path, ensure 
that two-way communication is established prior to initiating the approach. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Monitor the airspeed, altitude, heading, and system health parameters while on approach. 
➢ Perform approaches per the published approach plates unless a standardized approach 
exists for specific unmanned system being flown. 
➢ Ensure that the final approach path is clear of aircraft and obstacles. 
➢ If a visual observer (VO) is the sole means of clearing the airspace for an approach, 
ensure that two-way communication with the observer is maintained throughout the 
approach. 
 




Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Two-way communication must be established prior to arrival at the destination or when 
passing through controlled airspace. Communications with the controlling agency must 
be maintained while the UA is in controlled airspace. 
➢ Communication during landing procedures must conform to standardized aviation 
phraseology and be appropriate to the airspace in which the UA is operating. 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Establish communication with local ATC when arriving at the destination or entering 
controlled airspace, as applicable.  
➢ Maintain communication with ATC when operating in controlled airspace. Acknowledge 
and read back clearances per the AIM 4-4-7(b). 
➢ Use standard phraseology to obtain ATC clearance for landing. 
 
6.12.2 Approach and Landing (Human-in-the-Loop) 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be trained in all applicable landing procedures. 
➢ The pilot must obtain clearance from ATC to land. 
➢ The pilot must ensure that the UA is configured for landing. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Choose landing procedure appropriate to the type of approach and prevailing weather 
conditions. 
➢ Contact ATC and request clearance to land; acknowledge landing clearance when 
received. 




Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ When considering executing a go-around, the pilot must assess the risk posed by 
continuing to land when compared to the risk associated with the aborted landing. 
➢ Intent to perform a go-around must be communicated to ATC as soon as it is practical to 
do so. 
➢ Go-around maneuvers must be executed at appropriate engine power settings to achieve a 
climb gradient that allows the UA to remain clear of obstacles. 
➢ Upon initiating a go-around, the UA must climb to a predetermined altitude that allows 
for obstacle clearance. 
➢ In the event of a go-around, the pilot must follow published missed approach procedures 
and/or ATC clearance to re-attempt the approach. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Communicate the go-around to ATC as soon as practical. 
➢ Abort landing prior to commitment point. 
➢ Maintain positive rate of climb. 
➢ Maintain runway centerline. 
➢ Climb to a predetermined altitude that ensures obstacle clearance. 
➢ Follow applicable missed approach procedures. 
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➢ Coordinate with ATC as required to re-attempt the approach. 
 
Recommended Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Assess the risk of performing a go-around. 
 
6.12.4 Ground Support 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ If required for landing, ground support personnel must adhere to standardized procedures 
to ensure operational safety and be properly briefed on required procedures. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ If required for landing, coordinate with any ground support personnel and brief them on 
landing procedures. 
 
6.12.5 Approach and Landing (Automated) 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Automated landings must be monitored by the pilot to ensure that the aircraft adheres to 
performance limitations and approach parameters throughout the maneuver.  
➢ The pilot must be able to interrupt an automated approach and landing in the event of an 
emergency or to input corrections as needed to ensure a safe landing. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Monitor the aircraft on approach and ensure that it conforms to known performance 
limitations on approach and landing. 
➢ If required and the UA is so equipped, make manual control inputs to assist in guiding the 
UA while on approach. 






Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Communication must be maintained with ATC or the required controlling agency upon 
landing. The pilot must be prepared to follow instructions relating to taxi, route of taxi, 
and holding short for traffic. 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Maintain communication with the applicable ATC element upon landing. 




Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Communication and coordination with ATC and any required ground crew must be 
maintained when taxiing clear of the runway.  
➢ When taxiing clear of the runway, the pilot must have the ability ensure that the UA 
remains clear of obstacles, vehicles, and other aircraft. 
➢ The pilot is required to observe and comply with all signage and warning lights, if 
equipped. If not equipped to visually identify signage and warning lights, the pilot must 
follow instructions from ground crew or ground control element to the maximum extent 
they are able. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Taxi on cleared route. 
➢ If capable of taxi, maintain a taxi speed at the marshaller's pace, or as appropriate to 
maintain separation from other traffic. 
➢ Remain a safe distance from other aircraft. 
➢ Avoid hazards on taxiway surface. 
➢ Taxi according to applicable signage and warning lights. 
 
6.13.3 Ground Support 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ When applicable, the pilot must coordinate with ground support personnel to park the 
UA. 
➢ Engine shutdown must be completed in accordance with applicable procedures. A post-
flight inspection must be conducted following engine shutdown. 
➢ If applicable, engine shutdown must be confirmed with crew. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Verify UA is parked in designated location. 
➢ Shut down the engine. 
➢ If applicable, confirm engine shutdown with ground crew. 
➢ Perform a post-flight inspection of CS and associated systems.  
➢ If applicable, coordinate with ground crews to perform a post-flight inspection of the UA. 
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6.14  CONTROL STATION HANDOFF 
 
6.14.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ If a control station handoff is intended as part of the flight plan, the correct function of 
the receiving control station(s) must be verified prior to initiating handoff procedures. 
➢ Prior to initiating control station handoff procedures, the pilot must establish two-way 
communications with the receiving control station. 
➢ Control station handoffs must be performed procedurally. Positive transfer of control 
must be confirmed between pilots every time a control station handoff occurs. 
➢ Control station handoff briefings must include, at minimum: 
- UA health, 




- ATC clearances, 
- Any abnormal occurrences, 
- Any information deemed safety critical by the pilot that is handing over control, 
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability), and 
- Lost-link profile(s)/routing. 
➢ Control station changeover briefings must include, at minimum: 
- UA health, 




- ATC clearances, 
- Any abnormal occurrences, 
- Any information deemed safety critical by the pilot that is handing over control, 
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability), and 
- Lost-link profile(s)/routing. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Receiving Pilot - Perform preflight on receiving CS and verify correct function of 
essential systems. 
➢ Establish two-way communication with the receiving control station prior to initiating a 
control station handoff. 
➢ Receiving CS: Establish voice communications with transferring CS. 
➢ Receiving CS: Coordinate with transferring CS to establish C2 link with UA, if/as 
applicable per the pilot’s operating handbook (POH). 
➢ Transferring CS: Provide handover briefing to Receiving CS: 
- Verify autopilot mode, 
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- If applicable, verify matched commands, 
- If applicable, verify data terminal settings, 
- Verify altimeter setting, 
- Verify current clearance, and 
- Verify any other flight-critical systems. 
➢ Transferring CS: Initiate positive transfer of UA control to Receiving CS. 
➢ Receiving CS: Verify UA control. 
➢ Keep the transferring CS on link as a backup, if/as applicable.  
➢ For transfer of UA control from one CS to another – Perform a control station handoff 
briefing for the receiving pilot, to include at a minimum: 
- UA overall health, 
- Fuel state, 
- Altitude, 
- Altimeter setting, 
- Airspeed, 
- Heading, 
- ATC clearances, 
- Any abnormal occurrences, 
- Contingency/emergency plan(s), 
- Safety critical information that the receiving pilot will need to ensure safe flight, 
and 
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability). 
➢ For an internal crew changeover within a CS– Perform a crew changeover briefing for the 
receiving pilot, to include at a minimum: 
- UA overall health, 
- Fuel state, 
- Altitude, 
- Altimeter setting, 
- Airspeed, 
- Heading, 
- ATC clearances, 
- Any abnormal occurrences, 
- Contingency/emergency plan(s), 
- Safety critical information that the receiving pilot will need to ensure safe flight, 
and 
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability). 
 
6.15 LOST-LINK CONTROL PROCEDURES 
 
6.15.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ UA lost-link behavior must consist of one or more predetermined flight plans that are 
activated automatically upon the loss of the command link. The pilot must understand 
how the UA will behave in the event lost-link flight plans are activated. Lost-link 
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behavior must also trigger an appropriate transponder squawk code to alert ATC of the 
UA's lost-link status. 
➢ If able, the pilot must communicate with ATC to verify the appropriate transponder 
squawk code upon encountering a lost-link scenario. 
➢ Upon encountering a lost-link scenario, the pilot must communicate the UA’s last known 
altitude, heading, destination, location, and expected lost-link behavior/routing to ATC. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Ensure that lost-link fail-safes are set up as appropriate for the flight (including any 
automated transponder triggering to squawk 7400) and active throughout all phases of 
flight. 
➢ Communicate lost-link behavior to ATC and verify appropriate transponder squawk 
code, if able. 
➢ At a minimum, relay the following information to ATC: 
- Last known altitude, 
- Heading, 
- Destination, 
- Location when the link was lost (Latitude/Longitude), and 
- Expected lost-link behavior/routing. 
 
6.16 LOST-LINK TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES 
 
6.16.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot should communicate the outcome of lost-link troubleshooting procedures to 
ATC upon completion of the lost-link troubleshooting checklist. 
➢ Lost-link troubleshooting procedures must be published in the UAS POH and accessible 
by the pilot in the control station. 
➢ Lost-link troubleshooting procedures must clearly define instances when the flight may 
be continued or must be terminated. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Refer to published troubleshooting procedures when troubleshooting a lost command 
link. 
➢ Continue or terminate the flight based upon the outcome of link troubleshooting 
procedures. 
➢ Communicate the outcome of troubleshooting to ATC. 
 
6.17 OPERATIONS DURING COMMAND AND CONTROL LINK DEGRADATION AND 
LOSS 
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6.17.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Command link integrity must be monitored while in flight, and should degraded 
performance be encountered, the pilot must take steps troubleshoot command link 
performance if it is deemed necessary to do so.  
➢ Operations during command and control degradation and loss must be included in the 
POH. Procedures must address: 
- Troubleshooting measures that must be undertaken by the pilot to restore control, 
- Communication protocols, including communications/coordination with ATC, 
- Actions to be taken if the command link is re-established or restored to full 
functionality, and 
- Contingencies for degraded operation. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ While operating a UA, monitor the command and control link integrity. Should degraded 
link performance be encountered, execute appropriate procedures to address the situation. 
➢ During command and control degradation or loss of signal, execute appropriate 
checklists, troubleshooting, communication protocols, and contingencies for re-
establishing the command link. 
 
6.18  OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF DECREASED SENSORY CUES FROM 
AIRCRAFT AND ENVIRONMENT 
 
6.18.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ If equipped, the pilot may utilize aircraft sensors, such as electro-optical cameras, 
infrared sensors, or any other available means to regain or maintain orientation and 
spatial awareness. 
➢ If required for safe operation, the pilot must be able to manage multiple telemetry 
datalinks independently. 
➢ The pilot must be able to interpret information from multiple instruments and displays to 
determine the UA's status. 
➢ The pilot must be able to prioritize emergency procedures in the event that multiple 
emergency scenarios occur when in a state of degraded sensory cues. 
➢ To facilitate navigation in situations where cues from the UA are intermittent or 
degraded, the pilot must be able to use recorded position, heading, and airspeed to 
calculate the proper heading and time to a designated recovery point. 
➢ If equipped with a directional ground data terminal (GDT), the pilot must be able to use 
GDT azimuth and dead reckoning icons to aid in navigation and maintain UA position. 
➢ The pilot is required to understand when conditions of partial or full loss of sensory cues 
exist.  




Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Determine if full or partial loss of sensory cues exist. 
➢ If applicable, use UA sensors to regain or maintain orientation and spatial awareness of 
the UA. 
➢ If applicable, manage multiple telemetry datalinks independently. 
➢ Maintain positional and spatial awareness of the UA by scanning displays and 
instrumentation. 
➢ Monitor UA caution/alert status. 
➢ If multiple emergences exist, manage them using aeronautical decision making 
techniques. 
➢ When applicable, calculate position, headings, and airspeed to determine proper heading 
and time to designated location. 
➢ If equipped, be familiar with ground data terminal azimuth and dead reckoning to 
maintain UA position. 
 
Recommended Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Determine if full or partial loss of sensory cues exist. 
 
6.19 IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES 
 
6.19.1 Propulsion Failure 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Propulsion failure notifications must be available to the pilot and must convey any 
associated system failures that aid the pilot in diagnosing the failure. 
➢ The pilot must maintain aircraft control and properly configure the aircraft to achieve an 
optimum glide. 
➢ Emergency landing areas must be selected such that risk to personnel and property on the 
ground and in the air is minimized. 
➢ Emergency approaches and landings that transect high-volume airspace should be 
avoided whenever possible. 
➢ If no suitable landing airfield is available, the pilot must determine the best area to ditch 
or terminate aircraft.  
➢ Terrain and weather conditions must be evaluated when choosing a suitable emergency 
landing or ditching location. 
➢ Utilize applicable emergency procedures to address an engine failure. 
➢ The pilot must set the transponder to squawk 7700 in the event of an engine failure, if 
able. 
➢ When the situation warrants, the pilot must communicate engine failures to ATC. 
➢ The pilot must coordinate with ground support personnel as necessary to meet the needs 
of an emergency. 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Identify and address engine failure notifications with the appropriate emergency 
procedures, as applicable. 
➢ Maintain aircraft control and configure the aircraft to achieve optimum glide, as required. 
➢ While performing an emergency landing, select landing areas that pose minimal risk to 
personnel and property on the ground. 
➢ During an emergency landing, take high-volume transects and approaches into 
consideration and maneuver to avoid them whenever possible. 
➢ If a suitable landing site is unavailable, determine the best area to terminate the flight to 
minimize risk to personnel and property on the ground. 
➢ Determine effects of weather on landing/ditching location. 
➢ Address all applicable emergency procedures as practical. 
➢ Set transponder to 7700 if/when able to do so. 
➢ Communicate an engine failure to ATC as soon as practical. 
➢ When applicable, notify ground crew. 
 
6.19.2 Two-way Communications Failure 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ When feasible, the pilot should ensure UA transponder squawk code is set to 7600. 
➢ When available, the pilot should use an alternative means of communication, such as a 
cellular phone, backup radio system, or some other means to communicate with ATC in 
the event of a communication failure. 
➢ When the UA is so equipped, the pilot must prioritize routing as follows:  
- Assigned route, 
- Vectors, 
- Expected (if given further clearance), and 
- Filed flight plan. 
➢ When applicable, the pilot must prioritize altitude as follows: 
- Assigned altitude, 
- Expected altitude (if given further clearance), and 
- Minimum en-route altitude (MEA). 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Set transponder to 7600. 
➢ When available, utilize alternative means of communication to communicate with ATC. 
➢ Prioritize routing as required for IFR communications failures. 
➢ Prioritize altitudes as required for IFR communications failures. 
 
6.19.3 Navigation Failure – GPS or Other System 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must diagnose navigation failures and take timely action to troubleshoot them. 
➢ In the event of a failure within the navigation system, the pilot must address the failure(s) 
in accordance with established procedures.  
➢ In the event of a navigation failure, the pilot must maintain radio contact with ATC. If the 
UA is not capable of safely continuing the flight or landing safely, the pilot must contact 
ATC and advise of intent. 
➢ If applicable, the pilot should utilize dead reckoning navigation.  
➢ Standard procedures for off-site landings must be published, known to the pilot, and 
accessible to the pilot within the control station. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Address navigation system failures as soon as practical. 
➢ Address a navigation failure in accordance with established procedures for the given 
system. 
➢ If applicable, perform dead reckoning navigation. 
➢ Notify ATC of intentions. 
➢ Refer to off-site landing (ditching) or termination procedures, as required, if flight cannot 
be continued with a failed navigation system. 
 
6.19.4 Detect and Avoid (Traffic, Terrain, and Obstacles) 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot is required to give way to both manned and unmanned aircraft per 14 CFR 
§91.113. The pilot should use their discretion when acting upon alerts from collision 
avoidance instruments including but not limited to TCAS, ADS-B, and TIS. 
➢ If an automated detect and avoid system is used, it must give way to other air traffic in a 
manner that is consistent with 14 CFR §91.113. 
➢ Potential collision threats must be displayed to the pilot. 
➢ The pilot must be able to execute evasive maneuvers when required. 
➢ If autonomous detect and avoid systems are used, the pilot must be able to monitor the 
execution of collision avoidance maneuvers. 
➢ The pilot must be able to override autonomous collision avoidance maneuvers. 
➢ When able, the pilot must communicate with ATC upon deviating from a clearance to 
execute a collision avoidance maneuver. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Abide by applicable right-of-way rules. 
➢ When applicable, use available collision avoidance instruments and understand their 
associated procedures. 
➢ If an automated detect and avoid system is used, it must give way to other air traffic in a 
manner that is consistent with 14 CFR §91.113. 
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➢ Monitor DAA system to maintain safe distance from other aircraft. 
➢ Execute evasive maneuvers when required. 
➢ When applicable, the pilot must monitor the execution of automated collision avoidance 
maneuvers. 
➢ If required, override autonomous DAA system. 
➢ Notify ATC of intentions when able. 
 
6.19.5 Uncontrolled Flight 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must be able to identify and react to equipment failures that can lead to or 
hinder the recovery from uncontrolled flight.  
➢ Equipment failures must be addressed in accordance with established procedures. 
➢ The unmanned system must make the pilot aware of conditions that may result in 
uncontrolled flight. 
➢ The pilot must be aware of aircraft configurations and flight regimes in which the UA is 
susceptible to a loss of control. 
➢ The pilot must be able to recognize and recover from unusual attitudes that would 
otherwise lead to the UA entering into a state of uncontrolled flight, when UA 
capabilities allow such control. 
➢ The pilot must be able to execute appropriate spin recovery strategies for multiple types 
of stalls/spins, when UA capabilities allow such control. 
➢ An emergency must be declared with ATC if control of a UA is lost. 
➢ Standard procedures for loss of control must be published in the POH, known to the pilot, 
and accessible to the pilot within the control station. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Address equipment failures that can lead to or hinder the recovery from uncontrolled 
flight.  
➢ Address equipment failures in accordance with established procedures. 
➢ Interpret and react to system cues that warn of the possibility of entering into a state of 
uncontrolled flight. 
➢ Avoid configurations and flight regimes in which the UA is susceptible to a loss of 
control. 
➢ Recognize and recover from unusual attitudes, when UA capabilities allow such control. 
➢ Execute appropriate stall/spin recovery strategies for multiple types of stalls/spins, when 
UA capabilities allow such control. 
➢ Notify ATC of a loss of control as soon as practical. 
➢ Know and execute any published procedures to address any loss of UA control. 
 
6.19.6 Emergency Descent 
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must demonstrate the ability to execute proper division of attention in an 
emergency descent scenario. 
➢ Emergency descents must be executed such that the aircraft's performance limitations are 
not exceeded. 
➢ Emergency descent maneuvers must be performed with consideration given to the 
aircraft's configuration. 
➢ If an emergency descent is executed, the pilot must inform ATC as soon as practical. 
➢ The pilot will execute all descent procedures as time allows while maintaining aircraft 
control. 
➢ If applicable, the pilot will brief and perform hand-off procedures to the landing pilot. 
➢ The pilot must be able to determine whether a viable landing or termination point is 
within the descent path. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Execute proper division of attention in an emergency descent scenario. 
➢ When performing an emergency decent, ensure that any performance limitations are not 
exceeded. 
➢ Perform emergency descents as applicable to the aircraft's configuration (flaps, landing 
gear, and engine power setting) as applicable. 
➢ Notify ATC as soon as practical when executing an emergency decent. 
➢ Execute all descent procedures as time allows while maintaining aircraft control. 
➢ If applicable, brief and perform hand-off procedures to the landing pilot. 
➢ Determine if landing or flight termination is suitable. 
 




Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Emergency landing flight plans and/or routes must be communicated with ATC as soon 
as practical. 
➢ ATC must be notified as soon as possible when deviating from a clearance. 
➢ The pilot must maintain a sterile cockpit during emergency maneuvers. 
➢ When the situation warrants, the pilot must provide ATC with information regarding the 
nature of the emergency and intentions. 
➢ During the transition portions and prior to landing, the pilot must maintain 
communication with ATC and any required ground crew. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Communicate emergency landing flight plans/or routes with ATC as soon as practical. 
➢ Notify ATC as soon as practical when deviating from a clearance. 
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
37 
➢ Maintain a sterile cockpit during emergency maneuvers. 
➢ When the situation warrants, provide ATC with information regarding the nature of the 
emergency and intentions. 
➢ During the transition portions and prior to landing, maintain communication with ATC 




Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ The pilot must perform emergency approaches in accordance with procedures. 
➢ The pilot must continue to monitor airspeed, altitude, and performance parameters while 
on approach. 
➢ Emergency landing locations must be chosen to minimize risk to personnel and property. 
➢ If possible, the pilot must confirm that weather minimums for landing are met. 
➢ The pilot must ensure obstacle clearance to the best of their ability when executing an 
emergency landing. 
➢ Standard procedures for emergency landings must be published in the POH, known to the 
pilot, and accessible to the pilot within the control station. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Perform emergency approaches in accordance with procedures for the given system. 
➢ Monitor airspeed, altitude, and other flight performance parameters while on approach. 
➢ Choose an emergency landing location that minimizes risk to persons or property on the 
ground. 
➢ Determine effects of weather on emergency landing conditions. 
➢ Ensure obstacle clearance to the best extent possible when executing an emergency 
landing. 





Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Upon touchdown, the pilot must perform any additional emergency procedures that may 
be required to fully address the emergency. 
➢ When able, the pilot must maintain communication with ATC throughout an emergency 
landing scenario to maintain traffic separation and clear a landing area. 
➢ Upon touchdown, communication with any required visual observer(s) or other necessary 
ground support personnel must be maintained to ensure that the approach path remains 
clear.  
➢ The pilot must be aware of missed approach and/or ATC requirements throughout the 
approach. If missed approach requirements are not established, the pilot must notify 
ATC. 
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➢ Standard procedures for emergency landings must be published in the POH, known to the 
pilot, and accessible to the pilot within the control station. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Complete any additional procedures that may be required after touching down. 
➢ Maintain communications with ATC. 
➢ Upon touchdown, communicate with any required visual observer(s) or other necessary 
ground support personnel to ensure that the approach path remains clear.  
➢ Determine missed approach requirements. 
➢ Complete emergency landings in accordance with any published emergency procedures 
for the given system. 
 
6.20.4 Ditching (Off-site Landing) Site Selection 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ Aircraft ditching must be included as part of a standardized emergency checklist. 
➢ Ditching locations must be selected based upon the ability to minimize risk to personnel 
and property on the ground. 
➢ Ditching locations and pilot intentions must be communicated to ATC prior to ditching 
the aircraft if able. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Execute ditching maneuvers in accordance with published procedures for the given 
system. 
➢ Select ditching locations based upon the ability to minimize risk to personnel and 
property on the ground. 
➢ When practical, communicate ditching locations and pilot intentions to ATC. 
 
6.20.5 Flight Termination 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ If the UA has the capability to flight terminate (manually or through preprogrammed 
control inputs), the procedures will be included as part of a standardized emergency 
checklist. 
➢ At a minimum, flight termination states and parameters for execution must be known to 
the pilot, and the pilot must monitor the execution of flight termination, if asserted, 
whenever the command downlink is active. 
➢ Flight termination locations must be selected based upon the ability to minimize risk to 
personnel and property on the ground. 
➢ The pilot must communicate his/her intention to terminate the flight to ATC and provide 
the flight termination point. 
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➢ The flight termination procedure should engage a fuel cutoff upon activation and if able, 
provide an indication to the pilot when the fuel cutoff is engaged. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ If required, perform flight termination. 
➢ Execute flight termination according to established flight termination procedures for the 
given system. 
➢ When executing flight termination, monitor the execution of the maneuver. 
➢ Select flight termination locations bases upon the ability to minimize risk to personnel 
and property on the ground. 
➢ Notify ATC of intent to terminate and provide the flight termination position. 
➢ If applicable, engage the fuel cutoff upon activating flight termination. 
 
6.21 ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 
 
6.21.1 General Tasks 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s) 
➢ All abnormal operational states and procedures must be included in a standardized 
abnormal operations checklist. 
➢ ATC must be informed when a UA enters into a state of abnormal operation, such as 
abnormal gear extension/retraction, unintentional CG shift, data/communication timeouts, 
or non-standard performance parameters. Pilots must report any failures of 
instrumentation, reversion to backup or standby systems, or any other failure/abnormal 
operation that may impact the safety of flight. 
 
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s) 
➢ Perform any abnormal operations procedures as they are published for the given system.  
➢ Report any failures of instrumentation, reversion to backup or standby systems, or any 
other failure/abnormal operation that may impact safety of flight to ATC. 
  
7 PC-3 VALIDATION PROCEDURE 
The US Army’s Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS) (Defense Industry Daily, 2013) was 
considered a representative device of sufficient maturity and human factors design 
considerations to verify operational procedures. Use of the UGCS served to validate the 
proposed minimum operational procedures and identified potential gaps with recommendations 
to the FAA. This validation procedure was not intended to evaluate the Army’s UGCS for 
BVLOS operations in the NAS, but to validate if the recommended operational requirements and 
procedures were of a robust and comprehensive nature using a representative device. Details 
regarding the validation process results in Appendix E. 
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The validation of minimum operational procedures was performed on June 6, 2017 through June 
8, 2017 with two Army UGCSs in Huntsville, AL using 13 flight test cards in a simulated 
environment. All 46-proposed minimum operational procedures were represented within the 13 
flight test cards. Each of the two UGCSs were used in a simulated environment to replicate the 
MQ-1C Gray Eagle and RQ-7Bv2 Shadow 200 UAS respectively. Researchers noted differences 
between vehicle-specific modules (VSMs), using NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 
4586 (Platts, Cummings, and Kerr, 2007), and procedures between them, based on the 
capabilities of these UAS. These differences demonstrated the flexibility of a common 
architecture for hardware and software, which benefited this validation procedure. For example, 
the MQ-1C Gray Eagle operated on the airport surface area similar to manned aircraft, including 
taxi and ATC communications procedures; however, the RQ-7Bv2 was launched from a 
pneumatic launcher and did not taxi but still required ATC communications procedures. 
Although these differences were limitations, the variability increased researcher confidence in 
determining pass/fail criteria while validating these procedures. 
 
7.1 VALIDATION APPROACH 
A chronological sequence of phases of flight organized the proposed procedures into logical 
areas and associated to a flight test card (Appendices E and F). Validation was determined 
through the following types of observations: 
1. Normal and abnormal procedural performance observations to validate if the proposed 
procedures were comprehensive and accounted for all minimum requirements needed, 
regardless of specific control stations used.  
2. Contingency procedural observations to validate the completeness of the proposed 
contingency operations. In addition, to validate repeatability of proposed procedures 
varying contingency conditions were considered.  
3. User interface observations to validate that control station controls, layout, and command 
and data entry sequences supported all proposed minimum procedures.  
 
7.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PROCEDURES TO VALIDATE 
Flight test cards (Appendix D) were used to document and standardize the verification 
observations. Multiple flight test cards were used to capture all 46 proposed procedures.  
 
A pilot validation procedure was conducted to validate procedural accuracy in each of 
observation areas in controlled settings. The verification procedure was altered to improve the 
reliability of the data collection to ensure a more complete evaluation of proposed procedures. 
 
7.3 FAULT REPORTING AND DATA RECORDING 
Data collectors administered each flight card with a UAS operator on a UGCS control station. 
The data collector communicated each step in each flight card and observed the operator’s ability 
to perform steps using the UGCS. Results were recorded directly on each flight test card, 
including any specific information for a procedure’s inability to be performed or if a proposed 
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procedure failed to adequately define the operational steps required for the safe operation of a 
UAS in the NAS. 
 
Because the data collector was able to physically see the UAS Operator to know their identity, 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) considered this research confidential. Each UAS Operator 
was assigned a UAS Operator ID number. No names or other personally identifiable information 
were collected. Once the test flight card data had been input into an electronic database, the 
original test flight cards were destroyed. 
 
7.4 PERSONNEL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
Four data collectors and three UAS operators were used during the data collection. During the 
preliminary experiment in March 2017, requests were made to increase the quantity of UGCSs 
from one to two and additional UAS operators from one to three to increase the confidence of 
each procedure’s validation using multiple iterations and collected data for each flight test 
performed. The data collector and UAS operator were familiar with each flight test card’s 
procedures prior to beginning the validation of proposed procedures within each attempt. No 
other additional or special personnel were used or required. 
 
UAS Operators were volunteers and had UAS system qualification and availability from the 
Army’s UAS Project Office. According to US Army UAS Regulation 95-23 (US Army, 2006), 
to be considered qualified, each UAS Operator had completed either the MQ-1C Gray Eagle or 
RQ-7B Shadow Individual Qualification Course at the Army’s UAS training institution. 
 
7.5 EQUIPMENT RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
The US Army uses the UGCS emulator and Universal Mission Simulator (UMS) as a Training 
Aids, Devices, Simulator and Simulations (TADSS) system. The device can simulate the MQ-5B 
Hunter, RQ7Bv2 Shadow, and MQ-1C Gray Eagle Army Unmanned Aircraft types. All of these 
UAS fit into the assumptions for this research. These devices provide a training capability to 
UAS operators for qualification training and follow-on continuation training to maintain 
proficiency and currency in all required operator tasks. The devices also use Multiple Unified 
Simulation Environment (MUSE) software to stimulate the Vehicle Control Software (VCS) for 
UA control, payload control, weapons control, communications, data dissemination, and mission 
planning. 
 
The Army’s TADSS system supports their objectives strategic vision to employ a family of UAS 
via common hardware and software. The Army’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 
(Army, 2011) identified simulation devices as a core competency for its science and technology 
(S&T), research, development, test, and evaluation (RTD&E) capabilities in UAS operations.  
 




Figure 2. Universal Mission Simulator (UMS). (U.S. Army, 2015). 
One UGCS emulator (Long, 2017) and one UGCS Universal Mission Simulator (UMS) (Ficken, 
2017) were used during the validation procedure. The emulator and UMS are the same device 
except, the UGCS emulator reflected the same hardware and software to operate a MQ-1C Gray 
Eagle UAS; the UGCS UMS reflected the same hardware and software to operate the RQ-7BV2 
Shadow 200 UAS (Long, 2017). The UMS replicated radio communications equipment with 
photographs of the equipment in their respective locations within the UGCS. System-specific 
Operator’s Manuals and Checklists were provided and used during the data collection for each 
test flight card. Two fully-software-functional UGCS running simulated telemetry data provided 
fidelity to accurately replicate each proposed operational procedure. The use of simulation to 
validate operational procedures significantly mitigated the risk of loss of aircraft, equipment, or 
personnel while performing the flight test cards for abnormal and emergency operational 
procedures. No other special equipment was used or required.  
 
7.6 VALIDATION ENVIRONMENT 
Personnel and equipment had dedicated facilities that were free of distractions and capable of 
independence between UGCSs. Both UGCSs were located in Huntsville, AL at two contractor 
facilities approximately one mile apart. Neither UGCS had connectivity to the other. Multiple 
validation observations were collected by completing 13 test flight cards to observe all 46 
operational procedures. A matrix for the breakdown of flight test card and operational procedure 
can be found in Appendix B.  
 
7.7 PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES 
Four data collectors were required to record observations as they occurred within each test flight 
card. Each data collector also compared the expected results to the observed results for each 
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operational procedure to determine an initial pass/fail status. UAS operators were responsible for 
performing each proposed operational procedure to the best of their ability within the constraints 
of any operational limitation or publication such as checklist or Operator’s Manual. During the 
course of simulating each flight test card, the UAS Operators would manipulate the Instructor 
Operator Console (IOC) to induce faults or conditions necessary for the UGCS to display 
conditional indicators, such as warnings, cautions, alerts, or specific telemetry feedback for the 
UAS operator/ data collector to perform each procedure.  
 
7.8 VALIDATION PROCEDURES 
1. Each UAS Operator was presented an Informed Consent form. Each UAS operator read 
and signed the form. 
2. Each UAS Operator sat at the UA operator workstation within the UGCS. 
3. Each UAS Operator vocalized all procedures, process steps, and CS observations to ensure 
the data collector accurately recorded observations. 
4. The data collector stood or sat either behind the UAS operator or in the sensor operator 
workstation, provided it is not required to perform the operational procedures outlined in 
each flight test card. 
5. The UAS operator also performed duties as the Instructor Operator Console (IOC) 
administrator, interacting with the IOC to replicate each operational procedure and/or 
process step, as required.  
6. The data collector described the operational procedure and any specific process steps 
required for each procedure to the UAS Operator.  
7. The UAS Operator performed each operational procedure or process step by manipulating 
the correct subsystem controls. The UAS operator used a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
and data input devices to perform the tasks. The UAS Operator also observed system 
responses before proceeding to the next process step or operational procedure.  
8. The data collector recorded observations as the UAS Operator’s performed each 
operational procedure or process step. Additionally, the data collection observed and 
recorded any operational procedure or process step that was not able to be performed.  
9. Both the data collector and UAS operator proceeded through all operational procedures and 
process steps until each test flight card was completed.  
 
A minimum of four observations of each of the 13 test flight cards were performed.  
 
7.9 VALIDATION ASSESSMENT 
After the completion of four observations of each of the 13 flight test cards, the research team 
collectively assessed pass/fail conditions for each operational by using judgement after 
comparing the expected-to-actual results observations recorded. The results were shown in 
Appendix E.  
 
The research team recorded the collective pass/fail results from the four validation observations 
from each flight test card. The operational procedures within each flight test card was reviewed 
for agreement between all four observations. Any unanimous attempts (either a pass or fail) was 
accepted by the research team. Non-unanimous attempts were reviewed for any accompanying 
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notes. With a majority rule, the data collector team determined the overall pass/fail condition 
from data collector comments. A majority rule of pass/fail determined the recommended 
operational procedure’s acceptance. There were no tie-breaker validation attempts required, 
resulting in a majority rule decision for all 46 recommended operational procedures. 
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
An urgent need exists to incorporate standardized organization for UAS operating documentation 
to capture and present procedures and performance information regarding their UAS. Some 
foreign states, such as Australia (2017) and Sweden (2009), began to address this issue through 
requirement of approved flight manuals or inclusion of flight and control station procedures in 
the aircraft’s operation manual as a condition for access to certain airspace. 
 
Several gaps exist among the unmanned procedures surveyed. Specific areas for future 
investigation and study include unmanned pre-taxi procedures, ground support operations, and 
rejected takeoffs. In the En-route and Landing phases of flight, gaps were found in the climb, 
transition, and manual (i.e. human in the loop) landing procedures. For the After Landing phase 
of flight, procedural gaps were noted again for ground support, parking, ground support 
handling, and shutdown. Among Abnormal and Emergency phases, procedures related to 
operations during degraded uplink, lost link (uplink), and lost link troubleshooting also appear 
deficient.  
 
It is additionally recommended for research in the following areas:  
 
1. Validate recommended procedures during an actual flight environment.  
2. Validation of procedures using a HF-optimized prototype CS.  
3. Development of a PTS/ACS – performance based standards – with the minimum procedures 
for CS recommended from this research. 
4. Research high and low traffic conditions relating to minimum tasks required. 
5. Research runway independence vs runway dependence between UAS platforms and 
differences in requirements – for example – a runway-independent UAS may have different 
weather infrastructure requirements. Also, how are procedures different – having to taxi on a 
runway versus no taxi necessary.  
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APPENDIX A—COMPARISONS BY PHASE OF FLIGHT 
Appendix A provides information about the similarities and differences in requirements, 
practices, and procedures between UAS and unmanned to manned aircraft were divided by 
phases of flight that was determined in research task PC-1. The phases of flight are presented in 
the temporal order of flight progression from prior to take-off through engine shutdown upon 
landing. Some phases of flight were further broken down into categories given specific 
requirements or importance those sub-categories play during that particular phase. Additionally, 
researchers included abnormal or emergency procedures after the normal phases of flight, 
addressing not every possible emergency, but those which standards or checklists are most often 
included across all aircraft due to the significant nature and potential outcome. 
 
A.  PREFLIGHT  
  
1.  Before Entering GCS – [Preflight] 
 
a. Common practices among UAS 
Common practices between UAS included the need to obtain weather observations and 
forecasts, crew health analysis or CRM check, NOTAMS, or a review of instrument 
procedures. Many systems required obtaining information necessary for navigation 
performance infrastructure along the planned route, the availability of an instrument 
approach at the destination; alternate landing sites, fuel requirements and alternate airport 
fuel requirements. Other commonalities included a confirmation of the quality and 
availability of C2 links and filing a flight plan when required. 
  
Fuel planning was consistent across UAS to ensure the aircraft is carrying enough usable 
fuel on each flight, although there was a variation of the amount of reserve fuel based on 
a percentage of planned flight time or a minimum reserve time in minutes. Same 
considerations on endurance and flight duration is also made with regard to electric 
powered aircraft with consideration to battery life. 
 
b. Common practices among UAS and manned aircraft 
Require the pilot to become familiar with all available information concerning each 
flight. Additionally, required proficiency areas include checklist usage, ability to properly 
identify aircraft discrepancies, procedures for deferring inoperative equipment, proper 
fuel and oil servicing. 
 
For instrument flight, planning was required for the identification of forecast weather, 
alternate airports, and fuel requirements. The length and configuration of the runway (i.e. 
grade, crown, and slope) were also planning considerations.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
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Variation between UAS existed. Some requirements of manned aircraft relating to the 
crew manifest, people on board the aircraft, oxygen, etc. were not required for UAS. 
Some UAS and manned aircraft systems required the physical inspection of the aircraft, 
ground control, and ground support equipment prior to entering the control station. Some 
UAS required a physical inspection of the ground control and support equipment prior to 
entering the control station. Variances were noted in the requirement to complete the 
physical inspection of the aircraft. Some were after the preflight inspection was complete, 
but before the engine start procedures, others were a part of or before the preflight.  
 
Note: UAS reviewed included systems that performed horizontal takeoff using traditional 
runway environments. Some UAS used catapult launcher devices and were runway 
independent for takeoff. 
 
2.  Before Engine Start – [Preflight] 
 
a. Common practices among UAS  
Common practices verify the functionality of the aircraft and control station through a 
methodological process. The methods used by each system are unique to that system. 
Minimally, the functionality of the avionics, sensors, actuators, lighting, flight control 
surfaces, servo actuators, data links, fuel and oil levels are checked. Levels of autonomy 
for the UAS are verified from creating, saving, and uploading mission and emergency 
mission plans, loading the plans to the aircraft, and verifying the plan was received. Some 
systems require the activation of the mission plan during the preflight to observe control 
station indicators reported from the aircraft and physical changes to the aircraft such as 
deflection/ orientation of deflection of flight control surfaces or throttle position prior to 
engine start. 
  
Many UAS platforms rely on communication between the ground station and the crew 
out at the aircraft as well as the hand-off ground station when applicable. There were 
procedures noted where extensive radio checks were made, to include phone checks, 
prior to engine start.  
 
b. Common practices among UAS and manned aircraft 
Manned aircraft procedures also required an aircraft inspection to detect possible defects 
within the aircraft including documentation such as airworthiness, registration, currency 
of electronic data, identification of minimum equipment required for flight, avionics; 
engine controls, lighting, electrical fuses, circuit breakers, and annunciators, flight control 
surfaces, landing gear wheels and tires. 
 
UAS aircraft mimicked manned aircraft by requesting engine start, as a requirement 
when at a controlled airfield, and putting clearance on request when applicable. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
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There were some limitations to the data collected for this task because many procedures 
require the use of a system-specific checklists to perform this portion of the preflight. 
Many checklists contained either proprietary information or were ITAR controlled, 
limiting their use in this research.  
 
Many of the manned aircraft requirements were not applicable to UAS. For example, 
seatbelts were required to be inspection and passengers were required to be instructed in 
their use. Additionally, fire extinguishing equipment and life support equipment were 
required to be inspected during a preflight inspection. Currently, these requirements are 
not applicable to UAS because there are no people on board the aircraft; however, if UAS 
begin to perform people transport operations, then requirements such as these may be 
required. 
 
A preflight inspection for a UAS may require other crewmembers to perform checklist 
such as a crew chief or sensor operator. Establishing and maintaining communications 
with other crewmembers during the preflight inspection varied between UAS as well as 
manned systems. 
 
Manned aircraft before-engine-start procedures had requirements, not clearly identified in 
most commercial UAS platforms such as procedures and required documentation, flying 
with inoperative equipment, limitations of flying with inoperative equipment, 
requirements for having a current aviation database, equipment required for IFR flight, 
IFR airworthiness to include aircraft inspection requirements. It was only noted in 
military UAS platforms were the above listed requirements were present. 
 
There were additional ground stations requirements present in UAS that were not similar 
to manned aircraft. The large amount of computer equipment in a ground station 
produces a lot of heat. There were steps to verify the ground station was under a certain 
temperature to ensure the computers would not overheat. There were also steps to 
confirm the ground station was configured in flight mode as some of these stations also 
have the capability to duplicate as simulators. 
 
3.  Engine Start – [Preflight] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Common practices for performing the engine start task use UAS-specific checklist 
procedures. Most UAS required the proper positioning of aircraft, including mooring the 
aircraft to prevent movement. The engine start procedure for many UAS required other 
crewmembers to perform such as a crew chief or maintainer.  
 
Establishing and maintaining communications with other crewmembers during the engine 
start procedure varied between UAS. All UAS required the pilot to monitor engine-
related information, such as RPM, fuel flow, oil pressure, and bus voltage output to 
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determine if the engine was operating within normal operational parameters. Some UAS 
platforms required the pilot to verify throttle position prior to engine start and change the 
throttle position during an engine run while verifying normal operating parameters at 
other-than-idle RPM.  
 
Additionally, the majority of the surveyed UAS platforms had a procedure during 
emergencies, to quickly shut the engine off.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Commonalities between UAS and manned systems included the proper positioning of the 
aircraft to ensure propeller safety. Engine starting procedures also required the ability to 
monitor the electrical system and RPM during the starting procedure. Adherence to 
checklist procedures were also required. 
 
It was noted on a few UAS platforms considerations for cold and hot weather procedures 
that were similar to manned aircraft. 
 
Requirement for a fire bottle was also duplicated for larger-than-small UAS on a 
controlled airfield during engine start. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Some UAS’s had the capability to start the engine without the need for support 
equipment. Some UAS required support equipment such as an air start cart or a computer 
plug-in to monitor indications until a link could be established.  
 
 Researchers were unable to determine the specific engine start procedures from the 
UAS-specific documentation provided. Manned aircraft engine starting procedures 
included details for failures or emergency procedures during or after engine starting 
procedures. The manned aircraft procedures included propeller safety information for 
passengers, which currently is not required for UAS because it is assumed that no 
passengers would be on board the UAS.  
 
The manned aircraft engine starting procedures also provided details for abnormal 
starting procedures, hand propping to start the engine, high altitude operations, and hot or 
cold weather environments. The manned aircraft engine starting procedures also included 
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4. Pre-Taxi – [Preflight] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
A visual observer to clear taxi path and follow through taxi was a requirement for some 
of the UAS platforms in our research. A confirmation that all personnel and equipment 
were cleared prior to requesting clearance was a procedure noted.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Pilots, both manned and UAS, showed requirements to get current ATIS, altimeter setting 
and finish all pre-taxi checklists prior to asking for taxi. 
 
Information from UAS and manned aircraft operations focused on knowledge and 
awareness prior to beginning the taxi operation. Knowledge included procedures for 
appropriate cockpit activities during taxiing including taxi route planning, 
communications with ATC, understanding procedures for steering, maneuvering, 
maintaining taxiway, runway position, and maintaining awareness, understanding 
relevance/importance of hold lines, and understanding taxi operation planning 
procedures. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Considerations for icing (such as anti-icing or de-icing) prior to taxi was observed within 
the manned aircraft pre-taxi operations; however only some UAS researched had de-icing 
capabilities.  
 
Understanding taxi operations for procedures unique to night operations, non-towered 
airports, and aircraft lighting; understanding the hazards of low visibility taxi operations 
was not identified in UAS operations as it is in manned.  
 
Manned aircraft documentation also provided information about the proper settings of the 
different avionics systems and flight instruments. 
 
A brief between the safety observer and the UAS operator is made prior to taxi to ensure 
proper verbiage is used and any other pertinent information to be past. 
 
B. TAXI  
 
1.  Communication and Pre-Takeoff Checks 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Common practices included the ability to communicate and comply with ATC 
instructions. All UAS reviewed used runway markings during taxi operations. UAS were 
required to taxi at safe speeds; only one system provided maximum taxi speeds. 
 




b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Common elements for taxi operations between UAS and manned aircraft include the 
compulsory requirements to comply with ATC instructions and procedures (e-CFR, 
2017). 
 
Brake checks were required an all aircraft that taxied from a parking location to the 
runway.  
 
Taxi speeds and safe taxi distances were also a requirement on most aircraft researched.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Some UAS require no taxi whatsoever. These UAS are catapult launched instead of 
taxied from a storage location such as a hangar to the launch and recovery site on the 
airport may occur prior to preflight. These aircraft are towed by another vehicle, which 
should use ATC instructions to the driver of the vehicle to comply with ATC instructions 
as if the aircraft was taxing under its own power. 
 
Some UAS required the use of an External Operator and marshalling personnel or the 
vehicle operator to visually clear the aircraft while taxing on the airport surface. The 
external Operator maintained a visual contact with the aircraft and radio communications 
with the marshalling team and tower during taxi operations.  
 
Manned aircraft taxi procedures included the sustainment of a sterile cockpit and 
monitoring of flight instruments during taxi operations.  
 
C. TAKEOFF  
 
1.  Communications – [Takeoff] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Commonalities in takeoff communication procedures fell along the lines of highlighting 
the necessity to communicate with ATC prior to takeoff. These procedures, while 
highlighted at a fairly high level, pointed to the need to ensure clear communication with 
ATC using standard aviation terminology and phraseology. 
 
Procedures also emphasized the need for clear communication amongst the crew, both in 
the ground station or through use of a radio for dual shelters and/or visual observer 
operations. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Commonalities were rooted in the requirements to clearly communicate with ATC, and 
communicate with essential crew. In the context of takeoff, communications with ground 
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crew, such as those responsible for marshaling the aircraft, and ATC are expected to 
adhere to existing standards, using typical aviation phraseology and terminology.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
With all common communication procedures being very similar, the biggest difference 
that was noted was the requirement to acknowledge ATC light signals. There is an 
obvious limitation of a UAS to not be able to acknowledge light gun signals due a 
potential inability of the UAS pilot to visually acquire light gun signals.  
 
Note: It should be noted that documentation for some small unmanned aircraft system 
(sUAS) were reviewed. While these systems were generally considered to be out of scope 
for this research project, it was included for the sake of comparison. It highlights key 
operational differences and presents a case for differentiating procedures that are 
intended for small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) and larger, more complex systems. 
Especially in the communications and takeoff phase for comparisons.  
 
2.  Takeoff – [Takeoff] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Similar requirements for a takeoff run revolve around establishing the aircraft is ready for 
takeoff (verifying completion of pre-takeoff checks), performing the takeoff itself, and 
monitoring aircraft status and function after takeoff. These procedures primarily 
consisted of ensuring that the aircraft was aligned and positioned on the correct runway, 
applying power/commanding a takeoff, ensuring rotation at the correct airspeed, and 
establishing a steady climb. 
 
An emphasis on monitoring of aircraft systems and functions was also common, 
requiring the pilot to check flap settings prior to takeoff, rotation at the desired airspeed, 
status of the navigation system, and the correction function of the aircraft throughout 
takeoff.  
 
Monitoring of systems continues through takeoff and into climb out, with the pilot 
continuously monitoring system status and verifying that such things as flap retraction, 
navigation, and any required automation are functioning correctly. Should any anomalies 
occur that necessitate a rejected takeoff, it is initiated per the required procedures.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Common procedures between manned and unmanned aircraft at takeoff included many of 
the same fundamental requirements for fixed-wing takeoff. The UAS, like a manned 
aircraft, required the aircraft to be positioned on the correct runway relative to wind 
direction, verification of ATC clearance, and that the takeoff run be initiated with the 
aircraft when all required variables such as traffic and aircraft system status are 
accounted for and known to the pilot.  




c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
One of the more obvious differences between manned and unmanned takeoff procedures 
is that not all unmanned aircraft are capable of performing a conventional takeoff. While 
other platforms were capable of performing either a conventional takeoff or a catapult 
launch, depending upon the mission requirements. The ability to utilize less conventional 
takeoff methods, such as a catapult creates drastically different procedures and 
requirements for takeoff than those for conventional manned aircraft. This is especially 
true given that aircraft that have a simple “push button” launch system that initiates a 
takeoff with a high degree of autonomy, requiring little (if any) pilot intervention upon 
launch. 
 
Some UAS platforms had an autonomous abort built into the system. Others had red 
warning lights and/or accompanying aural tones to indicate an abnormal indication to 
help a pilot facilitate a timely abort if needed.  
 
Research only discovered standards and procedures in military UAS’s that referenced 
bird conditions and requirements associated with those conditions in relation to take-off 
and landing. Bird hazards and conditions were addressed throughout manned aviation. 
 
3. Ground Support – [Takeoff] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
A Requirement for ground support at takeoff varied by systems and was not fully 
captured in available documentation. While there are requirements to utilize supporting 
ground crew and/or equipment for several unmanned aircraft systems addressed by the 
literature, few specific procedures matched when compared between systems. 
Additionally, there were some platforms that relied on maintenance or communication 
troops to facilitate or participate in checklists. Those documents were not made available 
to researchers.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
No common ground support requirements were identified between manned and 
unmanned aircraft except the need to have a fire bottle during engine start. The need for 
dedicated ground personnel to marshal a manned aircraft and provide a means to clear a 
runway of traffic is diminished for a manned aircraft due to the presence of a pilot 
onboard the manned aircraft. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
For manned aircraft, the requirement for support equipment and ground support 
personnel often ends upon the start of taxi. This being the case, there was very little 
commonality between manned and unmanned aircraft in terms of ground support for 
takeoff. For unmanned aircraft, the requirement for ground personnel extends up to the 
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completion of takeoff. Taxiing and visually clearing taxiways, runways, and parking 
locations is automatic for a manned aircraft due to the presence of a pilot in the cockpit. 
With unmanned aircraft, 
 these simple tasks become more complex when the pilot is removed from the aircraft and 
high levels of autonomy are exercised. The addition of ground personnel to perform these 
visual checks becomes a necessity unless a different means to visually clear the taxiways, 
runways, verify configuration, and externally monitor the climb are available to the pilot.  
 
These functions are not dissimilar to the role of visual observers in the context of many 
sUAS operations—a dedicated person on the ground to provide deconfliction of the UA 
from objects…in this case, on the ground. 
 
4.  Aborted/Rejected – [Takeoff] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Little information was available for the comparison of rejected takeoff procedures. A few 
of the platforms had abort procedures related to aircraft being outside limitations while 
on takeoff roll or due to malfunction of critical equipment.  
 
Upon examining the rejected (aborted) takeoff procedures there are some basic elements 
that are immediately noticeable, and are applicable to all manners of UAS. When the 
procedure is broken down to the fundamental level, it requires the pilot to perform 
several basic tasks to ensure a safe abort. The basic tasks/requirements for an aborted 
takeoff are: 
a. The pilot must first recognize the need to reject the takeoff, 
b. Control of the UAS must be maintained by the pilot at all times, 
c. The pilot must bring the aircraft to a stop as quickly and safely as possible, 
and 
d. If the aircraft departed the runway, the pilot must shutdown the engine 
immediately. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Very little information was available to make this comparison. Limitations in the types of 
documentation available prevented a full comparison here. A commonality shared was to 
notify ATC of the abort as soon as aircraft control could be maintained. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Little information on abort procedures was available to the research team. This is due to 
the differing sources of information and the proprietary/restricted nature of many of the 
systems that were considered for this research. The lack of listed procedures here points 
to limitations on the kinds of information that the research team was able to obtain and/or 
release. 
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One difference identified, which may be unique to unmanned aircraft, pertained to some 
of the autonomous behaviors of some systems. Some aircraft, under certain criteria like a 
lost link would abort automatically. Also, some aircraft would reject the abort input after 
certain airspeed, such as V1 was reached. In such cases, the aircraft would continue to 
takeoff.  
 
D.  CLIMB-OUT  
 
1. Climb-Out - [Climb-Out] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Climb out procedures and requirements varied between different unmanned aircraft, and 
were often embedded within takeoff procedures. However, commonalities observed 
between unmanned aircraft revolved around system monitoring and ensuring the aircraft 
and associated systems perform within their desired constraints.  
 
At the most basic level, common elements of UAS climb performance related to the 
necessity of the pilot to understand climb characteristics of the UAS and how they may 
be affected by pilot inputs. At the deeper level, these procedures consist of ensuring that 
such things as rotation at the desired airspeed, the raising of landing gear and flaps, the 
proper climb attitude and airspeed is achieved, engine function is normal for the climb 
power setting, ATC communications are maintained, directional control is maintained, 
and systems are monitored for any abnormal operation. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Common areas between manned and unmanned climb out procedures were largely 
focused on the tasks performed during climb out. These tasks primarily consisted of such 
things as ensuring that the aircraft was rotated at the correct speed to initiate a climb, the 
gear were raised and flaps retracted, critical systems were monitored, and the correct 
pitch and airspeed required for the climb were maintained until reaching the desired 
altitude. 
 
Communications on climb-out were mirrored. Tower switching over to departure and 
requirement to check-in with departure, was duplicated with the same verbiage and 
intent. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Despite their similarities, there are some distinct differences between manned and 
unmanned aircraft when addressing aircraft climb procedures. Levels of automation 
within unmanned aircraft can vary, ranging from nearly full automation to manual pilot 
control. While the tasks that were performed between both manned and UAS were 
largely the same, the manner in which they were performed differed. Systems with high 
levels of automation perform many of the critical post-takeoff climb functions such as 
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raising the gear and flaps with a high degree of autonomy. Some platforms are capable of 
initiating an automated takeoff and subsequent climb with a button press. This places the 
pilot in the role of monitoring system function, rather than actively piloting the aircraft. 
 
Additionally, the automation of some UAS platforms regulate the rate of climb so the 
pilot is unable to shallow or increase feet per minute of the climb. The rate at which it 
climbs and descends will remain constant and can only be changed through level off. 
 
Manned aircraft climb out procedures provided a greater emphasis on obstacle avoidance. 
While it is certain that this is an important factor in unmanned aircraft climb out 
procedures as well, it was not a prevalent in the sources that were compiled. This likely a 
result of the limitations of documentation available for this research.  
 
E.  EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS  
 
1. Communications – [En-route] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
UAS systems that have the capability for launch and recovery in one geographical 
location, and the ability to execute command and control for the en-route portion of the 
flight from a separate geographical location have unique communication requirements. 
This type of operation is often referred to as “remote split operations” and is common for 
UAS that fly beyond line of sight (BLOS). The communication between the Launch and 
Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission Control Element (MCE) is essential for 
smooth transition of aircraft control and to keep updated on any changes in expected 
times for the scheduled or non-scheduled transition to occur.  
 
For UAS that do not fly BLOS operator and observer should remain co-located and 
communicate verbally. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
UAS and manned aircraft both require an operator to exhibits the knowledge, and skills 
to communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) for clearances and procedures within the 
National Airspace System (NAS). The skill to use and understand the proper phraseology 
and to correctly copy, read back, interpret, and comply with an ATC clearance is 
common between platforms.  
 
Knowledge and skills are required to correctly set up communication frequencies, 
navigation systems and transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance along 
with monitoring proper frequencies, including emergency frequencies. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
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Manned aviation systems do not have a condition similar to the unmanned aircraft 
systems remote split operations. This set of required skill and knowledge is new for those 
operators transitioning from manned to UAS 
 
UAS aircraft that operate BLOS rely heavily on a control structure of satellites and other 
communication links. The monitoring of these control links is crucial and the ability to 
switch between them, if the capability allows so, when one becomes degraded or no 
longer useful is unique to UAS. 
 
2.  Navigation (including GPS availability) – [En-route] 
 
a. Common en-route navigation requirements between UAS 
Due to the large variation of UAS, the common en-route navigation requirements are also 
dramatically different between different UAS. However, based on the purpose of 
navigation there were a few commonalities found. Pilot is expected to navigate the 
unmanned aircraft in reference to latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, and time and 
demonstrate the ability to use all installed navigation systems (if any navigation systems 
are installed). There was a strong reliance on visual navigation and/or GPS navigation 
across the platforms. Pilot skills also included being able to locate the unmanned 
aircraft’s position using visual contact and/or the navigation system, exhibit satisfactory 
knowledge to keep the unmanned aircraft inside its authorized airspace (latitude, 
longitude, altitude, speed, and time), and consistently monitor present position with lost 
link failure route to ensure route will not violate airspace or be unable to maintain 
obstacle clearance. All pilots of UAS platforms were expected to exhibit satisfactory 
knowledge of airspace restricted from UAS use. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Due to the large variation of UAS and manned aircraft, the common en-route navigation 
requirements are also dramatically different between UAS and manned aircraft. The need 
for a complex navigation system increases as an aircraft integrates into controlled 
airspace. The redundancy or back-up navigation systems vary from platform to platform. 
 
A common characteristic with manned and unmanned aircraft is the use of automation to 
ensure adherence to navigation requirements. Small aircraft, flying in uncontrolled 
airspace typically utilize the pilot to navigate their aircraft. As the unmanned and manned 
aircraft become more complex, the use of automation will guarantee proper navigation.  
 
Common navigation requirements between manned and unmanned aircraft included 
utilizing the same GPS constellation for navigation, navigate in reference to latitude, 
longitude, altitude, speed, and time, and locate the airplane’s position using the 
navigation system. Additional skills expected were intercept and track a given course, 
radial, or bearing, as appropriate, verify route does not violate airspace and avoids 
obstacles, and recognize navigation signal loss and take appropriate action. When using 
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the GPS for navigation, pilots also should possess knowledge of Global Positioning 
System (GPS) or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (equipment, regulations, 
databases authorized use, Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
It is not surprising to find large variations between UASs and manned systems 
concerning en-route navigation requirements. Some UAS platforms utilize a high degree 
of automation, some have no automation, and some utilize a hybrid between the two 
levels of automation. The use of automation affects how the aircraft navigates, and who is 
responsible for safely navigating the aircraft. Additionally, some UASs are fully 
autonomous, some are not autonomous, and some UASs utilize a hybrid of non-
autonomous and fully autonomous operations. If a UAS has no automation, the pilot will 
navigate the aircraft. As a system becomes more automated, the pilot will manage the 
automation. The following two examples of automated and manual conditions point out 
the different roles of the pilot in order to execute the UAS mission. 
 
1. AUTOMATED - CONDITIONS: 1). Set proper flight mode for cruise flight. 2). 
Verify the aircraft enters the selected flight mode. 3). Verify cruise airspeed, 
heading, and altitude are set to programmed settings.  
 
2. MANUAL CONDITIONS:  1). Change heading commands to meet mission 
waypoints. 2). Adjust for winds. 3). Adjust airspeed commands to meet time on 
target (TOT) requirements while staying within the operating parameters. 4). 
Adjust altitude commands to meet waypoint requirements or air traffic control 
(ATC) directions. 5). Ensure aircraft maintains airspeed and altitude within 
assigned parameters of the aircraft operating limits. 
 
The size of the aircraft will also affect its navigation capabilities. Some large 
transport aircraft carry multiple GPS units and other navigation aids. A prudent pilot 
will always use all available navigation sources during en-route navigation. The 
number of available navigation sources is widely varied from aircraft to aircraft. 
 
Unique navigation requirement differences between UAS to manned systems were 
small UASs often use GPS to determine altitude, but most manned aircraft utilize 
pitot static instruments, UASs monitor present position with lost link failure route to 
ensure route will not violate airspace or be unable to maintain obstacle clearance and 
if a manned aircraft loses ground communication, it typically continues on its 
preplanned route of flight. Also, small UASs have the ability to immediately 
terminate flight when navigation capabilities are lost, where a manned aircraft needs 
to reestablish its location and navigate to a landing area. 
 
Another difference is most manned aircraft use vertical navigation to avoid other 
aircraft, however many UASs are too low to the ground to use altitude confliction 
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methods. Additionally, a manned aircraft pilot often uses see and avoid in order to 
avoid a midair collision. A UAS pilot often uses sense and avoid in order to avoid a 
midair collision.  
 
3.  Climb – [En-route] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Information regarding requirements for UAS for this task in the en-route phase of flight 
was scarce. The majority of unmanned platforms reviewed do not appear to have 
formalized procedures or standards for accomplishing an en-route climb. Of the 
unmanned platforms, a group II fixed wing platform described the need for the PIC to 
“understand the climb characteristics of the aircraft” as well as the “climb rate controlled 
by the autopilot” and how this is adjusted manually and by the aircraft’s automation 
during waypoint navigation. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned 
Both unmanned and manned systems seemed to lack formalized procedures for this task. 
While the reason for this absence is unclear, the PIC of either platform must understand 
the climb characteristics of the aircraft and how this performance can be adjusted. 
 
For instrument flight, both unmanned and manned aircraft will be required to perform at 
least to the minimum climb performance used in determining Minimum Crossing 
Altitudes (MCA) for en-route instrument flight (i.e. 150 Feet Per Nautical Mile below 
5,000’, 120 ft/NM below 10,000’, and 100 ft/NM above 10,000’ MSL) (FAA Order 
8260.3B). 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Although few UAS provided standards or procedures for performing an en-route climb, 
variation between navigation systems and level of automation are likely to be 
differentiators both among unmanned platforms as well as between unmanned and 
manned aircraft. 
 
The level of automation is some UAS’s did not allow the pilot to increase or decrease 
climb rate as the computer determined best rate of climb and used that information to 
regulate airspeed, angle of attack and other flight controls to optimize the climb. 
 
4.  Descent – [En-route] 
   
     a. Common practices between UAS 
Requirements reviewed for UAS indicated a focus on the ability of the PIC to anticipate 
the airspeed, altitude, and heading of future waypoints and to plan their descent 
accordingly while monitoring system health (e.g. pitch indications, proper airspeed and 
altitude responses, vertical speed and engine indicators).  




Regardless the level of autonomy assisting in the descent, a second theme was found in a 
need for the PIC to again understand the performance envelope of their aircraft and to 
plan their descents accordingly. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Both unmanned and manned systems standards and procedures call for the PIC to 
understand and operate within the performance envelope of their aircraft. The need to 
plan descents with future waypoints or procedures in mind while monitoring system 
health is also universal. 
 
      c.   Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
A notable distinction between unmanned and manned systems was presented in this task 
within descent planning with regards to the waypoint navigation system utilized by some 
UAS. Specifically, the procedures for a group II fixed wing UA describes a need to 
“Establish waypoints … to integrate [the] approach with manned aircraft procedures.” 
Although waypoint navigation appears common among UAS, these navigation systems 
lack standardization and do not appear innately compatible with existing NAS 
procedures.  
 
5.  Cruise Power Settings – [En-route] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
UAS systems reflect highly automated systems, based on terminology in literature. The 
terminology is predominately managing airspeed and altitude, statements such as “do not 
exceed system limitations”, “monitor fuel level”, “set flight mode” are used, but little 
guidance in regard to actually setting cruise power settings is stated. One widely used 
platform requires, “an in-flight fuel consumption check 30 to 60 minutes after level-off or 
entry into cruise flight. Initiate alternate course of action if actual fuel consumption varies 
from the planning value, and the flight cannot be completed with the required reserve. 
Monitor fuel quantity and consumption rate during the flight.” This also refers to 
performance automation that is monitored by the operator. Another platform states, “The 
Operator shall continuously monitor battery voltage”.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Both UAS and manned require an applicant to exhibits satisfactory knowledge, risk 
management, and skills associated with ensuring the aircraft is performing as specified.  
 
Altitude and airspeed, whether controlled by automation or power settings on a manned 
aircraft, require input by the operator and continued monitoring to ensure the expected 
results are maintained. Most manned and unmanned aircraft have multifunction display to 
monitor fuel burn rate, current fuel levels, system parameters are met as well as warnings 
and cautions should the system not operate properly. Manned aircraft verbiage is much 
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more manual than the automation terminology used within the UAS, but both require 
regular monitoring of the system. 
 
c. Unique requirements differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Manned aircraft verbiage is much more manual than the automation terminology used 
within the UAS.  Procedures are more mature but involve more manual input of power 
settings and fuel control, such as mixture to obtain optimal performance. UAS systems 
are more automated, in which performance in maximized through automation instead of 
operator input. It becomes a monitor the indications verse provide input to get desired 
indications. 
 
Fixed wing aircraft generally refer in terms of fuel burn and use of traditional power 
source such as AvGas. While larger-than-small unmanned aircraft are not as likely to be 
electrically powered – they may be powered by means other than traditional fuel, for 
example the Altavian states, “The Operator shall continuously monitor battery voltage”. 
When considering cruise power settings, this may be significant to an unmanned aircraft 
but would not be a significant consideration for manned aircraft. 
 
 
F.  LANDING 
 
1.  Communications – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
In general, there were no common practices across all platforms besides the requirement 
to coordinate descent and landing with ATC. Two platforms referred to communication 
with operating control towers in preparation for landing. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
For the UAS platforms that discussed landing communication they aligned with the 
manned standards in 14 CFR 91.129(i) “Takeoff, landing, taxi clearance. No person may, 
at any airport with an operating control tower, operate an aircraft on a runway or taxiway, 
or take off or land an aircraft, unless an appropriate clearance is received from ATC.” 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The unique difference between systems is that some systems did not address the topic or 
those that did only stated that crews should maintain communication and seek clearance 
prior to landing procedures. This is stated clearly in manned aircraft due to the 
requirements of 14 CFR.  
 
Due to the previous requirements to be a rated pilot for operation of UAS, coupled with 
the restrictions of operating in controlled airspace, the procedure to communicate with 
Air Traffic control may be sparse because they are the standard operating procedures 
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trained for manned operations and may be assumed. Additionally, for hand and catapult 
launched systems they do not operate in manned airspace and therefore there is normally 
no requirement to contact prior to take-off and landing operations. 
 
2.  Transition – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
There were no Common practices between UAS. On the unique platforms which had split 
operations, the time to do hand-off between shelters varied. Once the aircraft was within 
Line of Sight (LOS) links, usually was the time the shelters would switch from mission 
control to launch/landing control.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Due to the lack of procedures for transition in both manned and unmanned no 
commonalities and dissimilar actions can be highlighted.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Due to the lack of procedures for transition in both manned and unmanned no 
commonalities and dissimilar actions can be highlighted with the exception of split 
operations hand-off mentioned previously.  
 
3.  Approach – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
For systems that included Approach procedures the requirements were in general 
common between all platforms. Each procedure in some wording included verify fuel / 
flight time in case of a go-around, approaches and go-around options via chart or mission 
planning tools, and review and establish descent rates, weather, obstacles, etc. prior to 
commencing the approach. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Common between UAS and manned is the UAS uses the spirit of the manned procedures 
for approach to include checklists, communication with ATC and required briefings with 
crew. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The unmanned procedures in some cases reference mission planning tools whereas 
manned procedures do not use a mission planner or GCS.  
 
Additionally, some UAS platforms required the visual observer to be present for the 
landing to verify configuration, correct landing runway and expedite taxi off. It would be 
during the approach phase the pilot would verify observer has two-way communication 
with the pilot and is in position for the landing. 




4.  Landing (Non-Automated) Approach and Landing – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
There were no specific procedures for non-automated landings within the scope of this 
research. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The landing phase was considered a critical phase of flight and therefore the only 
commonality that could be drawn was for there to be a sterile cockpit during this phase.  
 
Confirming landing gear was down and clearance was given to land was a commonality 
shared between manned and unmanned platforms. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
For manned aircraft, 14 CFR has very detailed guidance on both VFR and IFR landings. 
For UAS the information was not abundant enough to draw any conclusions from. 
 
5.  Landing (Automated) Approach and Landing – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
For aircraft that included landing procedures, the procedures were similar in that the 
aircraft and operator were configured for the landing phase, reviewed the pilot checklist, 
communicated and verified that the ground crews were ready, and then initiated the 
landing. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The information for this phase of flight was not abundant enough to draw any 
conclusions from. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The main difference is that manned aircraft traditionally do not land using automated 
systems. For those that do the procedures were similar in that the aircraft were 
configured, checklist complete, and landing initiated. 
 
For UAS aircraft that relied on a visual observer, a final confirmation of aircraft 
configuration, alignment to runway, and runway approach path, runway was clear of all 
aircraft and equipment was procedural.  
 
6.  Go Around – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
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There were numerous Common practices between UAS systems in regards to missed 
approaches and go-arounds. Each procedure that was included followed similar 
procedures of determining risk and initiate a missed approach procedure. Pilots were to 
communicate intent, apply power, climb to a safe altitude (various procedures stated 
different altitudes), and reposition to begin approach or transition to alternate landing 
area. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The missed approach procedures for manned and UAS were common between them both 
in stating intentions to ATC and executing the go around with a smooth climb at runway 
heading to a safe altitude.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The noticeable differences were the platform specific details. Depending on the platform 
the level of detail was different on climb out, attitude, etc.  
 
The technology built into some UAS platforms sends the aircraft into a go-around 
autonomously if it breaks from one of its landing parameters. Also, the pilot can select 
the go-around manually, but on these same platforms the aircraft performs the go-around 
autonomously once selected.  
 
Some UAS platforms have a minimum altitude in which a go-around can be selected due 
to the lag time between entering a command and the aircraft receiving the command. 
Once the aircraft is below the minimum altitude established, the aircraft will ignore the 
pilots command and continue to land. 
 
7.  Ground Support – [Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
There was little written about ground support for UAS. Those platforms that included the 
information referenced communicating with the ground crew to ensure that they are ready 
for recovery and support. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
There were no commonalities discovered during this research. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The unique differences are in manned operations there is limited discussion of ground 
support after landing. Even though there are few UAS platforms that discuss ground 
support, the ones that do require it, provide ample guidance.  
 
G.  POST LANDING  
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1.  Communications – [Post Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
In general, there were two requirements noted in the procedures that included post 
landing communication; communicate with ground crew and communicate with ATC. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The commonalities are that in both manned and UAS that communication between the 
pilot, crew, and ATC are critical. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The unique differences are that the manned procedures provide more detail about when 
and what to communicate. 14 CFR 91.129(i) states; “Takeoff, landing, taxi clearance. No 
person may, at any airport with an operating control tower, operate an aircraft on a 
runway or taxiway, or take off or land an aircraft, unless an appropriate clearance is 
received from ATC.” 
 
2.  Ground Support – [Post Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Across each aircraft that listed procedures there were Common practices that include 
verifying the aircraft is in a safe location, securing the aircraft, and conducting shutdown 
checklists and post flight. Finally, the ground crew was to communicate the shutdown 
had been completed to the pilot. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
In manned flight, there are ground support and shutdown procedures conducted by the 
pilot and crew. The procedures between and manned and UAS were similar in nature. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The unique difference is the pilot is not in the vicinity of the aircraft and ground crew. 
Therefore, the communication is done remotely which imposes additional communication 
requirements and procedures.  
 
3.  Taxi – [Post Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
The common requirement shared is if an aircraft has the ability to taxi, then clearances 
must be approved prior to moving the aircraft. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The taxi procedures between manned and UAS are very similar in that they both follow 
the 14 CFR and require clearance for taxi operations. 




c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
The main difference is in the UAS the pilot does not have as much information of 
obstacles on the ground as a manned pilot. The UAS pilot is remote and relies upon the 
ground support in many instances to direct and observe for the pilot therefore this adds a 
risk to any taxi operation a manned pilot does not incur. 
 
4.  Parking – [Post Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
There were no detailed procedures for parking found in this research. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
There were no detailed procedures for parking found in this research. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
There were no detailed procedures for parking found in this research.  
 
5.  Engine Shutdown – [Post Landing] 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
      There were no detailed procedures for engine shutdown.  
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
There were no detailed procedures for engine shutdown.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
There were no detailed procedures for engine shutdown.  
 
H.  PROCEDURAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO PILOTS 
  
a. Common practices between UAS 
All systems required a minimum of one pilot to act as the RPIC. 
 
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
All manned aircraft require at least one pilot to act as PIC. Some aircraft require a flight 
crew of more than one person; however, only one may act at the PIC.  
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
Although a UAS requires one PIC to operate the system, the PIC can change. With a 
UAS, the incoming PIC may not have participated in other phases of flight such as 
preflight, taxi, takeoff, transfer of control, or en-route operations, but may become the 
PIC later in a flight, such as a landing procedure. A crew-changeover briefing may take 
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place as the transfer of control between crewmembers within the same control station or 
different control station occurs.  
 
In a manned aircraft, all of the crewmember must be on the aircraft during all preceding 
phases of flight. Crewmembers may participate in an initial crew briefing, but may also 
participate in a crew changeover briefing within the same cockpit. 
 
Some systems require the use of an Aircraft Commander and/or Mission Commander in 





I. CONTROL STATION HANDOFF AND PILOT CHANGEOVER DURING   
OPERATIONS 
 
       a.   Common practices between UAS  
Initially during this element of research task, consideration was only the control 
station handoff, which pertains to transferring control from one control station to 
another. This is typically completed in operations in which the aircraft is in a beyond 
line of sight (BLOS) environment. The nature of long-endurance UAS is such that 
crews may be scheduled in shifts. The transition of control from one pilot to another 
within the same ground station is referred to as a changeover. It was decided to 
expand this task to include crew changeover as well.  
 
Regarding ground station handoff, since commercial regulations do not broadly 
encapsulate BLOS operations, little information is available outside of DoD assets. 
Within the DoD systems, little information regarding the transfer of control between 
remote ground control stations was available within the documents that were 
compiled for the literature review, with literature focusing primarily on crew 
changeover procedures within a control station.  
 
Of the available information relating to control station handoffs between remote 
locations, the most detailed information was found in military UAS Operations 
Manuals. Handoff procedures included briefings and radio communication 
requirements. Similarities between control station handoff procedures were the most 
pronounced between the Air Force assets, referring to the aircraft operator’s 
requirement to complete required steps and follow the aircraft manuals and checklist.  
 
Literature that focused on crew changeovers within the control station was primarily 
oriented towards a briefing for the incoming pilot that covers both normal and 
abnormal system behavior, identifying responsibilities during the transfer, and 
ensuring that control is not interrupted. These procedures ensure a smooth transition 
of control between pilots and the aircrafts status is known while preventing an 
interruption in aircraft control.  




A common theme between all UAS handoff procedures is the importance of 
communication and the reliance on a checklist to guide the procedure. The emphasis 
on these elements of UAS operation highlight the importance of coordination and 
defined procedures when exchanging the information necessary to hand over control 
of a UAS to a pilot that will take over control from a remote location.  
  
     b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The chosen literature showed few similarities between manned and unmanned 
procedures relating to the transfer of controls between control stations. The closest 
comparison that can be made between manned and unmanned aircraft in terms of the 
transfer of controls in a UAS crew changeover procedures. However, these 
similarities are primarily superficial in that they involve the physical transfer of the 
control station from one pilot to another and require the aircraft’s status and 
instrumentation to be monitored throughout the process. They do not address the 
handoff of controls to a control stations in a remote location, and do not allow for a 
direct comparison between the required procedures.  
  
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
There are obvious differences between manned and unmanned control transfer in that 
the unmanned aircraft has the capability to pass control of the system to a different 
physical location. This is entirely unique to unmanned aircraft and is due to the 
fundamental difference in how the two types of aircraft (manned and unmanned) are 
piloted.  
 
The majority of the literature for unmanned aircraft systems highlights procedures 
and processes that relate to crew changeovers within a control station, with a smaller 
emphasis on transfer of control from one control station to another. Despite the 
limited information relating to control handoff between control stations, what is 
available highlights the importance of procedures for both events; a change of crew 
and a handoff to a different control station.  
  
J.  OPERATIONS DURING COMMAND AND CONTROL DEGRADATION AND LOSS 
 
a. Common practices between UAS  
Little information relating to procedures with degraded command and control 
performance was found in the literature. The most significant information relating 
to operations with degraded system performance came from Air Force doctrine and 
referenced the ability of the UAS to land with a degraded navigation solution, provided 
that the runway is suitable.  
     
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
            The literature showed no commonalities between manned and unmanned aircraft with  
respect to the operation of the aircraft with degraded or a loss of command and control.   
  
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
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The literature was extremely limited in terms of describing procedures for degraded 
operation. This is especially true with respect to degraded command and control. The loss 
of primary command and control functions on the part of the pilot due to a lost-link 
scenario was better covered, but degraded performance and control loss due to other 
factors was not. This is not necessarily due to these procedures not existing, but instead 
points to a gap in the literature that may be addressed with greater access to system 
documentation and operations manuals.  
 
K.  OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF DECREASED DATA FROM AIRCRAFT 
ATTITUDE, PERFORMANCE OR ENVIRONMENT 
 
a. Common practices between UAS 
Degraded sensory cues may occur under two conditions. Partial or full downlink failure 
modes.  
 
Partial or intermittent downlink failure modes occurred when the downlink stream was 
not consistent. The downlink reports from the unmanned aircraft (UA) may occur as 
interrupted messages from the UA to the Control Station (CS). The conditions may occur 
from multiple causes including failures with onboard datalink equipment; masking of the 
datalink stream between air data terminal and the ground data terminal; failures with the 
ground data terminal to the CS; downlink telemetry signal jamming. The pilot may be 
able to maintain awareness, although may experience periods of increased workload 
while performing emergency procedures to increase the downlink quality, or to move the 
UA to an area to eliminate masking. Additionally, the pilot may become disoriented as 
the CS is displaying intermittent data, such as inconsistent or erroneous UA status such as 
RPM or UA’s position on scrolling map confusing the pilot. 
 
Full downlink failure modes occur when the AV downlink is consistently disrupted. The 
downlink reports from the unmanned aircraft (UA) will occur as no report(s) from the 
UA to the Control Station (CS). The conditions may occur from multiple causes 
including failures with onboard datalink equipment; masking of the datalink stream 
between air data terminal and the ground data terminal; failures with the ground data 
terminal to the CS; downlink telemetry signal jamming, or an UA mishap (such as 
propulsion failure causing flight into terrain). The pilot is not able to maintain awareness 
because no telemetry is being reported (or received) into the CS. The pilot may 
experience periods of increased workload while performing emergency procedures to 
reestablish a downlink signal.  
 
Common considerations for between UAS included the use of payload video, if available, 
to assist the pilot in understanding if uplink is still being received by the UA. In some 
UAS the payload video, if available, was used during emergency procedures to navigate 
the aircraft to a better location, return to home, or navigate to a flight termination 
location.  
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b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
The manned aircraft has a back-up if the performance engines fail. The pilot can use 5 
senses to track location, approximate speed, attitude and altitude. Many UAS also have a 
built-in, redundant back-up in lieu of not having the ability to rely on senses. 
 
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems 
UAS with operational payload video may be able to use the video to assist the pilot with 
understanding the status such as pitch, roll, and location of the UA; however, not all UAS 
have an independent full-motion video datalink. Some UAS have no full-motion video at 
all. Some UAS have a single downlink datalink which includes both telemetry and video.  
 
Some UAS have redundant telemetry datalinks. Should a primary datalink fail, then a 
secondary datalink may enable the pilot to understand what the UA is doing during 
normal or emergency operations. For example, the primary datalink range may be limited 
to shorter distances, but uses a higher data bandwidth for launch and recovery operations. 
During en-route operations, the UAS may be operating on a secondary datalink under 
normal operations. Other UAS may operate under primary datalinks and the use of 
secondary datalinks may be considered emergency operations.  
 
The pilot of a manned aircraft would be able to use other cues such as aural, vibration, 
and other instruments to continue flight with the loss of attitude or airspeed indications. 
The manned aircraft pilot has the ability to disengage an autopilot, if operational at the 
time of partial instrument failure, to manually control the aircraft using input from other 
information. A UAS pilot relies on the data to fly the aircraft and has no other outside 
cues to use as back-up if performance instruments degrade or fail. 
 
L.  LOST-LINK TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES 
 
      a.  Common practices between UAS  
More research is desired on this topic; few sources contained information relating to lost-
link troubleshooting procedures. Procedures within some documentation were rooted in 
over-arching doctrine, and were not specific to any particular platform as the example 
below:  
  
“During this emergency, the UAS crew will attempt to reestablish communications with 
the unmanned aircraft. If contact is reestablished, the aircrew will decide whether to 
terminate the mission and return to base to preserve the asset or, based on the tactical 
situation, continue the mission as planned. At the return home side, the unmanned aircraft 
will perform the programmed flight recovery maneuver unless communications have 
been restored and the Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) commands otherwise.”  
  
This straightforward approach to lost-link troubleshooting paints a broad picture of how 
such procedures are frames. It is also likely that it relies on specific system 
documentation to further define what specific lost-link troubleshooting actions are.  




While this general standard is geared towards operation in a tactical scenario, it is 
relevant in that it points to a baseline for how lost-link troubleshooting may be handled 
with any UAS, regardless of the operating environment. This general approach 
specifies that attempts should be made to regain control, and based upon the outcome of 
those attempts; the pilot should make a decision whether to continue the flight, land, or 
terminate the flight based upon the nature of the failure. If the link cannot be re-
established, the UAS will fly its predetermined lost-link flight plan.  
     
 b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
Manned aircraft are not subject to the same constraints associated with direct control 
through a data link and therefore does not have an equivalent lost-link procedure. 
  
 c.  Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
UAS’s are unique in a loss of the command and control (C2) link can render the pilot 
unable to directly influence the flight path of the aircraft. In the event of this kind of 
failure, the options available to a UAS pilot are often limited, and the UAS typically 
reverts to a predetermined state. This state is often to return to a suitable landing location. 
 
Information relating to lost-link troubleshooting procedures for specific UAS was limited 
within the given literature. Further access to system documentation may help to fill these 
gaps. Checklists and manuals for specific UAS are expected to include any 
troubleshooting procedures and any additional information that the pilot needs to address 
a lost-link scenario, but given the nature of the systems that were evaluated for this 
literature review, this information is difficult to share due to the proprietary and/or 
confidential nature of the systems.  
  
M.  LOST-LINK PROCEDURES (following confirmation of lost link) 
 
a. Common practices between UAS  
Commonalities reflecting responses to lost-link conditions are highlighted in the higher-
level doctrine that was reviewed. Best Practices share two common practices for 
addressing lost-link scenarios. 
 
The first is in the event of a lost link, the pilot of the UAS should be in contact with ATC 
and ensure that their lost-link plan, whatever that may be, complies with any ATC 
clearance requirements. 
  
The second is UAS behaves in a predictable manner after the link is lost, often following 
a pre-planned route.  
  
In addition, FAA ATO Policy addressing lost-link scenarios further specify that specific 
transponder squawk codes should be used to broadcast a lost-link scenario to ATC 
independently of pilot radio calls.  
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Commonalities between UAS with respect to lost-link control, while not as clear in the 
literature, do exist. They all state the requirement of the UAS to follow some kind of 
“predicted flight path”. However, lost-link procedures for specific UAS may differ based 
upon operating environment and conditions. The pilot will need to ensure the lost-link 
flight plan account for terrain, weather, and any restricted airspace along the route of 
flight.  
     
b.    Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft  
Given the significant differences in how manned and unmanned aircraft are controlled, 
there are no commonalities between manned and unmanned aircraft in this respect. 
Policies propose that transponder codes be used to indicate lost-communication status of 
UAS using squawk codes. For UAS applications, this is a natural extension of common, 
accepted aviation practice that addresses the need to communicate a lost-link status 
quickly and allow ATC to adapt to the change.  
 
      c.   Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
While it is known that all UAS considered within the literature have some form of lost-
link control procedures, not all were present in the literature. This gap is largely due to 
the nature of the systems and their documentation. The procedures that were available 
varied in what the aircraft was programmed to do in the event it went lost-link. Some 
immediately climbed and headed back to landing airfield while others went into a holding 
pattern for a period of time before returning to an airfield. Other aircraft would start a 
descent to landing, while other aircraft had not logic pre-build in. 
 
N.  IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES 
 
An in-flight emergency can be generalized when other-than-normal circumstances in 
performance occur that could lead to degraded ability to aviate, navigate or communicate with 
potential for loss of aircraft or life. Based on the severity of the situation the goal is to minimize 
the impact of the emergency to prevent loss of life and resources. Due to this common goal, it is 
not surprising the standards and procedures used in manned aviation have been closely adapted 
to current UAS operations. Any significant changes noted in research were driven by technology 
constraints and not due to a change in philosophy. The greatest deviation noted in the handling of 
an in-flight emergency between manned and unmanned aircraft was in UAS procedures it was 
noted several times where the PIC was trained to make the decision to terminate or ditch the 
aircraft verse doing a forced landing which could not ensure the safety of other manned aircraft, 
resources and infrastructure on the ground, or civilian lives. Having the absence of a soul on 
board made ditching and flight termination a greater outcome potential for an in-flight 
emergency on a UAS verse a manned aircraft where ditching would be an extreme last resort 
option.  
 
1.  Propulsion failure – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
 a.  Common practices between unmanned system 
 Most UAS aircraft have been designed to get airborne and stay aloft with minimal power, 
therefore, they often have more of a glider design. The Altavian NOVA 7200 has a 12:1 glide          
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ratio and the RQ-4 Global Hawk boasts a 131-foot wingspan as examples. The nature of most 
UAS designs allow the aircraft to be able to glide at a controlled rate for relatively long 
distances over time and therefore one of the first common steps during engine failure was to 
asses’ ability to make it back to approved airfields or locate proper ditching locations. 
Though there is a sense of urgency in any emergency, a commonality between UAS 
platforms was having longer time prior to being on the ground in an engine out situation, 
allowing greater options for landing areas. 
 
 All UAS’s under the scope of this research addressed had an engine failure/engine out 
checklist or procedure. Most still maintain electrical power to be able to maintain aircraft 
control for purposes of navigating and communicating. The other common standards and 




  b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft - In-Flight Emergencies 
 This is one of the most critical emergencies that could happen during flight so it was no 
surprise that many UAS’s share similar procedures. There are many common shared 
practices.  
 
As with manned aircraft, airmanship is the number one priority. Maintain aircraft control, 
continue to navigate, and communicate when safely able to do so remains a common core 
of airmanship between manned and UAS aircraft. 
 
UAS rely heavily on detection and identification from the pilot as automation increases, 
verse flying the aircraft. Common areas included identifying a failure in a timely manner 
using indications displayed on flight instruments in the cockpit for a manned aircraft or 
ground station screen in an UAS. Identify any other systems or load shedding affected by 
losing engine propulsion. Additionally, identifying a landing sight the aircraft can safely 
glide to. 
 
Other common skills addressed under this area were pilots’ ability to reduce drag if 
applicable, communicate with ATC of the emergency to gain priority and traffic 
deconfliction while maintaining aircraft control, and squawk 7700 (this happens 
automatically on most UAS’s like the RQs). 
 
Also, the pilot of most UAS platforms researched were provided and required to 
complete engine failure/out checklists. Pilots were directed to continue to monitor 
instruments like airspeed, altitude and temperatures and with this emergency land as soon 
as possible at a suitable airfield. 
  
 c.  Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
There was no research discovered on engine restarting procedures for UAS. Though this 
research didn’t exhaust every design and UAS on the market, it can be confidently said most 
UAS’s did not have restart capability after the engine failed. This is different than many 
manned aircraft that have the ability to try to restart a failed engine.  




 One of the main themes shared in an engine out checklist for UAS was to ensure route and 
waypoints to the landing or termination were safely away from people or property. In a 
manned aircraft, though safety of civilians were noted scarcely upon picking a suitable 
runway, there were no noted implications/restrictions of picking a flight path to that location 
over areas of population. This is logical as the difference is the consideration of getting souls 
on board safely to landing verse no consideration of souls on board in a UAS and therefore 
less risk should be taken to secure a landing for a UAS. 
 
The S in UAS is for systems, which speaks to the architecture of unmanned flight. There is 
Mission Control elements and ground support built into the architect. A pilot on a manned 
aircraft only needs to relay the emergency to ATC prior to landing. The UAS operator will 
also inform mission commanders, SOF (supervisor of flight), ground support crews and time 
permitting may even call a response center. Some larger contractors make response centers 
available which has on call experts to help troubleshoot information. In some UAS 
infrastructures there are different landing/takeoff control elements (LRE) and/or pilots that 
would need to be coordinated with quickly to “catch’ the aircraft on final. Often there are 
more resources and members involved in a UAS emergency then the single pilot flying in a 
manned aircraft would have access to. 
 
  On manned aircraft, there will be a quick check of seat backs in the most upright position and 
secure seat belts/harnesses. These steps would not be required on an unmanned aircraft. 
 
There was no research discovered on fuel jettison procedures for the UAS’s under the scope 
of this research. Though for engine-on emergencies, included in the checklist were burn-
down fuel procedures as the unmanned platform would be able to maintain altitude to afford 
the opportunity to lessen weight on the landing, it was not noted in any of the procedures for 
engine-out. This was a listed for consideration in manned aircraft engine-out procedures 
 
2.  Emergency Descent – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
a.  Common practices between UAS 
 UAS architecture allows for other members to help decrease task saturation during an 
emergency. The ground station affords access of resources outside of the virtual cockpit. 
Most platforms had other personnel readily available during operations to include a sensor 
operator, mission commander, and shelter maintenance personnel. These crewmembers can 
be delegated to execute tasks such as obtaining weather, communicating with ATC and other 
outside agencies, pulling up airfield diagrams, reading checklists, etc., to allow the pilot to 
remain focused on maintaining positive aircraft control, monitoring other aircraft systems 
and navigating to a landing area. Some UAS platforms additionally have extra pilots already 
on site to provide physiological breaks during the course of the sortie. 
 
As with normal en-route descents, requirements reviewed for UAS indicated a focus on the 
ability of the PIC to anticipate the airspeed, altitude, and heading of future waypoints and to 
plan their descent accordingly while monitoring system health (e.g. pitch indications, proper 
airspeed and altitude responses, vertical speed and engine indicators). A noted difference 
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
A-30 
found was based on the level of autonomy assisting in the descent. In an emergency situation 
a pilot must be aware of built in actions points along the mission route that may trigger 
additional actions based on the state or contingency the aircraft is in. Noted on one UAS 
platform, when put into a C-3 condition (emergency condition), the aircraft automatically 
shuts down the engine upon reaching the Initial Approach Point (IAP), which eliminates the 
ability for the aircraft to execute a missed approach. It is crucial the pilot is aware of these 
action points and has the knowledge to override them when absolutely necessary.  
 
b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
 Both unmanned and manned systems standards and procedures call for the PIC to understand 
and operate within the performance envelope of their aircraft. The need to plan descents with 
future waypoints or procedures in mind while monitoring system health is also universal. 
This remains true in an emergency with the caveat of working with ATC to gain traffic 
priority in the descent to ensure aircraft can maneuver to quickly get on the ground, 
especially in cases where the longer airborne the more exasperated the emergency becomes 
such as a fuel or other fluid leak. 
 
 
c.    Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
As earlier mentioned on some UAS platforms, the mission control ground station pilot is not 
the same as the take-off/landing control ground station pilot, as earlier referred to as split 
operations. Though these systems are capable of having the mission control pilot land the 
aircraft, it can come at a degradation of capability and/or skill. The take-off and landing 
ground station (LRE) is the only ground station with line of sight links such as UHF LOS. 
This allows more immediate control from the pilot’s command to the aircraft maneuvering. 
The mission control ground station (MCE) uses beyond line-of-sight links, which have a 
delay between pilot’s command and aircraft maneuver. In a critical environment where LOS 
links are available, it is desirable to have the LRE station and pilot fly the aircraft for descent 
and landing to have the most immediate response to pilot’s input. Therefore, unlike manned 
aviation, in regular procedures and emergency the LRE pilot and ground station would be 
brought on line and “catch” the aircraft, time permitting, which would require the extra step 
of doing a “hand-over” brief from one pilot and station to the other.  
 
Other UAS platforms, there are often different currencies and/or certifications, which vary 
from platform to platform. There is the potential the pilot in control during the cruise/mission 
phase when an emergency arises that requires the aircraft to be landed as soon as possible is 
non-current and/or not certified to land the aircraft. In this case a hand-off to a certified or 
current pilot would be the normal practice, time permitting. In a manned aircraft, the pilot 
would have all required certifications and currencies and the only equivalent practice would 
be to have the most experienced/skilled pilot fly the aircraft, if more than one is available.  
 
 Some UAS platforms have a ground observer as part of their architecture. In lieu of a full-
motion video capability (FMV) these platforms rely on a spotter to verify the aircraft is lined 
up on the correct landing runway, in the correct configuration and glide pattern, and the 
runway/taxi area is cleared of people and other obstacles. In a landing emergency, it will be 
important to get the visual observer back out on the airfield to perform these duties. If the 
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visual observer is unavailable, at locations where there is a control tower, coordination can be 
made with the tower to be the visual observer.  
 
 As mentioned earlier under in-flight emergencies, the emergency descent of a UAS as a 
glider designed aircraft often would have more time in the descent to run full checklists and 
seek the assistance of the Mission Commander and other resources to help with checklist 
execution and communications with ATC. There could be multiple airmen helping to resolve 
the problem to safely get the aircraft recovered verse a manned aircraft where the pilot may 
be the only person available responsible for obtaining weather, ATIS, communicate with 
ATC, study approach and landing, etc. and therefore have the potential to become more 
greatly task saturated under emergency situations. 
 A manned aircraft takes an exponential amount of attention verse a UAS to maintain positive 
aircraft control. Parameters such as radius of turns ¼ to 1/3 mile from reference points, bank 
angles to not exceed 60 degrees, establish 68 KIAS on descent, maintain step altitudes on 
descent +/-100 feet, airspeed +0/-10 knots, are all criteria which require tentativeness and 
skill that can be compromised when dealing with other emergency situations that also require 
extra procedures, steps, or monitoring. The automation built into some UAS platforms and 
preprogrammed mission points allows the aircraft to automatically maintain the correct 
airspeed, altitude and performance parameters allowing the pilot to monitor verse control 
which decreases task saturation. 
 
 Manned aircraft requirements also have considerations that would generate an emergency 
descent not necessary for UAS. Depressurization and cockpit smoke are examples, 
additionally during the descent the requirement to maintain positive load factors was 
addressed only in manned operations. 
 
3.  Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
  
Communication – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
a.  Common practices between UAS 
In general, there were no common practices identified on communications during an 
emergency across platforms. The expectations remained the same as normal operations and 
aligned with 14 CFR 91.129 (i). 
 
The communication between the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission 
Control Element (MCE) remain essential in an emergency ensuring smooth transition of 
aircraft control and to keep updated on any changes in expected times for the scheduled, or 
non-scheduled transition to occur.  
 
Few platforms required establishing notification procedures and communication connectivity 
between the operation center and emergency airfields as well as making contact with those 
able to ensure the landing runway was clear of personnel/aircraft/and equipment.  
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For UAS that do not fly BLOS, the need for the operator and observer landing to remain co-
located and communicate verbally remain in an emergency. 
 
b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
In general, there were no additional common guidance and requirements identified on 
communications during emergency but the expectation to continue 14 FR 91.129 (i) 
requirements listed below. 
 
UAS and manned aircraft both require an operator to exhibits the knowledge, and skills to 
communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) for clearances and procedures within the 
National Airspace System (NAS). The skill to use and understand the proper phraseology and 
to correctly copy, read back, interpret, and comply with an ATC clearance is common 
between platforms.  
Knowledge and skills are required to correctly set up communication frequencies, navigation 
systems and transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance along with monitoring 
proper frequencies, including emergency frequencies. 
 
c.  Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
Manned aviation systems do not have unmanned aircraft systems remote split operations. 
This adds an additional layer of communication during emergency landing between the 
landing crew and mission crew with UAS’s of this capability.  
  
  UAS’s, which have sensor operators or other crewmembers that provide additional back up 
during landings, become even more critical during an emergency. Some platforms the sensor 
operator is to notify the pilot of air traffic conflict or deviations in altitude. Additionally, each 
aircrew member will monitor the crew intercom and aircraft radio to maximum extent 
possible. 
  
The ground stations have the ability to use a telephone. It is procedure for the MQ-1/9 and 
other platforms to minimize uses during critical phases of flight.  
 
The sensor operator or additional crewmembers afforded to a UAS pilot during an 
emergency also will inform the pilot of any additional caution and warning messages.  
 
In the case of some UAS platforms, such as the RQ-4, an emergency mission plan with 
predetermined routes and altitudes are programmed into the aircraft logic. A pilot must be 
able to determine what contingency the aircraft is in and accurately predict what actions the 
aircraft will take, to include direction of turn, altitude it will climb or descend to during 
phases of flight, and the emergency flight route. 
 
Approach – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
  
a.  Common practices between UAS 
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 There were no common practices between UAS for emergency procedures during an 
approach. The research concludes in an emergency; the common approach requirements 
remain the same as normal operations listed below time permitting: 
1. Verify fuel/flight time in case of go-around 
 
2. Review approaches and go-around options via chart or mission planning tools 
 
3. Review and establish descent rates, weather, obstacles, etc. prior to commencing 
approach. 
 
b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
   During this phase of flight, approach to landing, the UAS and manned aircraft share the 
common goal of transitioning safely to landing and therefore the procedures are aligned in 
regard to executing checklist, receive proper ATC clearance to continue on approach and be 
aware of all go-around/missed approach procedures. 
   
 c.  Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
There are several unique procedures between manned and unmanned aircraft. The unmanned 
procedures in some cases reference mission planning tools whereas manned procedures do 
not use a mission planner or GCS. 
 
 In a UAS, the pilot can identify and seek waiver authority in the case of an emergency for 
landing below minimum weather or other stated requirements. 
 
 The UAS pilot will ensure if unable to comply with the missed approach routing or climb 
requirements, coordination for alternate climb out instructions are made which ensures 
obstacle clearance. 
 
 For an engine out emergency, a UAS pilot will identify safest ditching/termination point if a 
safe landing can’t be made while on the approach, or when directed to abort landing/go-
around by ATC due to safety of life or resources. 
 
For UAS’s that do not include approach procedures, a standard approach procedure should be 
developed with standard and emergency approach methods included. 
 
Touchdown – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
a.  Common practices between UAS 
 There were no specific procedures or standards noted in landing with an emergency besides 
the execution of all emergency and landing checklist prior to landing. There continued to be 
verbiage about UAS not landing in areas where potential life or resources could be put in 
danger.  
 
b.  Common between UAS and manned aircraft 
 For aircraft that included procedures for landing, the procedures were similar between UAS 
and manned. Both required the aircraft be configured for the landing phase, review and 
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completion of landing checklists, communicate and verify ground crews were ready, confirm 
clearance with ATC was given, and then initiated the landing. 
 
When conditions permitted, completion of both emergency and normal landing checklists 
were expected. 
 
c.  Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
 Due to the lack of procedures for landing in both manned and unmanned, no unique 
differences can be highlighted.  
 
Ditching Site Selection – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
a.  Common practices between UAS 
 Ditching an aircraft, for the purposes of this research, is an aircraft that is still able to 
maintain some level of positive control while landing, but unable to safely make a designated 
or approved  aircraft-landing surface. Ditching, verse flight termination, also assumes 
an attempt is being made to minimize damage to the aircraft and/or safety of the crew on 
board. Only common standard and requirement noted in the very few UAS’s that had 
standards or procedures for ditching were to ensure the primary site selected would not 
endanger personnel or property on the ground.  
 
b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
 There were very specific ditching procedures for manned aircraft based on type of aircraft 
and ability to carry passengers and/or cargo. However, no commonalities were found 
between UAS and manned operations, mostly due to the lack of procedures and standards for 
UAS ditching. 
 
c.   Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
The requirement to not ditch in a place where any risk property or safety of life could be 
jeopardized was not a stated standard or procedure for manned aircraft. 
 
Manned aircraft ditching procedures also included securing cargo and briefing passengers, to 
include proper impact positions and emergency exit procedures upon landing. Water ditching 
had additional requirements on releasing and using safety rafts for manned aircraft. These 
would not be procedures necessary to be adopted by current larger-than-small UAS 
platforms. 
     
Flight Termination – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
a.  Common practices between UAS 
 Flight termination for this research is when an aircraft is purposefully put into a spin or other 
unrecoverable flight parameter to ensure the aircraft impacts the desired area. Unlike 
ditching, the aircraft is expected to be a complete loss. The choice to terminate is most often 
due to the aircraft not being controllable for landing, or a suitable airfield cannot be made 
safely given the remaining battery supply and/or altitude. Technology for UAS to flight 
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terminate was different from platform to platform. The commonality was the emphasis to 
find a location that ensured safety of other aircraft, resources, and life. 
 
b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
 There were no flight termination procedures or standards available for manned aircraft. The 
closest procedure a manned aircraft would have is to put the aircraft into an intentional spin 
to minimize distance it would fly prior to impacting the ground, thus providing more 
assurance of it crashing where desired. However, with a person in the aircraft it would be 
assumed a ditching option would be selected over a flight termination, as this would also 
translate into a life termination procedure as well. 
 
c.   Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
  None were noted as there were no termination standards or procedures for manned aircraft 
discovered in this research to compare to. 
 
4.  Uncontrolled flight (where real time human pilot input, either manual or through  
     automated systems, has no effect on the aircraft attitude or flight path.) – [In-Flight   
     Emergencies] 
 
a.  Common practices between UAS 
 UAS platforms rely on a control links such as UHF, SATCOM, KU and/or Inmarsat to be 
able to relay commands. A common procedure when a pilot has no ability to change aircraft 
attitude or flight path is to switch over to another control link if available to help troubleshoot 
the lack of response.  
 There are various degrees of automation in UAS platforms and uncontrolled flight can be 
causal due to control link failure, mechanical failure, or pilot error. In all cases it is up to the 
UAS operator to troubleshoot the cause and try to put the aircraft back into the controlled 
flight envelope. 
 
 There were no commonalities between procedures across UAS in regards to recovering an 
aircraft from uncontrolled flight. Data that was found for uncontrolled flight situations was 
very limited. There were checklists in several UAS and others that addressed troubleshooting 
to regain command control. Spin and stall recovery checklist were present in a few 
publications. In one highly autonomous UAS the pilot doesn’t have the ability to recover the 
aircraft outside of controlled flight and only had checklist for mechanical and control link 
failures. The automation levels were too divergent across platforms to draw common 
practices. Some platforms autonomously control all of its flight parameters such as rate of 
climb, turn, and level-off, while others are flown with a stick and rudder.  
 
b.  Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
 The inability to control aircraft attitude or flight path for manned aircraft is due to either a 
mechanical failure of a control surface or the aircraft was flown outside its parameters to 
maintain controlled flight (stall or a spin). The only common procedures found between UAS 
and manned were in regards to uncontrolled flight caused by the aircraft being flown outside 
its parameters to maintain controlled flight.  
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Unusual flight attitudes that can lead to uncontrolled flight can result from stress, high 
workload, task saturation, and distractions. These contributors are experienced by both UAS 
and manned pilots. 
 
c.   Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
 The automation levels of some UAS aircraft were designed to keep it in its flight envelope. 
More developed UAS platforms have constant feedback from numerous sources to eliminate 
the pilot from being able to stall or put the aircraft in a spin. It will override commands from 
the pilot to increase/decrease power, increase/decrease climb/descent, or increase rate of turn. 
It uses optimal performance data while flying and pilots can only direct final altitude, final 
heading. The level of automation eliminated a pilot from being able to command the aircraft 
into an uncontrolled flight parameter unless flight termination was selected. 
 
 Manned aircraft have the benefit of the pilot in the aircraft using all senses while flying. A 
pilot can feel when the aircraft it climbing, descending and/or turning. This is not a benefit a 
pilot sitting in a ground station has. It can be concluded it is easier for a pilot in a manned 
aircraft to sense he/she is approaching an uncontrolled flight situation, or is in an 
uncontrolled flight situation, verse a person staring at a screen who may be distracted at 
looking at weather, chat windows, moving map, or other external factors.  
 
 There are physiological situations that can lead a manned aircraft into an unusual attitude 
and/or uncontrolled flight such as spatial disorientation or the leans. These are not generally 
concerns for a UAS pilot operating out of a ground station.  
 
5. Navigation (GPS or other navigation system) failure – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
a.   Common practices between UAS 
 UAS technology and platform reliance on internal navigation varied so widely, to include 
redundancy and back-up systems that no commonality could be assessed. There was a varied 
degree of possible safe recovery of aircraft based on navigation failure. 
 
b.   Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft 
 UAS and manned aircraft have procedures to use external references and ATC radar to assist 
in location of the aircraft and use pilotage to get to landing area. The use of ground data 
azimuth and dead reckoning is similar with platforms. Computing time, distance, and 
heading for each leg of flight route, and using assistance of ATC radar or visual observer was 
shared between platforms. 
 
c.   Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems  
 There were a few systems that had built in contingencies for loss of navigation. One UAS 
researched will enter into a 20-degree roll, orbiting clockwise, maintaining current altitude. 
The aircraft would descend as it maintained a 20-degree roll until it reaches the surface if it 
doesn’t regain GPS inputs. Another UAS researched will also enter an orbit if it loses all 
internal navigation inputs. This is a design to allow time to troubleshoot the navigation 
problem.  
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A unique difference between most UAS and manned aircraft is once a manned aircraft has 
successfully reached a landing field after a loss of internal navigation, the emergency is averted 
as the landing process in VFR conditions remains the same as standard operations. Most UAS 
platforms rely heavily on internal navigation for landing, especially those designed to land 
autonomously. To override automation and have to manually land the aircraft is still an 
emergency situation for the more autonomous platforms. 
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APPENDIX B—INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS BY TASK 
To accommodate the reader’s varied interest in the literature review during the PC-1 task of this 
research, this appendix was organized by each task concentrating on ‘Initial Recommendations”. 
Initial recommendations were not the proposed recommendations, but current research regarding 
available standards and procedures.  
A.  PREFLIGHT  
  




a. Require the pilot to become familiar with all available information concerning each 
flight, including weather, NOTAMS, flight plan, told data, alternate landing sites, and 
alternate airport fuel requirements. 
 
b. Require pilot proficiency areas in checklist usage; ability to properly identify aircraft 
discrepancies; procedures for deferring inoperative equipment; proper fuel and oil 
servicing. 
 
c. Require the pilot to perform fuel planning to ensure the aircraft is carrying enough usable 
fuel on each flight. Plan a reserve fuel based on a percentage of at least 10% of the 
planned flight time or a minimum reserve time of 30 minutes. 
 
d. Require each pilot and crew, to include visual observer, hand-over crew, launch/recovery 
specialist, and maintenance personnel to do a crew resource management check and/or 
brief to determine human factors risk for flight. 
 




a. Require the pilot to verify the functionality of the aircraft, control station, and support 
equipment through a methodological process.  
 
b. Require the pilot to evaluate the functionality of avionics, sensors, actuators, lighting, 
flight control surfaces, servo actuators, datalinks, fuel, and oil levels.  
 
c. Require the pilot to detect possible defects for aircraft, control station, and support 
equipment. 
 
d. Require the pilot to verify the functionality of the emergency/contingency mission plan. 
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e. Require the pilot to verify the UAS meets the minimum equipment list for flight. 
 
f. For UAS with multiple crewmembers, verify the functionality of communication 
systems.  
 
g. Require the pilot to document any defects noted, limitations as a result of missing or non-
functional equipment on a standardized form. 
 
h. Require the pilot to document the completion of the preflight inspection.  
 
i. Require the pilot be able to use radios and demonstrate use of correct verbiage when 
getting current ATIS information and requesting engine start/clearance on request with 
airport ground control. 
 
j. Require the pilot be familiar with any existing cold or hot weather starting procedures 
and/or standards for the aircraft and exercise correct action when operating inside one of 
those conditions. 
 




a. Require the pilot to establish two-way communication with ground support 
crewmembers.  
 
b. Require the pilot to perform engine starting procedures through a methodological 
process. 
 
c. Require the pilot to verify throttle position prior to engine start, if capability exists. 
 
d. Require engine health information to be monitored during engine start. In circumstances 
when a pilot is unable to establish a link connection to the aircraft to monitor engine 
health, a ground crew member is required to monitor engine health information until pilot 
establishes a link to take over these duties. 
 
e. Require the pilot to change the throttle position during an engine run to verify normal 
operating parameters at other-than-idle RPMs, if capability exists. 
 
f. Require the pilot to be able to demonstrate the ability to perform abnormal starting 
procedures. 
 
g. Require the pilot to be able to demonstrate the ability to detect unsafe engine parameters. 
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h. Require the pilot to be able to immediately shut off the engine, if required. 
 




a. Require the pilot to determine if ice exists or if de-icing procedures are required prior to 
taxi operations. 
 
b. Require the pilot to communicate with ATC to receive taxi instructions. 
 
c. Require the pilot to set the UAS avionics systems correctly and in a methodological 
manner. 
 
d. Require the pilot to correctly set the flight instruments. 
 
e. Require the pilot to perform a pre-taxi briefing to all crewmembers. 
 
B. TAXI  
 




a. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of 
flight.  
 
b. Require the pilot to communicate with ATC using proper and accepted terminology. 
 
c. Require the pilot to taxi in accordance with ATC instructions. 
 
d. Require the pilot to perform a brake check as soon as safely can be executed based on 
aircraft technical data. 
 
e. Require the pilot to be able to perform a full stop at any given time, whether self-initiated 
or directed to do so by ATC or visual observer. 
 
f. Require the pilot to maintain a reliable datalink with the aircraft. Pilot shall be able to 
perform a switch link procedure to use the most reliable datalink when capabilities exist. 
 
g. Require the pilot to use visual aids to taxi or be in two-way communication with visual 
observer. 
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h. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to have two-way communication with the 
marshaller. 
 
i. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to taxi at a normal walking speed. If a safety 
observer is in a follow-vehicle, pilot shall taxi at a safe speed for conditions. 
 
j. Require the pilot or visual observer to recognize hazards on the taxiway surface. 
 
k. If the pilot is using Full Motion Video for taxi and loses sight of the taxiway centerline, 
the pilot must be able to stop the aircraft until visual contact with the centerline is 
reacquired. 
 
l. Require the pilot to taxi at safe speeds for conditions present. 
 
m. Require the pilot to taxi at a safe distance from other aircraft. 
 
n. Require the pilot have knowledge of limitations for taxi for their airframe to include 
wind, temperature and RVR. 
 
C. TAKEOFF  
 




a. Require, prior to taking the runway, that the pilot clears the approach path and runway 
through visual observer or other means. 
 
b. Require the pilot to communicate using standard aviation/ATC phraseology, and adhere 
to standard ATC “read-back” requirements. 
 
c. Require communication with a controlling agency prior to takeoff; following instrument 
departure communication procedures as appropriate 
 
d. Ensure that a contingency is in place for a radio communications failure and that the pilot 
is proficient in its implementation. 
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a. Require the pilot to make a final check of aircraft systems and configuration prior to 
requesting permission from ATC for takeoff (aircraft flaps, communications and 
datalinks, engine, and other required equipment). 
 
b. Require the pilot or visual observer perform a final check of runway and airspace prior to 
initiating the takeoff run to ensure the runway and flightpath is clear of traffic. 
 
c. Require the pilot to check solid command and control links prior to initiating takeoff. 
 
d. Require pilot to acknowledge takeoff clearance in communications with ATC once 
takeoff approval has been received. 
 
e. Require pilot to monitor the aircraft performance indications during the takeoff roll. 
 
f. Require the pilot maintains runway heading. 
 
g. Require the pilot to have knowledge of performance indications and verify engine is at 
full power and operating within established parameters. 
 
h. Require pilot to monitor primary navigation or critical aircraft systems. Pilot must be able 
to recognize and perform proper procedures if aircraft falls outside of performance 
envelope. 
 
i. Require the pilot to demonstrate proper ability to perform and abort the takeoff shall a 
safety critical failure occur during the takeoff roll.  
 




a. Require the use of ground personnel to assist in takeoff if the UAS is not equipped with 
sensors that allow for the pilot to visually ensure that taxiways, runways, and parking 
locations are clear of traffic prior to takeoff.  
 




a. Require the pilot to recognize when an aborted takeoff is required per technical guidance. 
 
b. The pilot must know the minimum required airspeeds at which the UAS may be 
controlled while still on the ground or when out of ground effect and flying. 
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c. Require the pilot to maintain control of the UAS upon initiating an abort. This includes 
maintaining glide speeds and executing appropriate maneuvers in the event of an airborne 
abort. 
 
d. The pilot must know the airport environment, including the available runway distance 
and obstacles within 30° of the runway heading. 
 
e. Require the pilot to communicate an aborted takeoff to ATC when safety permits. 
 
f. Require the pilot to confirm with visual observer if it is safe to taxi clear of the runway 
(hot brakes, smoke from engine, or other indications the aircraft needs to be shutdown 
immediately). 
 
g. Pilot must be familiar with airport protocol when declaring an emergency for shutdown 
on runway and request assistance as necessary from fire department. 
 
h. Pilot will contact maintenance or tow crew to expedite removing aircraft from runway 
when it is unable to be taxied after an abort or landing. 
 
D. CLIMB-OUT   
 




a. Require the pilot to be familiar with the climb performance of the UAS being flown, 
including all relevant V-speeds (V1, VROT, VX, and VY). 
 
b. The pilot must know the climb limitations of the UAS for the purpose of obstacle 
avoidance. 
 
c. Require the pilot to be proficient in instrument flight rules, in this case, departure 
procedures (SIDs and Obstacle Departures). 
 
d. Require the pilot to possess relevant instrument departure plates and necessary charts 
within the control station. 
 
e. Require the pilot be able to execute climb-out checklist instructions such as raise the gear 
and flaps as required. 
 
f. Require the pilot to be capable of complying with ATC guidance to include, switching 
the radio to departure, and/or turn/climb/level-off to directed heading/altitude. 
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E.  EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS  
 




a. During all phases of flight, the operator must be aware of, and be able to monitor 
communication frequencies for ATC and comply with ATC clearance. 
 
b. During the transition portions of the en-route phase the operator must have the 
knowledge and skills to communicate with the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) or 
the Mission Control Element (MCE), which ever one is applicable. 
 
c. Pilot must be able to execute proper hand-over procedures between PIC and/or 
LRE/MCE shelters. 
 




a. Pilot shall demonstrate the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of installed 
electronic navigation system(s), elements related to navigation systems and radar 
services, and elements related to pilotage and dead reckoning. 
 
b. Pilot shall demonstrate knowledge of responsibilities associated with accepting an ATC 
clearance to include proper use of aviation phraseology, methods used to obtain an ATC 
clearance, knowledge of ATC airspace requirements, and read back ATC clearance. 
 
c. Pilot shall demonstrate knowledge of RNAV, RNP, and TCAS procedures along with 
knowledge of transponder (Mode(s) A, C, and S) and navigation publications and 
databases.  
 
d. Pilot shall demonstrate proper knowledge of lost communication procedures, and terrain 
clearance requirements associated with en-route navigation procedures. 
 
e. Pilot shall demonstrate appropriate knowledge and use of the airborne electronic 
navigation system, and be able to locate the airplane’s position using available and 
appropriate navigation system(s).  
f. Pilot shall demonstrate skill to navigate by means of precomputed headings, 
groundspeeds, and elapsed time. Additional navigations skills include being able to 
recognize and describe the indication of station, or waypoint passage, and verify 
airplane’s position within prescribed nautical miles of flight planned route.  
 
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
B-8 
g. Pilot shall be able to recognize navigation signal loss and be able to take appropriate 
action. 
 
h. Pilot must correctly set up communication frequencies, navigation systems and 
transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance. 
 
i. Pilot must establish two-way communication with the proper controlling agency, in a 
timely manner, and use standard phraseology. 
 
j. Pilot shall have the ability to identify, assess and mitigate risks, encompassing 
automation management for task management, degraded awareness, limitations of 
navigation systems, and avoidance of automation distractions. 
 




a. PIC must understand climb performance of the aircraft and how to adjust it when able. 
 
b. PIC must be able to notify ATC if aircraft climb performance does not meet minimum 
standards for instrument flight.  
 




a. Pilot must understand descent performance of the aircraft and how to adjust it. 
 
b. Pilot must understand and be able to operate within aircraft operating limitations. 
 
c. Pilot must be able to execute all descent checklists, to include hand-off checklists with 
LRE. 
 
d. Pilot must have the knowledge and ability to communicate with ATC with request to 
conduct en-route descent.  
 




a. During all phases of flight, the operator must be aware of and able to monitor aircraft 
performance such as range and endurance.  
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b. Pilot must exhibit satisfactory knowledge, risk management, and skills associated with 
IFR departure, en-route, and arrival operations. 
 
c. Pilot must understand and be able to utilize alternate power sources and related 
limitations associated with their uses. 
 
d. Operator must understand various conditions that may affect range and endurance of an 
aircraft and be able to stay within aircraft and regulatory limitations. 
 
e. Operator must be able to determine the effect of cruise performance on the aircraft shall 
airspeed, altitude, or other variables change en-route. 
 
f. Operator must be able to determine new performance capabilities/limitations if a flight 
plan is altered due to change in purpose of flight, directed by ATC, or an emergency 
arises. 
 
F.  LANDING 
 
1. Initial Descent 
   
Initial Recommendations 
 
a. The pilot must establish two-way radio communications with the ATC facility providing 
air traffic services prior to entering that airspace and thereafter maintain those 
communications while within that airspace. 
 
b. Due to the current nature of UAS operations it may be necessary to create more detailed 
procedures with guidance for controlled and uncontrolled airspace and operations with 
specific step by step guidance on contact and clearance procedures.  
 






a. Pilot shall be aware of aircraft performance and the environment requirements of which 
they are transitioning through.  
 
b. If a visual observer is required for landing to confirm configuration, proper runway 
alignment, and visually clear the approach path and landing runway, pilot must establish 
contact and be able to give an arrival time to ensure member is in place. 
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c. Pilot will contact maintenance and inform them of estimated land time in order to tow 
aircraft when required or assist in parking/shutdown as needed. 
 




a. Pilot must be able to execute all appropriate checklist associated with descent and before 
landing. 
 
b. Pilot must be able to access proper weather sources for updates to landing airfield, to 
include current altimeter setting and winds.  
 
c. Pilot must be able to communicate with ATC using proper terminology to request desired 
approach, state intentions (landing, touch-and-go), and receive approval to commence 
and continue approach. 
 
d. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of 
flight.  
 




a. Pilot must be able to execute all applicable landing checklists. 
 
b. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing weather minimum criteria and be able to identify 
alternate airfields if outside the required minimums. 
 
c. Pilot must be able to brief and execute missed approach or go-around procedures when 
applicable. 
 
d. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing fuel requirements and know when to declare 
minimum and emergency fuel to landing controller. 
 
e. Pilot must be able to recognize when aircraft is outside of landing parameters and be able 
to execute a successful missed approach procedure. 
 
f. Pilot must be knowledgeable of the proper landing configuration and verify aircraft is 
configured to land. 
 
g. Pilot must be able to communicate with ATC using proper terminology and read back to 
receive permission to land aircraft. 




h. Pilot must be able to communicate with ground support crew to ensure landing 
configuration and proper alignment when applicable.  
 
i. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of 
flight.  
 
5.  Landing (Automated Approach and Landing) - [Landing] 
 
a. Pilot must be able to execute all applicable landing checklists. 
 
b. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing weather minimum criteria and be able to identify 
alternate airfields if outside the required minimums. 
 
c. Pilot must be able to recognize criteria for an autonomous go-around and communicate 
those procedures with ATC when the aircraft executes a go-around.  
 
d. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing fuel requirements and know when to declare 
minimum and emergency fuel to landing controller. 
 
e. Pilot must be able to take over manually from an autonomous landing when directed to 
by ATC or safety dictates.  
 
f. Pilot must be knowledgeable of system limitations and know when a command to go-
around will be denied by the aircraft based on too low of an altitude.  
 
g. Pilot must be knowledgeable of the proper landing configuration and verify aircraft is 
configured to land. 
 
h. Pilot must be able to communicate with ATC using proper terminology and read back to 
receive permission to land aircraft. 
 
i. Pilot must be able to communicate with ground support crew to ensure landing 
configuration and proper alignment when applicable.  
 





a. Standard checklist for UAS landing procedures is developed for each variant of landing, 
size, and category that may be used as a standard for customization. 
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a. Pilot must be able to determine risk and initiate a missed approach procedure when 
required. 
 
b. Pilot must be able to communicate intent with ATC during a go-around and comply with 
ATC guidance when safely able.  
 
c. Pilot must be able to apply proper, smooth power and correct climb attitude during a go-
around. 
 
d. Pilot must be able to climb to a safe altitude 
 
e. Pilot must be able to reposition the aircraft to begin approach, transition to alternate 
landing area or request holding airspace to troubleshoot a malfunction. 
 
f. Pilot must be able to execute proper checklist associated with a go-around procedure. 
 




a. Pilot must establish two-way communication with ground support crew. 
 
b. Pilot must be able to brief ground support crew on standards for landing and post-landing 
procedures. 
 
G.  POST LANDING  
 




a. Pilots must be able to use correct terminology and request permission to taxi clear of 
runway, and continue taxi to parking.  
 




a. Pilot shall verify with ground crew the location of parking and ensure the safety of that 
location from damage or conflict of other aircraft. 




b. Pilot shall communicate with ground crew to secure the aircraft. 
 
c. Pilot shall be able to conduct shutdown checklists and post flight operations. 
 
d. Pilot shall communicate the shutdown has been completed with ground crew and set a 
time for debrief as applicable. 
 
e. Pilot shall accurately pass along any information they require to fill out all post-flight 
documentation. 
 




a. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all aircraft movement.  
 
b. Require the pilot to communicate with ATC using proper and accepted terminology. 
 
c. Require the pilot to taxi in accordance with ATC instructions. 
 
d. Require the pilot to be able to perform a full stop at any given time, whether self-assed or 
directed to do so by ATC or visual observer. 
 
e. Require the pilot to maintain a reliable datalink with the aircraft. Pilot shall be able to 
perform a switch link procedure to use the most reliable datalink when capabilities exist. 
 
f. Require the pilot to use visual aids to taxi or be in two-way communication with visual 
observer. 
 
g. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to have two-way communication with the 
marshaller. 
 
h. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to taxi at a normal walking speed. If a safety 
observer is in a follow-vehicle, pilot shall taxi at a safe speed for conditions. 
 
i. Require the pilot or visual observer to recognize hazards on the taxiway surface. 
 
j. If the pilot is using FMV for taxi and loses sight of the taxiway centerline, the pilot must 
be able to stop the aircraft until visual contact with the centerline is reacquired. 
 
k. Require the pilot to taxi at safe speeds for conditions present. 
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l. Require the pilot to taxi at a safe distance from other aircraft. 
 
m. Require the pilot have knowledge of limitations for taxi for their airframe to include 
wind, temperature and RVR. 
 




a. No recommendations at this time. 
 




a. Pilot must be able to execute all engine shutdown checklists. 
 
b. Pilot must be able to communicate properly with ground support crew during engine 
shutdown procedures. 
 
c. Pilot must be able to expeditiously shutdown the engine in case of an emergency during 
the engine shutdown process.  
 




a. Require a pilot to be designated as the PIC at all times. 
 
b. Require the pilot to communicate to ensure safe operations. 
 
c. Require the pilot to perform all procedures in accordance with applicable publications. 
 
d. Require the pilot to perform all emergency procedures with accuracy and proficiency. 
 
e. If equipped with a sensor operator workstation for any UAS, require at least one sensor 
operator in addition to one PIC. 
 
f. Require the outgoing PIC to brief an incoming PIC prior to a transfer of control from 
within the same control station. 
 
g. Require the outgoing PIC to brief an incoming PIC prior to a transfer of control between 
different CSs. 
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I.  Control Station Handoff and Pilot Changeover during Operations 
  
Initial Recommendations  
 
a. Control station handoffs must be governed by the use of a checklist. As with manned 
platforms, positive transfer of control must be confirmed before the control station 
handoff is complete.  
 
b. Pilot assuming control of the UAS has a complete understanding of all facets of the 
situation, including ATC clearance, any anomalies with the system, and other mission-
relevant items deemed appropriate by the operating entity.  
 
c. Control station handoff procedures will exercise concise communication protocols, 
conducted in a sterile environment, consistent with a critical phase of flight.  
 
d. For crew changeovers, operating entities establish a standard changeover brief, to include 
at a minimum, UAS health and status, ATC clearances, any changes in mission 
requirements, and changes in normal aircraft configurations and standards (C-1 timer) or 
other areas deemed appropriate by the RPIC or operating entity.  
 
J.  Operations during Command and Control Degradation and Loss 
 
Initial Recommendations  
 
a. Additional information is required to make recommendations.  
 
K.  Operations during Periods of Limited Data from Aircraft relating to Attitude, 




a. If equipped, Pilot is able to use FMV during sensor degradation.  
 
b. If equipped, the pilot must independently manage multiple telemetry datalinks. 
 
c. Pilot must be able to plan for terrain masking that may inhibit the control station from 
receiving downlink telemetry. 
 
d. Pilot must be capable of using multiple instruments to understand the aircraft’s status. 
 
e. Pilot must be able to prioritize most-to-least critical emergency procedures, shall multiple 
emergencies exist when operations during degraded sensory cues exists.  
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f. Pilot must be able to record the last known UA position, heading, airspeed, and calculate 
the proper heading and time required to navigate to a recovery point. 
 
g. Pilot is required to consider winds at altitude to set a proper heading to return to normal 
operations.  
 
h. If equipped with a directional ground data terminal (GDT), pilot is required to use GDT 
azimuth and dead reckoning icons to aid in navigation and maintain aircraft position. 
 
i. Pilot must understand when conditions of partial or full loss of sensory cues exist.  
 
L.  Lost-Link Troubleshooting Procedures 
  
Initial Recommendations  
 
a. Pilot will be able to communicate with ATC upon encountering a lost-link; clearly 
communicate the outcome of troubleshooting and the actions taken as a result. 
 
b. Pilot is required to be able to troubleshoot procedures to first address the possibility of re-
establishing the command link. 
 
c. Pilot is able to accurately predict the aircraft’s initial preprogrammed action to going lost-
link. 
 
d. Pilot is able to accurately assess, when applicable, the time the aircraft shall arrive to a 
landing airfield, to include the flight path and altitude aircraft will transverse to 
destination and communicate to ATC those actions in order for traffic clearance.  
 
e. Pilot once establishing link will be able to properly asses when the flight may be 
continued, or when the flight must be aborted.  
 
M.  Lost-Link Procedures (following confirmation of lost link) 
 
Initial Recommendations  
 
a. Require that the pilot be able to communicate lost link procedures to ATC.  
 
b. Require the pilot to communicate last known UAS status to ATC (Altitude, heading, 
destination, lost-link flight plan, location, etc.) and expected response to lost link (i.e., 
rout of flight, orbit location, landing location, etc.). 
 
c. Pilot is able to use troubleshooting method(s) available outside the control station (i.e. 
contacting off-site personnel) for the purpose of attempting to re-establish a lost link. 




d. Pilot is able to accurately assess, when applicable, the time the aircraft shall arrive to a 
landing airfield, to include the flight path and altitude aircraft will transverse to 
destination and communicate to ATC those actions in order for traffic clearance. 
 
N.  In-Flight Emergencies 
 




a. Pilot shall quickly and accurately diagnose an engine/propulsion failure. 
 
b. Pilot shall continue to maintain aircraft control and properly configure the aircraft for 
best glide ratio. 
 
c. Pilot shall quickly determine glide distance. 
 
d. Pilot shall select a suitable landing area, accurately assessing using risk management if 
landing to a runway or primary site can be completed without endangering personnel or 
property on the ground and in air. 
 
e. Pilots shall assess possible air traffic at suitable landing area. 
 
f. Pilot shall determine if no suitable landing airfield is available, the best area to make an 
off-field landing, ditch or terminate aircraft.  
 
g. Pilot shall evaluate terrain and weather conditions en-route and at suitable landing area. 
 
h. Pilot shall execute all applicable emergency checklists items per flight manual. 
 
i. Pilot shall perform crew coordination actions. 
 
j. Pilot shall ensure aircraft is squawking 7700. 
 
k. Pilot shall communicate emergency to ATC while maintaining aircraft control. 
 
l. When time permits, pilot will coordinate and communicate emergency with command 
center, ground support, and any other elements integrated into the make-up the unmanned 
system design. 
 




a. Pilot demonstrates the ability to assess priorities and execute proper division of attention. 




b. Pilot shall utilize crew resource management and delegate when appropriate to other 
crewmembers to decrease task saturation.  
 
c. Pilot must understand performance of the aircraft and how to correct when needed, to 
include any action points that may be triggered due to the state the aircraft is in. 
 
d. Pilot will ensure aircraft is configured properly for emergency descent procedures. 
 
e. Pilot will communicate with ATC to ensure all aviation traffic is cleared through the path 
of emergency descent. 
 
f. Pilot will obtain current weather and ATIS information, to include obtaining and ensuring 
proper altimeter setting at landing area. 
 
g. Pilot will execute all descent checklists and/or emergency descent checklists as time 
allows while maintaining aircraft control. 
 
h. Pilot will brief and perform hand-off procedures to landing pilot and or shelter as 
applicable. 
 
i. When time permits and aircraft control can be maintained, pilot will evaluate all options 
for alternate landing/termination points along descent and approach route in the event 
aircraft control cannot be maintained, runway or landing area can no longer be used due 
to safety of resources or lives or in the case of having to go missed approach.  
 
3.  Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
 Communication – Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies] 
 
 Initial Recommendations 
 
a. Pilot must be aware of and accurately communicate to ATC the emergency mission plan 
route and altitude aircraft is programmed to execute. 
 
b. Pilot shall notify ATC as soon as possible when deviating from an ATC clearance, for 
safety of flight during an emergency landing.  
 
c. Pilot shall limit communications to flight-critical information and emergency actions 
required during critical phases of flight. 
 
d. Pilot must be prepared to provide ATC nature of emergency, fuel/time available, souls on 
board and intentions to include explanation of being a UAS and level of 
control/autonomy available to comply with ATC guidance.  
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e. During the transition portions and prior to landing, the pilot must have the knowledge and 
skills to communicate with the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) if applicable. 
 
f. Due to the current nature of UAS operations it may be necessary to create more detailed 
procedures with guidance for controlled and uncontrolled airspace and operations with 
specific step-by-step guidance on contact and clearance procedures for communication of 
UAS during an emergency. 
 




a. Pilot is able to determine and execute proper emergency, before landing, and approach 
checklist. 
 
b. Pilot is able to monitor workstation and confirm proper airspeed, altitude, temperatures 
and performance parameters for approach. 
 
c. Pilot is able to determine and verify proper landing location that will protect people and 
possible property from harm.  
 
d. Pilot is able to identify minimum weather landing requirements for operations and 
confirms requirements are met. 
 
e. Pilot can identify and seek waiver authority in the case of an emergency for landing 
below minimum weather or other stated requirements. 
 
f. Pilot will ensure if unable to comply with the missed approach routing or climb 
requirements, coordination for alternate climb out instructions are made which ensures 
obstacle clearance. 
 
g. For an engine out emergency, pilot will identify safest ditching/termination point if a safe 
landing can’t be made while on the approach, or when directed to abort landing/go-
around by ATC due to safety of life or resources. 
 
h. For UAS’s that are more autonomous and fly using GPS guidance from approach to 
landing, a previously developed arrival and/or departure procedure with emergency 
approach methods included, is required. 
 




a. Exhibits satisfactory knowledge of the elements related to an approach and landing to 
include any additional emergency procedures. 
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b. Executes all appropriate emergency and landing checklists. 
 
c. Properly communicates with ATC to obtain proper landing clearance. 
 
d. Properly communicates with visual observer, when applicable, to ensure cleared 
approach path, landing surface, and departure path in the case of a go-around.  
 
e. Ensures aircraft is properly configured for landing, to include landing lights on and gear 
down.  
 
f. Pilot is aware of minimum missed approach requirements and is able to properly execute 
a missed approach. Where standards or requirements are absent, establish standards. 
 
g. Standards for UAS emergency landing procedures be developed for each variant of 
landing, size, and category that may be used as a standard that can be customized to each 
platform where such standards are absent. 
 




a. Pilot is able to execute ditching checklist. 
 
b. Pilot is able to determine a suitable ditching location that will not involve undue risk to 
personnel or property on the ground.  
 
c. Pilot will communicate with ATC about intention to ditch and location in order to keep 
traffic clear and expedite emergency vehicles and personnel to the scene.  
 
d. Where there is an absence of standards or emergency ditching checklist for UAS, 
procedures shall be developed for each variant of size and category that may be used as a 
standard to which is customizable to each platform. 
    




a. Pilot is able to execute termination checklist. 
 
b. Depending on the level of automation built in the termination procedures, pilot is familiar 
and will monitor or execute all steps for the termination sequence. 
 
c. Pilot is able to determine a suitable termination point, if not previously identified in the 
mission plan, which upon terminating will not involve undue risk to personnel or 
property on the ground.  
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d. If Pilot is unable to reach a designated termination point, the pilot will direct the 
unmanned aircraft to an unpopulated area and initiate flight termination.  
 
e. Pilot will communicate with ATC about intention to terminate and location in order to 
keep traffic clear and expedite emergency vehicles and personnel to the scene. 
 
f. Where there is an absent of standards or emergency termination checklist for UAS, 
procedures shall be developed for each variant of size and category that may be used as a 
standard to which is customizable to each platform. 
 
4.  Uncontrolled flight (where real time human pilot input, either manual or through  
     automated systems, has no effect on the aircraft attitude or flight path.) – [In-Flight  




a. Pilot shall identify systems and equipment failures and/or physiological factors that could 
lead to or hinder recovery from uncontrolled flight. 
 
b. Pilot shall be able to execute applicable checklist for control link or equipment failure. 
 
c. Pilot shall identify environmental factors that may be contributing to the uncontrolled 
flight. 
 
d. Pilot will contact ATC to declare an emergency to allow coordination for aircraft 
deconfliction. 
 
e. Development of more standardized procedures across all UAS for aircraft where real time 
human pilot input, either manual or through automated systems, has no effect on the 
aircraft attitude or flight path. 
 




a. Pilot shall understand the related systems to detect abnormal or possible emergency 
navigation situations.  
 
b. Pilot shall correctly diagnose failures and takes timely action to trouble shoot navigation 
failures. 
 
c. Pilot shall take appropriate action per checklists to recover aircraft using all internal and 
external references, to include engineers and communication specialists, and external 
controls from other shelters when available.  
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d. Pilot, when available, shall contact maintenance shelter and communication personnel to 
help troubleshoot navigation failure. 
 
e. Pilot shall execute all proper checklists and prepare for emergency landing if system can 
land without internal navigation inputs.  
 
f. Pilot will inform all applicable agencies, to include ATC, when aircraft cannot land 
without internal navigation. Pilot will provide information on predictive aircraft flight 
path to ATC so they can deconflict other traffic.  
 
Development of more standardized procedures across all UAS for aircraft where navigation 
system failure hinders the ability to get to landing airfield or land at all. 
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APPENDIX C—OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MATRIX 
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APPENDIX D—FLIGHT TEST CARDS WITH OBSERVED RESULTS 
Flight Card Description Flight Test #1 Test Case Description Perform Pre-Entering GCS & Presets 
Operational Procedures 
                     Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator 
ID 
All 





                                                   Assumption  Assumptions:  OP # Operational Procedures Validated 
                     1  UGCS operating in simulation mode  2 Presets 
                     2 Platform Specific POH is Available    
                     3       
                     4       
                                                    
     
Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / 
Not Observed/  
Not Applicable 
/ Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
2-1 Review CS maintenance 
logs. 
The CS displays 
maintenance logbook 
information to the pilot. 
Pass Checked logbook. Pass     Pass   Pass   Pass 
2-2 Resolve open discrepancies, 
as required. 
The CS displays open 
discrepancies for the pilot 
to determine if 
maintenance actions are 
required of the UA and CS. 
Pass Used an electronic 
logbook to determine 
faults. 
Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass 
2-3 Inspect control station. The pilot detects any 
deficiencies with the CS 
prior to preflight. 




Pass   Pass   Pass With limits of 
Simulation 
Pass  
2-4 Conduct an inventory of all 
appropriate publications to 
include but not limited to: 




- Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) 
- Aircraft weight and 
balance if required 
- Ensure all FAA publications 
are current  
- Ensure full FAA chart 
The CS provides the pilot a 
reference for applicable 
publications prior to 
starting the preflight 
inspection, including:                                     




- Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) 
- Aircraft weight and 
balance if required 
- Ensure all FAA 
Pass Pilot had Technical 
Manual (POH), Checklist, 
Airworthiness release, 
weight & balance sheets, 
weather forecast, and 
electronic charts loaded.  




Pass   Pass   Pass 
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coverage for the route publications are current  
- Ensure full FAA chart 
coverage for the route 
2-5 Apply power to all required 
ground control equipment. 
The pilot powers up all CS-
related equipment 
necessary for flight. 




Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass  
2-6 Verify that the control 
station and aircraft powered 
up correctly in accordance 
with the applicable POH. 
Pilot determines if the CS 
powered up correctly. 




Pass   Pass   Pass Software (Pass); 
Hardware (NE) 
Pass 
2-7 Ensure sufficient CS power 
is available for entire 
duration of operations. 
Pilot determines if the CS 
has enough power 
throughout the flight, 
including generator fuel if 
powered by a generator or 
uninterruptable backup if 
powered from a non-
generator source. 
Not Observed Only shore power was 
available.  
Not Observed   Not Performed   Not Performed   NA (simulator) 
2-8 Ensure functionality of all 
equipment as required. 
Pilot verifies the CS 
hardware and software is 
set to the correct UA 
configuration. 
Pass Performed during power 
up. 
Pass   Not Performed   Not Performed   Pass 
2-9 Load and verify all maps and 
navigation data that are 
required for flight. 
Pilot loads applicable map 
data, elevation data, and 
overlays. 
Pass Loaded and checked 
during presets. 
Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass  
2-10 Create, upload, and set 
mission plans. 
Pilot creates, uploads, and 
sets a mission plan to the 
UA. 
Pass Used Aviation Mission 
Planning System (AMPS) 
on pilot workstation. 
Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass 
2-11 Ensure that all command 
and control link equipment, 
both in the control station 
and onboard the aircraft is 
correctly configured for 
flight. 
Pilot sets control link 
equipment in CS and UA by 
establishing link and 
verifying control.  
Pass Recalled link profile. Set. 
Performed datalink 
terminal calibration. Set 
datalink terminal GPS 
location. 
Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass 
2-12 Tune all voice 
communication radios to 
the appropriate frequencies. 
The pilot sets applicable 
voice communication 
frequencies and performs a 
radio check. 
Pass Simulated setting radio 
frequencies using the 
radio head unit. 
Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass  
2-13 Verify that all required 
approach plates, en-route 
charts, and any required 
supplements are in the 
control stations and 
accessible. 
Pilot references applicable 
approach plates, en-route 
charts, and supplemental 
data within the control 
station. 
Pass Available prior to flight. 
Charts were loaded 
during preflight. 
Approach Charts were 
not used. 
Pass   Pass   Pass   Pass 
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Flight Card Description Flight Test 
#2 
Test Case Description Perform Preflight, Engine Start, 
Pre-Taxi, Taxi, and 
Communications Operational 
Procedures 
                 
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All                  
                           Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A                 
                           Assumption # Assumptions: OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
                 
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  3 Preflight                  
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  4 Engine Start                  
3 Presets have been completed  5 Pre-Taxi                  
4 Simulated ground clearance to taxi 
provided 
 6 Taxi - General                  
     7 Taxi - Communications                  
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / 
Not Observed/  
Not Applicable 
/ Suspended 
























3-1 Verify successful 
completion of any BIT. 
CS displays the result of a 
BIT test. 
Pass   Displayed BIT 
status. 
Pass   Multiple BITs 
to check 




Pass    Auto Pass   
3-2 Verify the correct function 
of the throttle control(s) as 
applicable. 
The pilot uses the CS to 
manipulate the UA's 
throttle position and 
verify functionality prior 
to engine start. 
Pass Verified ignition 
switch as cold. 
Checked ECM. 




Pass   Pass   
3-2-1 Set throttle to max The pilot uses the CS to 
manipulate the UA's 
throttle position to 
maximum and verify 
correct UA response. 
Pass Displayed BIT 
status as pass. 
Pass Co-operative 
task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-2-2 Set throttle to min The pilot uses the CS to 
manipulate the UA's 
throttle position to 
minimum and verify 
correct UA response. 
Pass Displayed BIT 
status as pass. 
Pass Cooperative 
task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-3 Set/verify altimeter. The pilot loads an 
altimeter setting of 
30.09" Hg. The pilot 
should be able to 
determine is the CS 
commanded this 




reported in GUI. 










Pass   Pass   
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D-4 
3-4 Perform IMU function 
checks. 
The pilot performs an 










task with crew 
chief 




Pass Not BIT check 
but physically 
moving UA with 
RPIC validation 
Pass   
3-5 Perform payload function 
checks, if applicable. 
The pilot performs a 
payload check to slew the 
camera 360 degrees 
around, 90 degrees down, 
and nose position. The CS 
is able to display these 
payload functions to the 
pilot. 







Pass No payload 
operator 
present 




Pass   Pass 
3-6 Perform a function check 
on all redundant command 
link systems. Ensure that all 
systems function and are 
able to do so at the levels 
required for flight. 
Pilot verifies functionality 
of all command datalinks 
prior to flight. 
Pass Link loss setting 








Pass   Pass   
3-6-1 Pilot disables backup 
control link. 
Pilot disables backup 
datalink and verifies the 
downlink telemetry 
datalink from primary link 
within the CS. Pilot 
determines a secondary 
uplink loss condition. 









Pass And antenna 
configuration 
Pass   
3-6-2 Pilot disables primary 
control link. 
Pilot disables primary 
datalink and verifies the 
downlink telemetry 
datalink from secondary 
link within the CS. Pilot 
determines a primary 
uplink loss condition. 
Pass Not performed. Not 
Observed. 
Disabled 
primary link - 
Redundant 
link takes over 




Pass   Pass   
3-6-3 Pilot disables primary and 
secondary uplink control 
links. 
Pilot disables both 
primary and secondary 
uplinks. Pilot determines 
the UA initiates link loss 
emergency mode. 
Pass Selected the 
SYS1 switch to 
off, disabling 
both datalinks. 
Pass Test by 
placing both 








Pass   Pass   
3-7 Verify correct function of 
two-way communication 
radios by performing a 
radio check with a 
controlling agency, crew, or 
visual observer as required. 
Pilot performs a two-way 
radio communications 
check with ATC, 
air/ground crew, and any 
Visual Observers. 
Pass Simulated 
setting the radio 
frequencies in 
the head unit, 
which was not 
functional in the 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass 
3-8 Verify flight controls and 
flight control surfaces are 
free and correct. 
Pilot deflects all flight 
control surfaces and 
receives confirmation of 
Pass Flight surfaces 
checked. 
Correct 
Pass   Pass Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass   Pass   










3-8-1 Set right roll. Pilot determines if the 
right aileron deflects up 
and the left aileron 
deflects down. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-2 Set left roll. Pilot determines if the left 
aileron deflects up and 
the right aileron deflects 
down. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-3 Set flaps down. Pilot determines if the 
flaps deflect down. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-4 Set flaps up. Pilot determines if the 
flaps retract back up. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-5 Set pitch down. Pilot determines if the 
elevator/ ruddervator 
deflects down. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-6 Set pitch up. Pilot determines if the 
elevator/ ruddervator 
deflects up. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-7 Set right yaw. Pilot determines if the 
rudder/ ruddervator 
deflects right. 




task with crew 
chief 
Pass Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass   Pass   








3-8-8 Set left yaw. Pilot determines if the 
rudder/ ruddervator 
deflects left. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-9 Set nose wheel left. Pilot determines if the 
nose wheel deflects left. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-8-10 Set nose wheel right. Pilot determines if the 
nose wheel deflects right. 








task with crew 
chief 




Pass   Pass   
3-9R RECOMMENDED: Verify 
any inoperative items 
found on MEL during Pre-
flight have been cleared 
and signed off.  
Pilot determines MEL 
requirements and verifies 
if any inoperative items 
are on this list. 
Pass Any BIT failure 
equated to a 
NOGO for flight 
situation.  




Pass No MEL for 
type series 
Fail 
3-9R-1 Verify navigation lights are 
functioning properly  













Pass   Pass   
3-9R-2 Verify anti-collision lights 
are functioning properly  













Pass   Pass   
3-9R-3 Verify landing lights are 
functioning properly  
Pilot turns on and off the 
landing lights. 









Pass   N/A 
3-9R-4 Verify fuel level. Pilot verifies the CS is Pass Entered the fuel Pass Fuel is based Pass Met or Pass Manually enter Pass 
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displaying the correct 
amount of fuel onboard 
the UA. 
level in GUI 
menu. 
Displayed fuel 
level in aircraft 











is based on this 
initial value and 
then burn rate. 
3-9R-5 Verify GPS functionality Pilot verifies the CS is 
displaying the correct GPS 
health, status, and 
position. 






Pass Verified in CS 
interface 




Pass   Pass   
4-1 Coordinate with 
crew/applicable personnel 
to ensure that required 
safety equipment is 
present and that the area is 
clear of hazards and non-
essential personnel. 
Pilot determines if 
required safety 
equipment is present. 
Pilot verifies the area 
around the UA is clear of 
hazards and non-essential 
personnel. 
Pass Coordinated 








Pass   Pass   
4-2 Establish communication 
with appropriate ground 
control agency and ground 
crew to coordinate engine 
start procedure, if 
required. 
Pilot communicates via 
CS-installed radios.  
Pass Coordinated 








Pass   Pass   
4-2-1 Set radio frequency to 
Redstone ATIS of 
121.25MHz. Obtain current 
altimeter.  
Pilot sets the radio to 
121.25 MHz and obtains 
current altimeter setting. 
Pass Simulated 
setting the radio 
frequencies in 
the head unit, 
which was not 
functional in the 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
4-2-2 Set radio frequency to 
Redstone Ground of 
124.8MHz and perform 
radio check.  
Pilot sets radio to 
124.8MHz and performs a 
radio check. 
Pass Simulated 
setting the radio 
frequencies in 
the head unit, 
which was not 
functional in the 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
4-2-3 Set radio frequency to an 
Internal Discrete of 
126.20MHz and perform 
radio check.  
Pilot sets radio to 
126.20MHz and performs 
a radio check with ground 
crew. 
Pass Simulated 
setting the radio 
frequencies in 
the head unit, 
which was not 
functional in the 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
4-3 Ensure that the system is 
properly configured for 
Pilot sets UA systems for 
engine start. 
Pass Checked the 
engine status 
Pass   Pass Met or 
exceeded 
Pass   Pass   
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engine start and begin 
engine start procedures. 




4-3-1 Set throttle for engine 
start. 
Pilot sets the throttle for 
engine start. 
Pass Set to idle. Pass Set within CS 
interface via 
slider 




Pass Auto Pass   
4-3-2 Set ignition switch for 
engine start. 
Pilot ensures the UA's 
ignition switch is set for 
engine start. 
Pass Enabled engine 
start switch 
from cold to hot 
from within CS. 
Coordinated 
with crew chief 




Pass Crew chief 
toggles the 
ignition switch 




Pass Crew Chief 
does this on 
actual aircraft 
based on the 
RPIC direction. 
Pass   
4-3-3 Verify glowplug status (if 
equipped) 
Pilot determines if 
glowplug (if equipped) is 
ready for engine start. 
Pass Checked in the 
engine status 
panel.  




Pass   N/A 
4-3-4 Start engine Pilot starts engine from 
CS. 
Pass Coordinated 
with crew chief 
to select UA 
starter switch to 
start 
(simulated). 








Pass Crew Chief 
does this based 
on RPIC 
direction 
Pass   
4-4 Monitor engine health 
throughout the engine 
start procedure. 
Pilot monitors engine 
instrumentation during 
engine start. 
Pass Checked engine 
health status. 
Ready to select 









Pass   Pass   
4-4-1 Monitor oil pressure. Pilot acknowledges the oil 
pressure is within 
prescribed limitations. 
Pass Checked the oil 
pressure was 
within spec.  




Pass   Pass   
4-4-2 Monitor fuel pressure. Pilot acknowledges the 
fuel pressure is within 
prescribed limitations. 
Pass Checked the 
fuel rail 
pressure was 
within spec.  




Pass   Pass   
4-4-3 Monitor coolant 
temperature. 
Pilot acknowledges the 
coolant temperature is 
within prescribed 
limitations. 
Pass Checked the 
coolant 
temperature 
was within spec.  
Pass The aircraft 
powerplant is 
air cooled 




Pass   N/A 
4-4-4 Monitor RPM. Pilot acknowledges the 
engine RPM is within 
prescribed limitations. 
Pass Checked the 
engine RPM was 
within spec.  
Pass Pilot monitors 
RPM 
Pass Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass   Pass   




4-4-5 Monitor manifold pressure. Pilot acknowledges the 
manifold pressure is 
within prescribed 
limitations. 
Pass Checked the 
manifold 
pressure was 
within spec.  
Pass Aircraft has a 
fixed-pitch 
propeller 




Pass   N/A 
4-4-6 Set warmup RPM Pilot sets the correct 
engine RPM for warmup. 
Pass Checked that 
RPM remained 
at idle for 
warmup. 
Pass Set an RPM of 
4500 for 
warmup 




Pass Auto button 
sequence 
Pass   
4-4-7 Monitor EGT temperature Pilot acknowledges the 
EGT temperature is 
within prescribed 
limitations. 
Pass Checked the 
EGT was within 
spec.  









Pass   Pass   
4-4-8 Monitor output current Pilot acknowledges the 
output current is within 
prescribed limitations. 
Pass Checked total 
system amps in 
engine status 
monitor. 
Pass Not equipped 
to read output 
current 




Pass Not available in 
system 
N/A 
4-5 Verify proper operation of 
the engine and all engine 
instrumentation. 
Pilot verifies the engine 
instrumentation is within 
required specifications.  
Pass Checked engine 
operation.  
Pass Run "snaps" 
and observe 
indications 




Pass   Pass   
4-5-1 Perform alternator check Pilot determines if the 













Pass   N/A 
4-5-2 Perform bus voltage check Pilot determines if the 
bus voltage is within the 
specified range. 










Pass   Pass   
4-6 Perform abnormal engine 
start procedures, if 
required. 
Pilot performs abnormal 
engine starting 
procedures from the CS. 










Pass   N/A 
4-6-1 Perform cold temperature 
engine start procedures 
The pilot performs a cold 
engine starting procedure 
from the CS. 












  N/A 
4-7 In the event of an 
emergency during engine 
start, perform an 
emergency engine 
shutdown. 
Pilot shuts down the 
engine. 
Pass Not required, 
but showed two 
methods to shut 
down the 
engine in the 
CS. 










5-1 Verify UA free of frost Pilot determines if pitot Pass Checked icing Pass   Not observed Met or Pass   N/E 
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and/or ice. heat/ pitot anti-icing 
system is functional. 
detector by 
coordinating 
with crew chief 











5-2 Contact ATC and request 
taxi clearance/instructions 
(if applicable). If at a non-
towered 
airport, 
communicate with other 
traffic on common traffic 
advisory frequency (CTAF) 
and/or utilize visual 
observers or other 
available means to ensure 
separation from traffic 
during taxi. 
Pilot performs two-way 
communication with ATC 
to request taxi clearance. 
Pass Performed 
(simulated).  
Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
5-3 Check all critical 
instrumentation for correct 
settings including but not 




instruments prior to taxi 




Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
5-3-1 Check flight mode 
commands 
Pilot verifies the flight 
mode commands prior to 
taxi. 
Pass Performed. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
5-3-2 Check altimeter setting Pilot verifies the current 














Pass   Pass   
5-3-3 Check GPS equipment Pilot verifies the health, 








Pass Auto   Pass 
5-4 Ensure all flight displays are 
correctly set and 
configured for flight. 
Pilot sets the correct GUI 
displays for taxi 
Pass Pulled up 
applicable 
menu. 
Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 
N/A Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass No Taxi N/A 




5-4-1 Set attitude indicator GUI Pilot sets attitude 
indicator GUI for taxi 
Pass Checked. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
5-4-2 Set airspeed indicator GUI Pilot sets airspeed 
indicator GUI for taxi 
Pass Checked. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
5-4-3 Set altitude indicator GUI Pilot sets altitude 
indicator GUI for taxi 
Pass Checked. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




  No Taxi N/A 
5-4-4 Set UA location on location 
display 
Pilot sets and locates the 
UA's position on the 
location display. 
Pass Checked FCA1, 
2, 3 and GPS 
health. 
Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass Auto Pass 
5-5 Brief any participating 
crewmembers on the 
following: 
- Taxi route 
- Known hazards along the 
route 
- Contingencies to address 
any abnormal or 
emergency situations 
Pilot communicates with 
ground crew to perform a 
pre-taxi briefing, to 
include:                                    
- Taxi route 
- Known hazards along 
the route 
- Contingencies to 
address any abnormal or 
emergency situations 
Pass Performed. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-1 Verify that command and 
control data links have the 
required signal strength 
and reliability required for 
taxi. 
Pilot verifies command 
and control data links 
have the required signal 
strength and reliability 
required for taxi from 
within the CS. 
Pass Performed. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-2 If brakes are installed, 
perform a check of brake 
function to ensure the UAS 
may be stopped at any 
point during taxi. Utilize 
ground crew to verify brake 
function, if applicable. 
Pilot performs a brake 
check by coming to a 
complete stop within one 
length of the UA. 
Pass Performed by 
pulling joystick 
rearward. 
Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 








6-3 If link loss during taxi, 
contact ground control 
element, if applicable. 
The pilot detects the UA 
has stopped during an 
uplink loss failure. 
Pass Set taxi brake 
duration for link 
loss. 
Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-4 Utilize visual aids and 
markers to assist with taxi 
operations to the 
maximum extent possible. 
The pilot uses cameras 
onboard the UA to 
properly recognize airport 
surface signage. 
Pass Performed. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-5 If possible, maintain visual The pilot maintains Pass Marshaller not Not Aircraft is not N/A Met or Pass No Taxi N/A 
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contact and/or two-way 
radio communication with 
a marshaller, if one is used. 
contact with a marshaller.  used. observed. taxied exceeded 
expected 
results 
6-5-1 Maintain visual contact 
with a marshaller, if one is 
used. 
The pilot uses an onboard 
camera to maintain visual 
contact with a marshaller.  




Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-5-2 Maintain two-way radio 
contact with a marshaller, 
if one is used. 
The pilot uses two-way 
radio contact from within 
the CS to maintain 
contact with a marshaller.  




Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-6 Conduct taxi operations at 
the pace of the marshaller, 
or vehicle observer. 
Pilot taxis at the same 
speed as the marshaller. 




Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-7 When using full-motion 
video, stop UA if taxiway 
centerline is lost and 
contact cannot be regained 
in a reasonable amount of 
time. 
Pilot stops the UA if the 
runway centerline is lost. 
Pass Performed. Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-8 Set taxi speed such that the 
UAS is able to be brought 
to a stop within a safe 
distance of obstacles and 
other traffic. 
Pilot maintains a taxi 
speed to enable a full-
stop to avoid obstacles. 
Pass Used speed 
indicator in 
HUD. 
Pass Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
6-9 Maintain communication 
with ground control and/or 
applicable ground crew 
throughout taxi. 
The pilot uses two-way 
radio contact from within 
the CS to maintain 
contact with a marshaller.  




Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
7-1 Maintain sterile cockpit 
while taxiing. 
Pilot maintains a sterile 
cockpit within the CS. 
Pass Not required. Not 
applicable. 
Aircraft is not 
taxied 




Pass No Taxi N/A 




Pilot selects backup 
communications methods 
if the voice radio 
communications method 
fails 




Pass Pilot is 
capable of 








Pass   Pass   
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Flight Card Description Flight Test #3 Test Case Description Perform Pre-Takeoff Checks, 
Takeoff Communications, 
Takeoff Run/ Launch, and 
Initial Climb Out Operational 
Procedures 
              
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational 
Procedures 
Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  8 Pre-Takeoff 
Checks 
              
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  9 Takeoff 
Communications 
              
4  Simulated ground clearance to taxi 
provided 
 10 Takeoff Run/ 
Launch 
              
5 UA taxied to departure runway. Cleared to 
position and hold on active runway 
 11 Initial Climb Out               
6 AIM is available in CS                    
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
































8-1 Complete any remaining 
pre-takeoff checks prior to 
taking position on the 
runway. 
Pilot completes takeoff 
check within CS prior to 
taking the active runway. 
Pass    Checked FCA 
1, 2, 3, and 
GPS health. 
Pass   Preflight is completed 
prior to placing the 
aircraft on the 
launcher 




Pass                       Launcher not 
Runway 
Pass   
9-1 Obtain ATC clearance in 
accordance with procedures 
in AIM Section 4. 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communications 
with ATC for takeoff 
clearance.  
Pass    Performed 
(simulated). 




Pass   Pass   
9-2 Record clearances in 
accordance with AIM 4-4-
7a. 
Pilot records ATC takeoff 
clearance. 
Pass    Performed 
(simulated). 




Pass   Pass   




Pilot uses a backup 
method of 
communications with ATC 
in the event of a two-way 
radio communications 
failure. 
Pass    Performed 
(simulated). 




Pass   Pass   
10-1 Perform flight checks of any 
critical systems. Verify 
proper setting and strength 
of required command 
Pilot verifies the datalinks 
are working correctly. 









failure is a 
WCA (auto 
detect) 
Pass   




10-2 Verify traffic is clear. Pilot identifies the 
presence of potential 
traffic conflicts. 








Pass   Pass   
10-3 Acknowledge receipt of 
clearance using standard 
phraseology and read-back 
practices. 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communications 
from within the CS to 
provide a read-back of 
ATC clearance 
instructions. 
Pass    Performed 
(simulated). 




Pass   Pass 
10-4 Maintain runway centerline; 
maintain runway heading at 
rotation. 
Pilot is able to taxi the UA 
onto the runway 
centerline and maintain 








Pass   N/A 
10-5 Maintain takeoff power and 
monitor critical power plant 
operating parameters. 
Pilot maintains the proper 
takeoff power setting 
from within the CS while 
simultaneously 









Pass   Pass 
10-6 Ø Monitor flight-critical 
systems, including by not 
limited to: 
- Navigation system, 
- Two-way communications,  
- Detect, sense and avoid 
equipment, as applicable  
- Command and control link, 
and 
- Any other flight-critical 
systems/equipment. 
Pilot monitors and 
acknowledges the 
function of flight critical 
systems from within the 




- Command and control 
link 
- Any other flight-critical 
systems/equipment 
Pass   Pass Most alerts populate 
as needed in 
warning/caution/alert 
window 




Pass   Pass 
10-7 Consider takeoff abort if 
required if an emergency 
situation develops. 
Pilot determines takeoff 
abort parameters during 
the takeoff procedure. 
Pass   Pass Acknowledges system 
cues and aborts if 
required 




Pass   Pass   
11-1 Rotate at rotation speed (VR 
or VROT). 
The pilot determines VR 
or VROT and rotate at that 
airspeed. 




Pass   N/A 
11-2 Maintain appropriate V 
speed during climb out. 
Pilot maintains Vy or Vx 
after rotation.  
Pass   Pass Climb @ 55 kts 
(Automated) 




Pass   Pass 
11-3 Maintain ATC-instructed 
departure altitudes and 
headings, as applicable. 
Pilot maintains the ATC-
instructed heading, 
altitude, and airspeed. 




Pass   Pass 
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Flight Card Description Flight Test #4 Test Case Description Perform Pre-Takeoff Checks, Takeoff Communications, Takeoff 
Run/ Launch, and Aborted Takeoff Operational Procedures 
                 
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All                   
                             Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case 
(Pass/Fail) 
N/A                   






                  
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  8 Pre-Takeoff Checks                   
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  9 Takeoff Communications                   
4  Simulated ground clearance to taxi 
provided 
 10 Takeoff Run/ Launch                   
5 UA taxied to departure runway. Cleared to 
position and hold on active runway 
 12 Aborted Takeoff                   
6 AIM is available in CS                        
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 


































8-1 Complete any remaining 
pre-takeoff checks prior to 
taking position on the 
runway. 
Pilot completes takeoff check 
within CS prior to taking the 
active runway. 
Pass     Pass   Completed this 
task in earlier 




N/A Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Launcher vice 
runway 
N/A 
9-1 Obtain ATC clearance in 
accordance with procedures 
in AIM Section 4. 
Pilot performs two-way radio 
communications with ATC for 
takeoff clearance.  
Pass Performed 
(simulated). 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
9-2 Record clearances in 
accordance with AIM 4-4-
7a. 




Pass   For military 
ops, clearances 
are logged in 
official forms. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   




Pilot uses a backup method of 
communications with ATC in 






  Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
10-1 Perform flight checks of any 
critical systems. Verify 
proper setting and strength 
of required command 
link(s). 
Pilot verifies the datalinks are 
working correctly. 
Pass   Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass WCA Pass   
10-2 Verify traffic is clear. Pilot identifies the presence of 
potential traffic conflicts prior 
to taking the active runway. 
Pass   Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Launcher Pass 
10-3 Acknowledge receipt of 
clearance using standard 
Pilot performs two-way radio 
communications from within 
Pass   Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
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phraseology and read-back 
practices. 
the CS to provide a read-back 
of ATC clearance instructions. 
10-4 Maintain runway centerline; 
maintain runway heading at 
rotation. 
Pilot taxis the UA onto the 
runway centerline and 
maintain centerline until 
rotation. 
Pass   Pass   The aircraft 
does not rotate 
due to utilizing 
a launcher for 
takeoff. 
N/A Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Launcher N/A 
10-5 Maintain takeoff power and 
monitor critical power plant 
operating parameters. 
Pilot monitors and 
acknowledges the function of 
takeoff power setting and 
engine health. 





Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
10-6 Monitor flight-critical 
systems, including by not 
limited to: 
- Navigation system 
- Two-way communications 
- Command and control link 
- Any other flight-critical 
systems/equipment 
Pilot monitors and 
acknowledges the function of 
flight critical systems from 
within the CS including:                     
- Navigation system 
- Two-way communications 
- Command and control link 
- Any other flight-critical 
systems/equipment 
Pass   Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass 
10-7 Consider takeoff abort if 
required if an emergency 
situation develops. 
Pilot determines takeoff abort 
parameters during the takeoff 
procedure. 
Pass   Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass 
12-1 Maintain an airspeed that 
allows positive control of 
the UAS. 
Pilot is able to determine 
airspeed and rate-of-climb; 
and maintain an airspeed that 
allows a positive rate of climb. 
Pass   Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Auto until 
Knobs 
Pass 
12-2 Maintain heading clear of 
obstacles. 
Pilot detects obstacles and 
maintain headings that are 
clear of obstacles. 
Pass   Pass   Commands 
aircraft heading 
to remain clear 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass 
12-3 Communicate the aborted 
takeoff to ATC as soon as 
practical. 
Pilot performs two-way radio 
communications to inform 




Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass 
 
  




Flight Card Description Flight Test #5 Test Case Description Perform Climb to Altitude, En-Route Operations, Cruise Power Settings, Weather Monitoring, Lost-Link 
Control Procedures, and Lost-Link Troubleshooting Procedures 
        
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All          
                    Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A          
                    Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
         
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  13 Climb to Altitude - General          
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  14a En-route Operations - General          
6 AIM is available in CS  14b En-route Operations - 
Navigation 
         
7 UA is airborne  15 En-route Operations - Climb          
8 A simulated ATC entity is available  16 En-route Operations - Course 
Change 
         
     17 En-route Operations - 
Descents 
         
     18 Cruise Power Settings          
     19 Weather Monitoring          
     31 Lost-Link Control Procedures - 
General 
         
     32 Lost-Link Troubleshooting 
Procedures - General 
         
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
13-1 Maintain contact with ATC 
and perform frequency 
changes as requested. 
Pilot changes ATC 
frequencies during flight. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Changes 
Frequency; 
notional here 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
13-1-1 Contact Huntsville 
Departure on 118.05MHz 
Pilot changes the two-
way radio to 118.05MHz. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Changes 
Frequency; 
notional here 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
13-2 Ensure that the aircraft is 
configured for climb. 
Pilot uses CS to set UA for 
flight and command a 
climb. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Commands and 
monitors climb 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
13-2-1 Climb to 5,000 feet. Pilot commands a climb 
to 5,000 feet MSL. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
13-3 Maintain heading assigned 
by ATC unless cleared to 
deviate or climb/maneuver 
at pilot's discretion. 
Pilot turns and maintains 
a heading of 360 degrees 
magnetic. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
13-4 Level off at assigned 
altitude. 
Pilot levels off at 5000 
feet MSL. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-1 Use proper communication 
procedures when using 
radar services (as 
The pilot uses two-way 
communication with ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   




14a-1-1 Contact Memphis Center on 
120.8MHz. 
The pilot changes the 
two-way radio frequency 
to 120.8 while in flight 
and contact the Memphis 
ARTCC.  
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-2 Obtain ATC clearance. Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
obtain an ATC clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-2-1 Request clearance for 
transitioning into R-2104B 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
request clearance into R-
2104B restricted airspace. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-3 Respond to ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-3-1 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot reads back the ATC 
clearance approval using 
standard aviation 
terminology. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-4 Comply with ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
14a-4-1 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot turns the UA into 
R2104B, remain within 
that airspace, climb to 
5,000 feet MSL and level 
off. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-5 Use standard aviation 
phraseology when 
communicating with ATC. 




Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-6 Set communication 
frequencies, navigation 
systems, and transponder 
codes to ensure compliance 
with ATC clearances. 
Pilot switches radio 
navigation frequencies 
and transponder code 
from within the CS. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Changed 
transponder 
frequency 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-7 Conduct any required 
communication frequency 
changes. 
Pilot switches two-way 
radio frequencies from 
within the CS. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-8 Use available systems (if 
equipped) to detect icing 
conditions. 
Pilot uses the CS to detect 
icing. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   No system to 
detect ice 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-8-1 Determine if the pitot tube 
has ice. 
Pilot uses the CS to detect 
icing on the pitot tube. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
14a-8-2 Determine if the UA has 
structural ice. 
Pilot uses the payload 
video to inspect the UA 
for structural icing. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
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14a-9 Monitor aircraft electrical, 
propulsion, and datalink 
performance. 
Pilot monitors status and 
health of electrical, 
propulsion, and datalink 
systems. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Pilot scans 
multiple 
windows 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14a-9-1 Determine if current bus 
voltage is within limitations. 
Pilot monitors bus voltage 
and determine it is within 
the POH-required limits. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Auto and # 
display 
Pass   
14b-1 Monitor aircraft's position 
throughout the flight and 
maintain course in 
accordance with ATC 
instructions/clearance. 
Pilot determines the 
location of the UA on a 
location display. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-1-1 Determine current location Pilot determines current 
location on the location 
display and/ or GPS 
coordinate display. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-1-1 Turn and maintain 130 
degrees. 
Pilot turns from 360 
degrees to 130 degrees. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
14b-2 Intercept and track a given 
course, radial (if equipped), 
or bearing, as appropriate. 
Pilot plots a course and 
command the UA 
heading. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Not equipped to 
track radials 
Fail Met or exceeded 
expected results 










14b-2-1 Determine the course 
heading to Nashville, TN. 
Pilot plots a course 
heading from the UA's 
current position direct to 
Atlanta, GA. While 
factoring winds. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-2-2 Determine a ground track to 
Nashville, TN. 
Pilot determines a ground 
track necessary for a 
direct course to Atlanta, 
GA. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-3 Determine loss of GPS or 
navigation solution if it 
occurs. 
The pilot interprets the 
GPS health and status 
within the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 






Pass   
14b-4 Maintain the appropriate 
altitude and headings.  
Pilot turns the UA and 
change altitude while in 
flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-4-1 Turn to heading 350 
degrees. 
Pilot turns the UA to 350 
degrees magnetic. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
14b-4-2 Climb and maintain 10,000 Pilot climbs the UA to Pass Met or exceeded expected Pass     Pass Met or exceeded Pass Used 5,000 ft Pass   
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feet MSL. 10,000 MSL and level off. results expected results 
14b-4-3 Perform dead reckoning 
navigation if required. 
Pilot uses payload video 
to navigate back to a 
landing airport. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-4-4 Return to Huntsville 
International Airport via 
heading and airspeed. 
Pilot uses the UA's 
heading and ground 
speed to return to HSV. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-4-6 Use payload video to enter 
the traffic pattern at 
Huntsville International 
Airport. 
Pilot uses payload video 
to navigate into the traffic 
pattern. 




  Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-6 Maintain course by 
reference to established 
waypoints/steer points or 
other navigational 
references, as applicable. 
Pilot remains on an 
established course and 
changes course once 
waypoints are achieved. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-7 If equipped, be able to 
identify surface features to 
chart symbols. 
Pilot performs map to 
video correlation 
between the payload 
video and location display 
to identify natural and 
man-made terrain 
features. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     N/E 
14b-8 Navigate by means of 
precomputed headings, 
groundspeeds, and elapsed 
time (if required). 
Pilot determines a 
required heading +/- 10 
degrees, groundspeed +/- 
10 knots, and time +/- 3 
minutes. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 






Pass   
14b-9 Correct for wind to maintain 
desired route and 
performance. 
The Pilot acknowledges 
and corrects for wind to 
maintain desired course. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-10 Remain within planned 
route described in the flight 
plan. 
The Pilot commands the 
UA to maintain the 
desired course, speed, 
and altitude outlined in 
the flight plan. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-10-1 Obtain ATC clearance. Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
obtain an ATC clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-10-2 Request clearance for 
transitioning into R-2104B 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
request clearance into R-
2104B restricted airspace. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-10-3 Respond to ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
14b-10-4 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
Pilot reads back the ATC 
clearance approval using 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
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14b-10-5 Comply with ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
14b-10-6 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot turns the UA into 
R2104B, remain within 
that airspace, climb to 
5,000 feet MSL and level 
off. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 





Pass   
15-1 Conduct en-route climbs 
according to ATC clearance. 
Pilot complies with ATC 
altitude instructions. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
15-1-1 Climb and maintain 7,500 
feet MSL.  
Pilot climbs and maintains 
7,500 feet MSL. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Used 5,000ft Pass   
15-2 Conduct climbs with respect 
to UAS performance 
limitations, including but 
limited to: 
- Absolute ceiling 
- service ceiling 
- altitude and temperature 
- time, fuel, and distance to 
climb 
Pilot climbs to the UA's 
performance limits 
identified in the POH. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 




built into the 
system. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
15-2-1 Determine time to climb to 
service ceiling 
Pilot determines the time 
required to climb from 
current altitude to the 
service ceiling. The pilot 
should plan within +/- 3 
minutes.  
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   The pilot has a 
chart available 
to outline climb 
performance 
and correlate it 
with a rate of 
climb 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
15-2-2 Perform a climb to service 
ceiling. 
Pilot determines the UA's 
service ceiling from POH 
and command a climb. 
Pilot monitors the 
performance of the climb 
and determine when 
service ceiling is reached 
from the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
15-2-3 Perform a maximum 
airspeed dash. 
Pilot determines the 
maximum airspeed and 
command the UA to 
maximum speed. Pilot 
monitors UA's 
performance at maximum 
speed from the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
15-3 Notify ATC if the UA is 
unable to climb at a 
specified rate or gradient in 
accordance with AIM 4-4-
If the pilot detects climb 
performance less than 
500 feet per minute, the 
pilot notifies ATC to 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
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10(d). indicate unable to comply 
with ATC instructions. 
16-1 Obtain and/or acknowledge 
clearance to change course 
from ATC. 
The pilot uses two-way 
radio communication and 
acknowledge ATC course 
change instructions. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
16-2 Command the UA to fly the 
desired heading or course. 
The pilot maneuvers the 
UA by changing course 
heading according to ATC 
instructions within the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
16-3 Verify the UA is flying the 
commanded heading and/or 
course using available flight 
data. 
The pilot determines the 
commanded heading or 
course from within the 
CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
16-4 Make corrections to 
maintain heading and/or 
course as required. 
The pilot detects 
deviations from the 
desired heading or course 
and adjusts commands to 
the UA to correct 
deviations from within 
the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 








with a "ground 
track" tool; can 
feed in headings 
to be followed. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
17-1 Conduct descents in 
accordance with ATC 
clearance. 
Pilot commands a 
descent of the UA when 
required by ATC. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Used 3,000 ft Pass   
17-1 Descend and maintain 5,000 
feet MSL.  
Pilot commands a 
descent of the UA when 
required by ATC. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Pilot descends 
to given altitude 
when 
commanded 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
17-2 Conduct descents with 
regard to UAS limitations. 
The pilot descends with a 
maximum descent rate 
less than the POH 
limitation. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
17-3 Do not exceed UAS 
performance limitations in 
descents. 
The pilot does not exceed 
airspeed, pitch, or roll in 
excess of the maximum 
limitation identified in the 
POH. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
18-1 Monitor UA fuel/battery 
status while in flight. 
Pilot determines the 
status of fuel/ battery 
during flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
18-1-1 Determine fuel burn rate. The pilot determines the 
rate of fuel consumption 
from within the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Fuel burn rate is 
an embedded 
variable that is 
determined by 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Initial input 
and fuel burn 
but no direct 
level gauge 
Pass   






18-1-1 Determine fuel consumed. The pilot determines the 
amount of fuel consumed 
within 10 gallons and how 
much remains within 10 
gallons since engine start. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
18-1-2 Determine fuel remaining. The pilot determines the 
amount of fuel remaining 
from within the CS since 
engine start. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
18-2 Adjust power settings as 
required to maintain 
desired performance. 
The pilot sets the power 
setting for maximum 
range or endurance. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 






Pass   
18-3 Perform fuel burn/battery 
life calculations such that 
the destination is reached 
with the required 
fuel/battery reserve 
remaining. 
Pilot calculates fuel/ 
battery remaining 
requirements within 10 
gallons or 5 minutes to 
complete a mission with 
reserve capacity from the 
CS while in flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
18-3-1 Determine the fuel required 
with a 30-minute reserve to 
fly to Memphis International 
Airport. 
Pilot calculates the fuel 
requirements, taking into 
account GS, time, 
distance, fuel burn rate, 
and reserve from within 
the CS while in flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 






Pass   
18-4 Re-evaluate performance 
data as required to reach 
the destination at the 





including fuel/ battery 
reserves within 10 gallons 
or 5 minutes after a 
change in the mission 
plan. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
18-4-1 Climb to 10,000 feet Pilot re-calculates the fuel 
requirements, taking into 
account GS, time, 
distance, fuel burn rate, 
and reserve within 10 
gallons or 5 minutes. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass POH Table Pass   
18-5 Determine any new 
performance capabilities or 
limitations that may result 
from alterations in the flight 
plan or an in-flight 
Pilot is able to determine 
if any performance 
limitations changed as a 
result of altering the flight 
plan form the CS while in 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   




19-1 Monitor weather conditions 
along the route of flight, 
establishing 
communications with in-
flight weather services as 
required. 
Pilot monitors current 
and forecasted weather 
conditions for current 
location, route of flight, 
and destination form the 
CS while in flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Pilot has to rely 
on outside help 
for this 
information; 
notional in this 
instance 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
19-2 Determine if icing 
conditions exist and utilize 
anti/de-icing equipment as 
appropriate. 
Pilot determines if icing 
conditions exist form the 
CS while in flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   No Payload 
cameras. 
N/E 
19-3 When necessary, alter the 
flight plan to avoid weather 
that poses a hazard to the 
safety of flight. 
Pilot maneuvers the 
mission plan to avoid 
hazardous weather to the 
destination from the CS 
while in flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
19-4 Notify ATC if a flight plan 
must be altered to avoid 
hazardous weather. 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communications to 
inform ATC of alterations 
to planned flight of route 
because of hazardous 
weather conditions. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
31-1 Ensure that lost-link fail 
safes are set up as 
appropriate for the flight 
(including any automated 
transponder triggering to 
squawk 7400) and active 
throughout all phases of 
flight. 
Pilot determines the 
current lost-link/ 
contingency actions and 
transponder actions prior 
to a lost-link event 
occurring. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 









Fail Met or exceeded 
expected results 





31-2 Communicate lost-link 
behavior to ATC and verify 
appropriate transponder 
squawk code, if able. 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication if a 
lost link conditions exists. 
Pilot is able to verify 
transponder code.  
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Note: Radio 
communication
s occur through 
the control 
station 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass Radios on are 
CS so Loss link 
does not 









Pass   
31-3 At a minimum, relay the 
following information to 
ATC: 
- Last known altitude 
- Heading 
- Destination 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communications to 
inform ATC of:                        
- Last known altitude 
- Heading 
- Destination 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
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- Location when the link was 
lost (Latitude/Longitude), 
and 
- Expected lost-link behavior 
- Location when the link 
was lost 
(Latitude/Longitude), and 
- Expected lost-link 
behavior 
32-1 Refer to published 
troubleshooting procedures 
when troubleshooting a lost 
command link. 
Pilot references the POH 
to troubleshoot lost-link 
conditions from the CS 
while in flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass   
32-2 Continue or terminate the 
flight based upon the 
outcome of link 
troubleshooting procedures. 
The pilot determines 
either to continue or 
terminate flight, based on 
lost-link troubleshooting 
results. 
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
32-3 Communicate the outcome 
of troubleshooting to ATC. 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication 
with ATC about the lost-
link troubleshooting 
outcome.  
Pass Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pass   
 
Flight Card Description Flight Test #6 Test Case Description Perform Lost-Link, In-Flight Emergency, and Emergency Landing Procedures              
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         
Assumption  Assumptions:  OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  33 Operations During 
Command and Control 
Degradation and Loss - 
General 
              
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  34 Operations During Periods of 
Decreased Sensory Cues 
from Aircraft and 
Environment 
              
7 UA is airborne  35 In-Flight Emergencies - 
Propulsion Failure 
              
8 A simulated ATC entity is available  44 Emergency Landing - 
Ditching Site Selection 
              
     45 Emergency Landing - Flight 
Termination 
              
                         
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / 
Not Observed/  
Not Applicable 
/ Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / 
Not Observed/  
Not Applicable 
/ Suspended 
33-1 While operating a UAS, 
monitor the command and 
control link integrity. Should 
The pilot detects a 
degraded command link 
and reacts by referring to 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass                    Pass   
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degraded link performance 
be encountered, execute 
appropriate procedures to 
address the situation. 




33-2 During command and 
control degradation or loss 




and contingencies for re-
establishing the command 
link. 
The pilot utilizes the 
appropriate checklists 
and procedures to 
troubleshoot/attempt to 
restore the command 
link. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
34-1 Determine if full or partial 
loss of sensory cues exist. 
The pilot acknowledges 
and inventories degraded 
performance of required 
displays and flight 
information. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   N/E 
34-2 If applicable, use UAS 
sensors to regain or 
maintain orientation and 
spatial awareness of the 
UAS. 
The pilot uses available 
sensors to maintain 
controlled flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   N/E 
34-3 Manage multiple telemetry 
datalinks independently, if 
applicable. 
The pilot chooses the 
data link with the 
strongest signal while 
demonstrating awareness 
of the status of other 
links. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 








34-4 Maintain situation 
awareness of the UAS by 
scanning displays and 
instrumentation. 
The pilot continues their 




Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
34-5 Monitor UA caution/alert 
status. 
The pilot acknowledges 
any caution or alert 
notifications as they 
occur. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
34-6 If multiple emergences 
exist, manage them using 
aeronautical decision 
making techniques. 
The pilot prioritizes the 
most significant 
emergency above less 
significant anomalies. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass     
34-7 If required, calculate 
position, heading, and 
airspeed to determine 
proper heading and time to 
designated location. 
The pilot determines their 
position, heading, and 
airspeed using alternative 
means. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
34-8 If equipped, be familiar with 
ground data terminal 
The pilot uses the GDT 
antenna to aid in 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Can orient to 
aircraft based 
Pass Met or 
exceeded 
Pass   Pass   
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azimuth and dead reckoning 








35-1 Identify and address engine 
failure notifications with the 
appropriate emergency 
procedures, as applicable. 
The pilot refers to the 
appropriate published 
procedures to address an 
engine failure and takes 
appropriate action. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Scenario: 
Stuck throttle 
servo 




Pass Stuck Throttle Pass   
35-2 Maintain aircraft control 
and configure the aircraft to 
achieve optimum glide, as 
required. 
The pilot ensures 
optimum glide is flown. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Pilot takes 
note of rate of 
descent and 
airspeed 




Pass  auto Airspeed Pass   
35-3 While performing an 
emergency landing, select 
landing areas that pose 
minimal risk to personnel 
and property on the ground. 
The pilot identifies a 
lowest-risk landing area. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




identify a safe 
area 




Pass   Pass   
35-4 During an emergency 
landing, take high-volume 
transects and approaches 
into consideration and 
maneuver to avoid them 
whenever possible. 
The pilot attempts to 
avoid busy airspace and 
airways. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




This could be 
coordinated if 
required. 




Pass   Pass   
35-5 If a suitable landing site is 
unavailable, determine the 
best area to terminate the 
flight to minimize risk to 
personnel and property on 
the ground. 
The pilot chooses a flight 
termination point in a 
location that minimizes 
risk. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
35-6 Determine effects of 
weather on landing/ditching 
location. 
The pilot demonstrates 
factoring weather into 
consideration when 
picking a landing/ditching 
location. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
35-7 Address all applicable 
emergency procedures as 
practical. 
The pilot addresses 
additional emergencies 
and prioritizes them by 
criticality. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 









effect of the 
low throttle 
setting over 
that of the 




Pass   Pass   




35-8 Set transponder to 7700 
if/when able to do so. 
The pilot sets the 
transponder accordingly. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
35-9 Communicate an engine 
failure to ATC as soon as 
practical. 
The pilot communicates 
the engine failure to ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
35-10 Notify ground crew, if 
required. 
The pilot notifies crew as 
applicable. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
44-1 Execute ditching maneuvers 
in accordance with 
published procedures for 
the given system. 
The pilot sets up to ditch 
the aircraft in accordance 
with established 
procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
44-2 Select ditching locations 
based upon the ability to 
minimize risk to personnel 
and property on the ground. 
A remote or unpopulated 
location is chosen for 
ditching. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
44-3 When practical, 
communicate ditching 
locations and pilot 
intentions to ATC. 
The pilot communicates 
their intent and ditching 
location to ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
45-1 Perform flight termination, 
if required. 
Flight termination is 
initiated if the pilot 
deems ditching is 
impractical. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
45-2 Execute flight termination 
according to established 
flight termination 
procedures for the given 
system. 
Flight termination is 
executed according to 
published procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
45-3 When executing flight 
termination, monitor the 
execution of the maneuver. 
The pilot monitors the 
termination procedure 
and verifies that it 
completes correctly. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
45-4 Select flight termination 
locations bases upon the 
ability to minimize risk to 
personnel and property on 
the ground. 
The pilot chooses a 
remote location for flight 
termination. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
45-5 Notify ATC of intent to 
terminate and provide the 
flight termination position. 
The pilot relays their 
intent to terminate the 
flight and the termination 
location to ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Ditch and 
Terminate are 
the same for 
this platform. 
Pass   
45-6 Upon execution of flight The pilot engages a fuel Pass   Met or exceeded Pass   Engine Pass Met or Pass Ditch and Pass   
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termination, engage the fuel 
cutoff, if applicable. 
cutoff during termination, 
if applicable. 
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Flight Card Description Flight Test #7 Test Case Description Perform En-route Operations, In-Flight 
Emergencies, and Emergency Landing 
Procedures 
              Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All 
                         
              Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A 
                         
              Assumption 
# 
Assumptions:  OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
              1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  14a En-route Operations - 
General 
              2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  14b En-route Operations - 
Navigation 
              7 UA is airborne  36 In-Flight Emergencies - 
Two-way Communications 
Failure 
              8 A simulated ATC entity is available  37 In-Flight Emergencies - 
Navigation Failure - GPS or 
Other System 
                   39 In-Flight Emergencies -
Uncontrolled Flight 
                   45 Emergency Landing - Flight 
Termination 
              
     
Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 






14a-1 Use proper communication 
procedures when using 
radar services (as 
applicable). 
The pilot uses two-way 
communication with ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass             
Pass   
14a-1-1 Contact Memphis Center on 
120.8MHz. 
The pilot changes the 
two-way radio frequency 
to 120.8 while in flight 
and contact the Memphis 
ARTCC.  
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-2 Obtain ATC clearance. Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
obtain an ATC clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
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14a-2-1 Request clearance for 
transitioning into R-2104B 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
request clearance into R-
2104B restricted airspace. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-3 Respond to ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-3-1 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot reads back the ATC 
clearance approval using 
standard aviation 
terminology. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-4 Comply with ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-4-1 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot turns the UA into 
R2104B, remain within 
that airspace, climb to 
5,000 feet MSL and level 
off. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-5 Use standard aviation 
phraseology when 
communicating with ATC. 




Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-6 Set communication 
frequencies, navigation 
systems, and transponder 
codes to ensure compliance 
with ATC clearances. 
Pilot switches radio 
navigation frequencies 
and transponder code 
from within the CS. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-7 Conduct any required 
communication frequency 
changes. 
Pilot switches two-way 
radio frequencies from 
within the CS. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-8 Use available systems (if 
equipped) to detect icing 
conditions. 
Pilot uses the CS to detect 
icing. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator; can 
use payload to 
detect airframe 
icing 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-8-1 Determine if the pitot tube 
has ice. 
Pilot uses the CS to detect 
icing on the pitot tube. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
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14a-8-2 Determine if the UA has 
structural ice. 
Pilot uses the payload 
video to inspect the UA 
for structural icing. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-9 Monitor aircraft electrical, 
propulsion, and datalink 
performance. 
Pilot monitors status and 
health of electrical, 
propulsion, and datalink 
systems. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14a-9-1 Determine if current bus 
voltage is within limitations. 
Pilot monitors bus voltage 
and determine it is within 
the POH-required limits. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Auto and # 
display 
Pass   
14b-1 Monitor aircraft's position 
throughout the flight and 
maintain course in 
accordance with ATC 
instructions/clearance. 
Pilot determines the 
location of the UA on a 
location display. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-1-1 Determine current location Pilot determines current 
location on the location 
display and/ or GPS 
coordinate display. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-1-1 Turn and maintain 130 
degrees. 
Pilot turns from 360 
degrees to 130 degrees. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-2 Intercept and track a given 
course, radial (if equipped), 
or bearing, as appropriate. 
Pilot plots a course and 
command the UA 
heading. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 










14b-2-1 Determine the course 
heading to Nashville, TN. 
Pilot plots a course 
heading from the UA's 
current position direct to 
Atlanta, GA. While 
factoring winds. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
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14b-2-2 Determine a ground track to 
Nashville, TN. 
Pilot determines a ground 
track necessary for a 
direct course to Atlanta, 
GA. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-3 Determine loss of GPS or 
navigation solution if it 
occurs. 
The pilot interprets the 
GPS health and status 
within the CS. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 





information Pass   
14b-4 Maintain the appropriate 
altitude and headings.  
Pilot turns the UA and 
change altitude while in 
flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-4-1 Turn to heading 350 
degrees. 
Pilot turns the UA to 350 
degrees magnetic. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-4-2 Climb and maintain 10,000 
feet MSL. 
Pilot climbs the UA to 
10,000 MSL and level off. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Used 5,000 ft 
Pass   
14b-4-3 Perform dead reckoning 
navigation if required. 
Pilot uses payload video 
to navigate back to a 
landing airport. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 
present 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-4-4 Return to Huntsville 
International Airport via 
heading and airspeed. 
Pilot uses the UA's 
heading and ground 
speed to return to HSV. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-4-6 Use payload video to enter 
the traffic pattern at 
Huntsville International 
Airport. 
Pilot uses payload video 
to navigate into the traffic 
pattern. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 
present 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-6 Maintain course by 
reference to established 
waypoints/steer points or 
other navigational 
references, as applicable. 
Pilot remains on an 
established course and 
changes course once 
waypoints are achieved. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
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14b-7 If equipped, be able to 
identify surface features to 
chart symbols. 
Pilot performs map to 
video correlation 
between the payload 
video and location display 
to identify natural and 
man-made terrain 
features. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 
present 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
N/E 
14b-8 Navigate by means of 
precomputed headings, 
groundspeeds, and elapsed 
time (if required). 
Pilot determines a 
required heading +/- 10 
degrees, groundspeed +/- 
10 knots, and time +/- 3 
minutes. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 






Pass   
14b-9 Correct for wind to maintain 
desired route and 
performance. 
The Pilot acknowledges 
and corrects for wind to 
maintain desired course. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10 Remain within planned 
route described in the flight 
plan. 
The Pilot commands the 
UA to maintain the 
desired course, speed, 
and altitude outlined in 
the flight plan. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10-1 Obtain ATC clearance. Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
obtain an ATC clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10-2 Request clearance for 
transitioning into R-2104B 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
request clearance into R-
2104B restricted airspace. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10-3 Respond to ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10-4 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot reads back the ATC 
clearance approval using 
standard aviation 
terminology. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10-5 Comply with ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
14b-10-6 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot turns the UA into 
R2104B, remain within 
that airspace, climb to 
5,000 feet MSL and level 
off. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 





Pass   
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36-1 Set transponder to 7600. The pilot sets the 
transponder code to 7600 
during a communication 
failure. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Sets 
transponder 
code 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
36-2 When available, utilize 
alternative means of 
communication to 
communicate with ATC. 
Alternative means to 
communicate with ATC 
are identified during a 
two-way communication 
failure. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Pilot can use 
phone 




Pass   
36-3 Prioritize routing as 
required for IFR 
communications failures. 
The pilot correctly 
prioritizes routes using 
AVEF. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 





Fail Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
36-4 Prioritize altitudes as 
required for IFR 
communications failures. 
The pilot correctly 
prioritizes altitudes for 
IFR communication 
failures. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Possible; Not 
observed 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
37-1 Address navigation system 
failures as soon as practical. 
Navigation failures are 
addressed as they are 
identified by the pilot. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Possible; Not 
observed 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass WCA  
Pass   
37-2 Address a navigation failure 
in accordance with 
established procedures for 
the given system. 
The pilot addresses 
navigation system failures 
in accordance with 
published procedures. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
37-3 Perform dead reckoning 
navigation if required. 
The pilot uses dead 
reckoning to perform 
navigation. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Use payload to 
assist if 
required; 
Notional in this 
case 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Using Payload 
if available. If 
not, last 
position. 
Pass   
37-4 Notify ATC of intentions. The pilot notifies ATC of 
their intentions when 
addressing a navigation 
failure. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
37-5 Refer to off-site landing 
(ditching) or termination 
procedures, as required, if 
flight cannot be continued 
with a failed navigation 
system. 
The pilot chooses to ditch 
or terminate if navigation 
systems cannot be 
restored. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
N/A 
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39-1 Address equipment failures 
that can lead to or hinder 
the recovery from 
uncontrolled flight.  
The pilot troubleshoots 
equipment failures 
related to flight control 
systems. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
39-2 Address equipment failures 
in accordance with 
established procedures. 
The pilot addresses 
equipment failures per 
published procedures. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
39-3 Interpret and react to 
system cues that warn of 
the possibility of entering 
into a state of uncontrolled 
flight. 
The pilot acknowledges 
and reacts to 
warnings/alerts that are 
indicators of uncontrolled 
flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
39-4 Avoid configurations and 
flight regimes in which the 
UAS is susceptible to a loss 
of control. 
The pilot acknowledges 
and avoids flight 
configurations where the 
aircraft is inherently 
unstable. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
39-5 Recognize and recover from 
unusual attitudes, when 
UAS capabilities allow such 
control. 
The pilot recovers from 
unusual attitudes. 
Pass Not performed Not observed.   Pass Software inhibits 
the capability of 
intentionally 
entering a stall 
or spin. 
Not Observed Auto system 
Pass   
39-6 Execute appropriate 
stall/spin recovery 
strategies for multiple types 
of stalls/spins, when UA 
capabilities allow such 
control. 
The pilot recovers from a 
stall/spin. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 







getting into a 
stall/spin 
scenario. 
N/A Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass No Stall due 
to auto 
protect so no 
spin either 
N/A 
39-7 Notify ATC of a loss of 
control as soon as practical. 
The pilot notifies ATC of a 
loss of aircraft control. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
39-8 Know and execute any 
published procedures to 
address any loss of UAS 
control. 
The pilot addresses loss 
of control with published 
procedures. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
45-1 Perform flight termination, 
if required. 
The pilot terminates the 
flight if controlled flight 
cannot be regained. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Pilot terminates 
in the event of a 
loss of control; 
deploys a 
parachute. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
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45-2 Execute flight termination 
according to established 
flight termination 
procedures for the given 
system. 
Flight termination is in 
accordance with 
established procedures 
for the system. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Followed 
established 
procedures 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
45-3 When executing flight 
termination, monitor the 
execution of the maneuver. 
The pilot monitors flight 
termination and confirms 
termination with ATC. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 










Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
45-4 Select flight termination 
locations bases upon the 
ability to minimize risk to 
personnel and property on 
the ground. 
The pilot chooses a 
remote location for flight 
termination. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
45-5 Notify ATC of intent to 
terminate and provide the 
flight termination position. 
The pilot notifies ATC of 
the intent to terminate 
and provides the location 
of the termination point. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
45-6 Upon execution of flight 
termination, engage the fuel 
cutoff, if applicable. 
The fuel cutoff is engaged 
when the flight is 
terminated. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   
Pass   
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Flight Card Description Flight Test #8 Test Case Description Perform Cruise Power Settings, In-Flight 
Emergencies, and Emergency Landing 
Procedures 
              
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  18 Cruise Power Settings               
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  40 In-Flight Emergencies - 
Emergency Descent 
              
7 UA is airborne  41 Emergency Landing - 
Communication 
              
8 A simulated ATC entity is available  42 Emergency Landing - Approach               
     43 Emergency Landing - 
Touchdown 
              
                              Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / 
Not Observed/  
Not Applicable 
/ Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / 
Not Observed/  
Not Applicable 
/ Suspended 
18-1 Monitor UA fuel/battery 
status while in flight. 
The pilot determines the 
status of fuel/ battery 
during flight. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass               Pass   
18-1-1 Determine fuel burn rate. The pilot determines the 
rate of fuel consumption 
from within the CS. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
18-1-1 Determine fuel consumed. The pilot determines the 
amount of fuel consumed 
from within the CS since 
engine start. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
18-1-2 Determine fuel remaining. The pilot determines the 
amount of fuel remaining 
from within the CS since 
engine start. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
18-2 Adjust power settings as 
required to maintain 
desired performance. 
The pilot adjusts power 
settings for maximum 
range or endurance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
18-3 Perform fuel burn/battery 
life calculations such that 
the destination is reached 
with the required 
fuel/battery reserve 
remaining. 
The pilot calculates fuel/ 
battery remaining 
requirements to 
complete a mission with 
reserve capacity from the 
CS while in flight. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
18-3-1 Determine the fuel required 
with a 30-minute reserve to 
fly to Memphis International 
Airport. 
Pilot is able to correctly 
calculate the fuel 
requirements, taking into 
account GS, time, 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Multiple Map 
and fuel 
measurements 
for pilot to 
Pass   
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distance, fuel burn rate, 
and reserve from within 
the CS while in flight. 
calculate from 
18-4 Re-evaluate performance 
data as required to reach 
the destination at the 
required time with the 
required fuel/battery 
reserves. 
The pilot re-evaluates 
performance/endurance, 
including fuel/ battery 
reserves after a change in 
the mission plan. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
18-4 Climb to 10,000 feet The pilot re-calculates the 
fuel requirements, taking 
into account ground 
speed, time, distance, 
fuel burn rate, and 
reserve from within the 
CS while in flight. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Used 5,000 ft Pass   
18-5 Determine any new 
performance capabilities or 
limitations that may result 
from alterations in the flight 
plan or an in-flight 
emergency. 
The pilot determines if 
any performance 
limitations have changed 
as a result of altering the 
flight plan form the CS 
while in flight. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass   Generator 
Failure chosen 





Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Gen Failure; 
Batt only, 
reduced loads 
Pass   
40-1 Execute proper division of 
attention in an emergency 
descent scenario. 
The pilot prioritizes 
emergencies. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 





Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
40-2 When performing an 
emergency decent, ensure 
that any performance 
limitations are not 
exceeded. 
The aircraft does not 
exceed VNE during the 
descent. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass auto  Pass   
40-3 Perform emergency 
descents as applicable to 
the aircraft's configuration 
(flaps, landing gear, and 
engine power setting) as 
applicable. 
The pilot configures the 
aircraft for emergency 
descent per established 
procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass same as 
normal 
Pass   
40-4 Notify ATC as soon as 
practical when executing an 
emergency decent. 
The pilot notifies ATC of 
emergency descent when 
practical. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
40-5 Execute all descent 
procedures as time allows 
while maintaining aircraft 
control. 
The pilot maintains 
positive control during 
the emergency descent 
maneuver. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 




Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
40-6 If applicable, brief and 
perform hand-off 
procedures to the landing 
A control station handoff 
is performed to meet the 
needs of the emergency. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   




40-7 Determine if landing or 
flight termination is 
suitable. 
The pilot makes a 
decision to land or 
terminate the flight. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
41-1 Communicate emergency 
landing flight plans/or 
routes with ATC as soon as 
practical. 
The pilot communicates 
their emergency route to 
ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Gen Failure Pass   
41-2 Notify ATC as soon as 
practical when deviating 
from a clearance. 
The pilot notifies ATC of a 
deviation from a known 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
41-3 Maintain a sterile cockpit 
during emergency 
maneuvers. 
The pilot maintains a 
sterile cockpit. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
41-4 When the situation 
warrants, provide ATC with 
information regarding the 
nature of the emergency 
and intentions. 
The pilot communicates 
their intention and the 
nature of their 
emergency to ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
41-5 During the transition 
portions and prior to 
landing, maintain 
communication with ATC 
and any required ground 
crew. 
The pilot maintains open 
communications with ATC 
and other required 
personnel. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
42-1 Perform emergency 
approaches in accordance 
with procedures for the 
given system. 
Emergency approaches 
are conducted in 
accordance with 
established procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
42-2 Monitor airspeed, altitude, 
and other flight 
performance parameters 
while on approach. 
The pilot identifies 
deviations in airspeed, 
altitude, and other 
performance parameters 
and corrects for them 
while on approach. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Auto and pilot Pass   
42-3 Choose an emergency 
landing location that 
minimizes risk to persons or 
property on the ground. 
The pilot chooses a 
remote location for the 
emergency landing. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
42-4 Determine effects of 
weather on emergency 
landing conditions. 
The pilot lands into the 
wind. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 








Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
42-5 Ensure obstacle clearance to The pilot avoids obstacles Pass   Met or exceeded expected Pass     Pass Met or exceeded Pass Map and if Pass   
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the best extent possible 




results expected results. available video 
42-6 Adhere to any published 
emergency approach and 
landing procedures that 
may exist for the system. 
The pilot follows 
established emergency 
landing procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Agreed to UAS 
approach 
Pass   
43-1 Complete any additional 
procedures that may be 
required after touching 
down. 
The pilot completes any 
other documented 
procedures that are 
required to follow an 
emergency landing. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Gen Failure 
TALS abort 
override (pilot 
kills engine if 
UAS does not 
do it properly) 
Pass   
43-2 Maintain communications 
with ATC. 
The pilot maintains 
communication with ATC 
throughout the 
emergency. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
43-3 Upon touchdown, 
communicate with a visual 
observer (if required) or 
other necessary ground 
support personnel to ensure 
that the approach path 
remains clear.  
The pilot coordinates with 
crew to ensure that the 
approach path is clear. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 





with a VO to 
clear airspace 
is possible. 
Not Observed Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass Crew Chief Pass   
43-4 Determine missed approach 
requirements. 
The pilot executes a 
missed approach if 
missed approach criteria 
are met. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 




resort in a 
GEN fail 
scenario. 
However, it is 
possible to 
perform a 
"wave off" if 
required. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
43-5 Complete emergency 
landings in accordance with 
any published emergency 
procedures for the given 
system. 
Emergency landings are 
executed in accordance 
with published 
procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded expected 
results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pass   
 
  




Flight Card Description Flight Test #9 Test Case Description Perform En-Route Operations, Descent 
from Cruise, Approach, Landing, and 
Ground Support Procedures 
              
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         
Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         
Assumption 
# 
Assumptions:  OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  17 En-route Operations - 
Descents 
              
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  20 Descent From Cruise - 
General 
              
6 AIM if available in CS  21 Approach - General               
8 UA is airborne  22 Landing - Communications               
8 A simulated ATC entity is available  23 Approach and Landing 
(Human in the Loop) 
              
     24 Go Around               
     25 Ground Support               
                         
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 
3 
Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 






























17-1 Conduct descents in 
accordance with ATC 
clearance. 
The pilot complies with 
ATC clearance to 
descend. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
17-2 Conduct descents with 
regard to UAS limitations. 
UAS airspeed and 
structural limitations are 
not exceeded.  
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
17-3 Do not exceed UAS 
performance limitations in 
descents. 
UAS airspeed and 
structural limitations are 
not exceeded.  
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
D-44 
20-1 Descend to pattern altitude 
or an approach fix/initial 
approach waypoint in a 
manner that does not 
impede or decrease the 
safety of other air traffic. 
The pilot maintains 
separation from other 
traffic while descending 
to pattern altitude. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




without a VO 
Fail Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   With ATC 
separation or 
VO. No internal 
DAA system. 
Pass   
20-2 If unable to perform a 
published instrument 
approach, coordinate 
approach procedures with 
ATC prior to arrival at the 
initial approach fix. 
The pilot coordinates 
their approach with ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
20-3 Comply with ATC clearance 
to descend, if applicable. 
The pilot complies with 
ATC clearance to 
descend. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
20-4 Ensure that the UA is 
configured for descent. 
The UA is configured for 
descent (flaps, landing 
gear, etc.). 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
21-1 Monitor the airspeed, 
altitude, heading, and 
system health parameters 
while on approach. 
The pilot monitors 
airspeed, altitude, 
heading, and system 
health while on approach 
and executes a missed 
approach if the UA falls 
within missed approach 
parameters. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
21-2 Perform approaches per the 
published approach plates 
unless a standardized 
approach exists for specific 
unmanned system being 
flown. 
The pilot performs the 
approach per established 
procedures, whatever 
they may be. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 







are unique to the 
platform. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
21-3 Ensure that the final 
approach path is clear of 
aircraft and obstacles. 
The final approach path is 
clear throughout 
approach and the pilot 
reacts correctly to a 
traffic conflict. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   PIC cannot clear 
traffic without a 
VO (notional) 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Pilot would 
coordinate (No 
DAA system) 
Pass   
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21-4 If a visual observer (VO) is 
the sole means of clearing 
the airspace for an 
approach, ensure that two-
way communication with 
the observer is maintained 
throughout the approach. 
If a VO is used to clear the 
airspace, the pilot 
maintains communication 
with them throughout the 
approach. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Radio or phone Pass   
22-1 Establish communication 
with local ATC when arriving 
at the destination or 
entering controlled 
airspace, as applicable.  
The pilot makes initial 
contact with ATC prior to 
entering controlled 
airspace. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
22-2 Maintain communication 
with ATC when operating in 
controlled airspace. 
Acknowledge and read back 
clearances per AIM 4-4-7. 
The pilot maintains 
communication with ATC 
and properly 
acknowledges clearances, 
reading them back when 
required. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
22-3 Use standard phraseology 
to obtain ATC clearance for 
landing. 
Then pilot uses standard 
ATC phraseology when 
requesting clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
23-1 Choose landing procedure 
appropriate to the type of 
approach and prevailing 
weather conditions. 
The pilot chooses an 
approach that is 
appropriate to the 
prevailing weather 
conditions at the 
destination airport. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 




Pass   
23-2 Contact ATC and request 
clearance to land; 
acknowledge landing 
clearance when received. 
The pilot requests and 
acknowledges landing 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
23-3 Ensure that the UA is 
configured for landing prior 
to touchdown. 
The UA is configured for 
landing as described in 
published 
procedure/POH. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Auto flaps only. 
Invisible to RPIC 
Pass   
24-1 Communicate the go-
around to ATC as soon as 
practical. 
The pilot communicates 
the go-around(s) to ATC. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
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24-2 Abort landing prior to 
commitment point. 
The pilot makes the 
decision to abort prior to 
a predetermined 
commitment point. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
24-3 Maintain positive rate of 
climb. 
The pilot maintains 
positive climb to a 
predetermined altitude 
during the abort 
procedure. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Verify positive 
climb 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Auto until 
Knobs mode 
selected 
Pass   
24-4 Maintain runway centerline. The pilot maintains 
runway centerline during 
the initial climb. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Climb to 
specified point 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass   Preprogrammed Pass   
24-5 Climb to a predetermined 
altitude that ensures 
obstacle clearance. 
The pilot climbs the UA to 
an altitude that assures 
obstacle clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Climb to 
specified point 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
24-6 Follow applicable missed 
approach procedures. 
Published missed 
approach procedures are 
followed (as applicable). 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   As applicable Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 




Pass   
24-7 Coordinate with ATC as 
required to re-attempt the 
approach. 
The pilot coordinates with 
ATC to re-attempt an 
approach. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass     Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
25-1 If required for landing, 
coordinate with any ground 
support personnel and brief 
them on landing 
procedures. 
The pilot coordinates with 
ground personnel if 
required. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Part of standard 
procedure 
(notional) 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results. 
Pass     Pass   
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Flight Card Description Flight Test 
#10 
Test Case Description Perform Normal Operational Procedures               
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  20 Descent From Cruise - 
General 
              
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  21 Approach - General               
6 AIM if available in CS  24 Go Around               
7 UA is airborne  25 Ground Support               
8 A simulated ATC entity is available  26 Approach and Landing 
(Automated) 
              
                              Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 






























20-1 Descend to pattern altitude 
or an approach fix/initial 
approach waypoint in a 
manner that does not 
impede or decrease the 
safety of other air traffic. 
The pilot descends to 
pattern altitude or an 
approach fix/initial 
approach waypoint in a 
manner that does not 
impede or decrease the 
safety of other air traffic. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Use payload of 
VO. Payload is 








Pass             Payload (if 
available)/ VO 
Pass   
20-2 If unable to perform a 
published instrument 
approach, coordinate 
approach procedures with 
ATC prior to arrival at the 
initial approach fix. 
(Pilot is unable to 
perform a published 
instrument approach)  
Pilot coordinates a new 
approach procedure with 
ATC prior to arrival at the 
initial approach fix.  
Pass   Not capable Fail Pilot performs a 
platform specific 
approach 








Pass   
20-3 Comply with ATC clearance 
to descend, if applicable. 
The pilot complies with 
an ATC clearance to 
descent, if applicable. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
20-4 Ensure that the UA is 
configured for descent. 
The pilot properly 
configures the UA for 
descent. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
21-1 Monitor the airspeed, 
altitude, heading, and 
system health parameters 
while on approach. 
The pilot monitors the 
airspeed, altitude, 
heading, and system 
health parameters while 
on approach. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Both Pilot and 
auto 
Pass   
21-2 Perform approaches per the The pilot executes the Pass   Not capable Fail Pilot performs a Pass Met or Pass   Pass   
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published approach plates 
unless a standardized 
approach exists for specific 
unmanned system being 
flown. 
instrument per the 
published approach 
plates unless a 
standardized approach 
exits for specific 







21-3 Ensure that the final 
approach path is clear of 
aircraft and obstacles. 
The pilot determines that 
the final approach path is 
clear of aircraft and 
obstacles. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Payload (If 
available)/ VO 
Pass   
21-4 If a visual observer (VO) is 
the sole means of clearing 
the airspace for an 
approach, ensure that two-
way communication with 
the observer is maintained 
throughout the approach. 
If a visual observer (VO) is 
the sole means of clearing 
the airspace for an 
approach, the pilot 
ensures two-way 
communication with the 
observer throughout the 
approach. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Communication 
was notional in 
this case 










CoA VO is 
used. 
Pass   
24-1 Communicate the go-
around to ATC as soon as 
practical. 
The pilot notifies ATC as 
soon as practical when a 
go-around is executed.  
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
24-2 Abort landing prior to 
commitment point. 
The pilot aborts the 
landing prior to 
commitment point. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Pilot and auto Pass   
24-3 Maintain positive rate of 
climb. 
The pilot maintains a 
positive rate of climb. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Auto Pass   
24-4 Maintain runway centerline. The pilot maintains 
runway centerline.  
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Auto and 
RPIC. 
Preconfigured 
by RPIC for 
route and 
altitude 
Pass   
24-5 Climb to a predetermined 
altitude that ensures 
obstacle clearance. 
The pilot climbs to a 
predetermined altitude 
that ensures obstacle 
clearance. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
24-6 Follow applicable missed 
approach procedures. 
The pilot follows 
applicable missed 
approach procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
24-7 Coordinate with ATC as 
required to re-attempt the 
approach. 
The pilot obtains ATC 
clearance to re-attempt 
the approach. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
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25-1 If required for landing, 
coordinate with any ground 
support personnel and brief 
them on landing 
procedures. 
If required for landing, 
the pilot coordinates with 
any ground support 
personnel and briefs 
them on landing 
procedures. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
26-1 Monitor the aircraft on 
approach and ensure that it 
conforms to known 
performance limitations on 
approach and landing. 
The pilot monitors the 
aircraft on approach and 
ensures that it conforms 
to all performance 
limitations during 
approach and landing. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
26-2 If required and the UAS is so 
equipped, make manual 
control inputs to assist in 
guiding the UAS while on 
approach. 
If required and the UAS is 
so equipped, the pilot 
manually controls the 
UAS during approach. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   N/A 
26-3 If applicable, assume 
manual control of the UAS 
in the event of an 
emergency. 
If applicable, the pilot 
assumes manual control 
of the UAS during 
emergency situations. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Auto N/A 
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Flight Card Description Flight Test 
#11 
Test Case Description Perform Post Landing Procedures               
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational 
Procedures Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  27 Post-Landing - 
Communications 
              
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  28 Post-Landing - Taxi               
7 UA is airborne  29 Post-Landing - Ground 
Support 
              
8 A simulated ATC entity is available                    
                              Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 
Expected Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
Actual Results Pass / Fail / Not 
Observed/  Not 
Applicable / 
Suspended 
27-1 Maintain communication 
with the applicable ATC 
element upon landing. 
The pilot establishes and 
maintains 2-way 
communication with the 
applicable ATC element 
upon landing. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass               Pass   
27-2 Follow ATC instructions for 
taxi. 
The pilot establishes and 
maintains 2-way 
communication with the 
applicable ATC element 
during taxi operations. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
28-1 Taxi on cleared route. The pilot uses the CS and 
camera if available to taxi 
on the cleared route. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
28-2 Maintain a taxi speed at the 
marshaller's pace (if 
required), or as appropriate 
to maintain separation from 
other traffic. 
The pilot follows the 
marshaller's commands 
or as appropriate to 
maintain separation from 
other traffic. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
28-3 Remain a safe distance from 
other aircraft. 
The pilot maintains a safe 
taxi speed in order to 
enable a full-stop to avoid 
other aircraft or 
obstacles. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
28-4 Avoid hazards on taxiway 
surface. 
The pilot uses the CS and 
camera, if available, to 
avoid hazards on the 
taxiway surface. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
28-5 Taxi according to applicable 
signage and warning lights. 
The pilot uses the CS, 
camera, or VO (if 
available) to avoid 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 
N/A Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass No Taxi N/A 
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hazards on the taxiway 
surface. 
results. 
29-1 Verify UA is parked in 
designated location. 
The pilot uses the CS, 
camera, marshaller, or VO 
(if available) to verify that 
the UA is parked in it 
designated location. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass   Aircraft does 
not taxi 




Pass No Taxi N/A 
29-2 Shut down the engine. The pilot successfully 
shuts down the engine. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 








29-3 If required, confirm engine 
shutdown with ground 
crew. 
The pilot confirms the 
successful engine 
shutdown with the 
ground crew, if required. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 








29-4 Perform a post-flight 
inspection of GCS and 
associated systems.  
The pilot follows the 
appropriate checklist(s) to 
perform the post-flight 
inspection of CS and 
associated systems. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
29-5 Coordinate with ground 
crews (if required) to 
perform a post-flight 
inspection of the UA. 
The pilot communicates 
with the appropriate 
ground crews (if required) 
to perform a post-flight 
inspection of the UA. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass 
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Flight Card Description Flight Test 
#12 
Test Case Description Perform En-Route, Cruise Power 
Settings, Weather Monitoring, and 
Control Station Handoff Procedures 
              
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All               
                         Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A               
                         Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
              
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  14a En-route Operations - 
General 
              
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  14b En-route Operations - 
Navigation 
              
7 UA is airborne  18 Cruise Power Settings               
8 A simulated ATC entity is available  19 Weather Monitoring               
     30 Control Station Handoff - 
General 
              
     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 






























14a-1 Use proper communication 
procedures when using 
radar services (as 
applicable). 
The pilot uses two-way 
communication with ATC. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass              Pass   
14a-1-1 Contact Memphis Center on 
120.8MHz. 
The pilot changes the 
two-way radio frequency 
to 120.8 while in flight 
and contact the Memphis 
ARTCC.  
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-2 Obtain ATC clearance. Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
obtain an ATC clearance. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-2-1 Request clearance for 
transitioning into R-2104B 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
request clearance into R-
2104B restricted airspace. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-3 Respond to ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-3-1 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot reads back the ATC 
clearance approval using 
standard aviation 
terminology. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
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14a-4 Comply with ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-4-1 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot turns the UA into 
R2104B, remain within 
that airspace, climb to 
5,000 feet MSL and level 
off. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-5 Use standard aviation 
phraseology when 
communicating with ATC. 




Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-6 Set communication 
frequencies, navigation 
systems, and transponder 
codes to ensure compliance 
with ATC clearances. 
Pilot switches radio 
navigation frequencies 
and transponder code 
from within the CS. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-7 Conduct any required 
communication frequency 
changes. 
Pilot switches two-way 
radio frequencies from 
within the CS. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 




Pass   Pass   
14a-8 Use available systems (if 
equipped) to detect icing 
conditions. 
Pilot uses the CS to detect 
icing. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 





blocked by ice 




Pass   Pass   
14a-8-1 Determine if the pitot tube 
has ice. 
Pilot uses the CS to detect 
icing on the pitot tube. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 





blocked by ice 




Pass   Pass   
14a-8-2 Determine if the UA has 
structural ice. 
Pilot uses the payload 
video to inspect the UA 
for structural icing. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Possible with 








Pass   Pass   
14a-9 Monitor aircraft electrical, 
propulsion, and datalink 
performance. 
Pilot monitors status and 
health of electrical, 
propulsion, and datalink 
systems. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14a-9-1 Determine if current bus 
voltage is within limitations. 
Pilot monitors bus voltage 
and determine it is within 
the POH-required limits. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Auto and # 
display 
Pass   
14b-1 Monitor aircraft's position 
throughout the flight and 
Pilot determines the 
location of the UA on a 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or 
exceeded 
Pass   Pass   
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maintain course in 
accordance with ATC 
instructions/clearance. 
location display. expected 
results. 
14b-1-1 Determine current location Pilot determines current 
location on the location 
display and/ or GPS 
coordinate display. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-1-1 Turn and maintain 130 
degrees. 
Pilot turns from 360 
degrees to 130 degrees. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-2 Intercept and track a given 
course, radial (if equipped), 
or bearing, as appropriate. 
Pilot plots a course and 
command the UA 
heading. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 













14b-2-1 Determine the course 
heading to Nashville, TN. 
Pilot plots a course 
heading from the UA's 
current position direct to 
Atlanta, GA. While 
factoring winds. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 








Pass   Pass   
14b-2-2 Determine a ground track to 
Nashville, TN. 
Pilot determines a ground 
track necessary for a 
direct course to Atlanta, 
GA. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 








Pass   Pass   
14b-3 Determine loss of GPS or 
navigation solution if it 
occurs. 
The pilot interprets the 
GPS health and status 
within the CS. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass WCA with 
secondary 
menus display 
for more detail 
information 
Pass   
14b-4 Maintain the appropriate 
altitude and headings.  
Pilot turns the UA and 
change altitude while in 
flight. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-4-1 Turn to heading 350 
degrees. 
Pilot turns the UA to 350 
degrees magnetic. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-4-2 Climb and maintain 10,000 
feet MSL. 
Pilot climbs the UA to 
10,000 MSL and level off. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass Used 5,000 ft Pass   
14b-4-3 Perform dead reckoning 
navigation if required. 
Pilot uses payload video 
to navigate back to a 
landing airport. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 




Pass   Pass   
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14b-4-4 Return to Huntsville 
International Airport via 
heading and airspeed. 
Pilot uses the UA's 
heading and ground 
speed to return to HSV. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-4-6 Use payload video to enter 
the traffic pattern at 
Huntsville International 
Airport. 
Pilot uses payload video 
to navigate into the traffic 
pattern. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 




Pass   Pass   
14b-6 Maintain course by 
reference to established 
waypoints/steer points or 
other navigational 
references, as applicable. 
Pilot remains on an 
established course and 
changes course once 
waypoints are achieved. 
Pass    Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-7 If equipped, be able to 
identify surface features to 
chart symbols. 
Pilot performs map to 
video correlation 
between the payload 
video and location display 
to identify natural and 
man-made terrain 
features. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    No payload 
operator 




Pass   N/E 
14b-8 Navigate by means of 
precomputed headings, 
groundspeeds, and elapsed 
time (if required). 
Pilot determines a 
required heading +/- 10 
degrees, groundspeed +/- 
10 knots, and time +/- 3 
minutes. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 








Pass   
14b-9 Correct for wind to maintain 
desired route and 
performance. 
The Pilot acknowledges 
and corrects for wind to 
maintain desired course. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 









Pass   Pass   
14b-10 Remain within planned 
route described in the flight 
plan. 
The Pilot commands the 
UA to maintain the 
desired course, speed, 
and altitude outlined in 
the flight plan. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-10-1 Obtain ATC clearance. Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
obtain an ATC clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-10-2 Request clearance for 
transitioning into R-2104B 
Pilot performs two-way 
radio communication to 
request clearance into R-
2104B restricted airspace. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-10-3 Respond to ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-10-4 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
Pilot reads back the ATC 
clearance approval using 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass      Pass Met or 
exceeded 
Pass   Pass   
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14b-10-5 Comply with ATC clearance. Pilot maneuvers the UA 
to comply with ATC 
clearance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
14b-10-6 Cleared into R-2104B 
airspace. Maintain climb 
and maintain 5,000 feet 
MSL. 
Pilot turns the UA into 
R2104B, remain within 
that airspace, climb to 
5,000 feet MSL and level 
off. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 







Pass   
18-1 Monitor UAS fuel/battery 
status while in flight. 
The pilot monitors UAS 
fuel/battery status while 
in flight 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
18-2 Adjust power settings as 
required to maintain 
desired performance. 
The pilot adjusts power 
settings as required to 
maintain desired 
performance. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 










Pass   
18-3 Perform fuel burn/battery 
consumption calculations 
such that the destination is 
reached with the required 
fuel reserve/battery power 
remaining. 
The pilot demonstrates 
the knowledge to 
perform fuel burn/battery 
consumption calculations 
such that the destination 
is reached with the 
required fuel/battery life. 
reserve/battery power 
remaining. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
18-4 Re-evaluate performance 
data as required to reach 
the destination at the 
required time with the 
required fuel/battery 
reserves. 
The pilot demonstrates 
the knowledge to re-
evaluate performance 
data as required to reach 
the destination at the 
required time with the 
required fuel/battery 
reserves. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
18-5 Determine any new 
performance capabilities or 
limitations that may result 
from alterations in the flight 
plan or an in-flight 
emergency. 
The pilot determines any 
new performance 
capabilities or limitations 
that may result from 
alterations in the flight 
plan or an in-flight 
emergency. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
19-1 Monitor weather conditions 
along the route of flight, 
establishing 
communications with in-
The pilot uses any 
available means to 
demonstrate the ability to 
monitor weather 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
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flight weather services as 
required. 
conditions along the 
route of flight, 
establishing 
communications with in-
flight weather services as 
required. 
19-2 Determine if icing 
conditions exist and utilize 
anti/de-icing equipment as 
appropriate. 
The pilot uses any 
available means to 
demonstrate the ability to 
determine if icing 




Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 
Pass    Not intended 








Pass No Payload 
cameras. 
N/E 
19-3 When necessary, alter the 
flight plan to avoid weather 
that poses a hazard to the 
safety of flight. 
The pilot demonstrates 
proper situation 
awareness and (when 
necessary), alter the flight 
plan to avoid weather 
that poses a hazard to the 
safety of flight. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
19-4 Notify ATC if a flight plan 
must be altered to avoid 
hazardous weather. 
The pilot uses any 
available means to notify 
ATC if a flight plan must 
be altered to avoid 
hazardous weather. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
30-1 Receiving Pilot - Perform 
preflight on receiving GCS 
and verify correct function 
of essential systems. 
The pilot performs 
preflight on receiving GCS 
and verifies correct 
function of essential 
systems. 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 
Not observed Documented 
in a preset 
procedure 




Pass   Pass   
30-2 Establish two-way 
communication with the 
receiving control station 
prior to initiating a control 
station handoff. 
The pilot establishes two-
way communication with 
the receiving control 
station prior to initiating a 
control station handoff. 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
30-3 Receiving CS: Coordinate 
with transferring CS to 
establish C2 link with UA, 
if/as applicable per the 
pilot’s operating handbook 
(POH). 
The receiving CS 
coordinates with the 
transferring CS to 
establish C2 link with UA, 
if/as applicable per the 
pilot's operating 
handbook (POH). 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
30-4 Receiving CS: Coordinate 
with transferring CS to 
establish C2 link with UA, 
if/as applicable per POH. 
The Receiving CS 
coordinates with 
Transferring CS to 
establish C2 link with UA, 
if/as applicable per POH. 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
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30-5 Transferring CS: Provide 
handover briefing to 
Receiving CS: 
- Verify autopilot mode 
- Verify matched commands 
(if applicable) 
- Verify data terminal 
settings (if applicable) 
- Verify altimeter setting 
- Verify current clearance 
- Verify any other flight-
critical systems  
The Transferring CS pilot 
provides handover 
briefing to Receiving CS 
pilot: 
- Verify autopilot mode 
- Verify matched 
commands (if applicable) 
- Verify data terminal 
settings (if applicable) 
- Verify altimeter setting 
- Verify current clearance 
- Verify any other flight-
critical systems  
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass These are 
automatically 
downloaded to 
CS from UA 
when receiving 
RPIC connects 
Pass   
30-6 Transferring CS: Positive 
transfer of UA control to 
Receiving CS. 
The Transferring CS pilot 
verifies positive transfer 
of UA control to Receiving 
CS. 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
30-7 Receiving CS: Verify UA 
control. 
The Receiving CS pilot is 
able to verify UA control. 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
30-8 Keep the transferring on link 
as backup, if/as applicable.  
Pilot ensures that the 
transferring CS remains 
on link as backup. If/as 
applicable. 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass   Pass   
30-9 For transfer of UA control 
from one CS to another - 
Perform a control station 
handoff briefing for the 
receiving pilot, to include at 
a minimum: 
- UAS overall health 
- Fuel/battery state 
- Altitude 
- Altimeter setting 
- Airspeed 
- Heading 
- ATC clearances 
- Any abnormal occurrences 
- Contingency/emergency 
plan(s) 
- Safety critical information 
that the receiving pilot will 
need to ensure safe flight 
- confirmation of command 
link integrity (strength/ 
reliability) 
For CS internal handoff – 
The pilot performs a 
control station handoff 
briefing for the receiving 
pilot, to include at a 
minimum: 
- UAS overall health 
- Fuel/battery state 
- Altitude 
- Altimeter setting 
- Airspeed 
- Heading 
- ATC clearances 




- Safety critical 
information that the 
receiving pilot will need 
to ensure safe flight 
- confirmation of 
command link integrity 
(strength/ reliability) 
Pass Not capable on 
simulator. 




Pass These are 
automatically 
downloaded to 
CS from UA 
when receiving 
RPIC connects 
Pass   
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30-10 For an internal crew 
changeover within a CS – 
Perform a crew changeover 
briefing for the receiving 
pilot, to include at a 
minimum: 
- UAS overall health 
- Fuel/battery state 
- Altitude 
- Altimeter setting 
- Airspeed 
- Heading 
- ATC clearances 
- Any abnormal occurrences 
- Contingency/emergency 
plan(s) 
- Safety critical information 
that the receiving pilot will 
need to ensure safe flight 
- confirmation of command 
link integrity (strength/ 
reliability) 
For an internal crew 
changeover - The pilot is 
able to perform a crew 
changeover briefing to 
the receiving pilot, to 
include at a minimum: 
- UAS overall health 
- Fuel/battery state 
- Altitude 
- Altimeter setting 
- Airspeed 
- Heading 
- ATC clearances 




- Safety critical 
information that the 
receiving pilot will need 
to ensure safe flight 
- confirmation of 
command link integrity 
(strength/ reliability) 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
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Flight Card Description Flight Test 
#13 
Test Case Description Perform In-Flight Emergencies and 
Abnormal Operating Procedures 
                     
Validation Attempt ID All Data Collector ID  Collective UAS Operator ID All                      
                                Researcher/Assessor's ID All Date Tested June 6, 2017 Test Case (Pass/Fail) N/A                      
                                Assumption 
# 
Assumptions: OP # Operational Procedures 
Validated 
                     
1 UGCS operating in simulation mode  38 In-Flight Emergencies - 
Detect and Avoid 
                     
2 Platform-specific POH is available in CS  46 Abnormal Operating 
Procedures - General 
                     
7 UA is airborne                           
8 A simulated ATC entity is available                           
                                     Final Result Observer 1 Observer 1 Observer 2 Observer 2 Observer 3 Observer 3 Observer 4 Observer 4 
OP # Operational Procedure/ 
Process Step 






























38-1 Abide by applicable right-of-
way rules. 
The pilot abides by 
applicable right-of-way 
rules. 
Pass   Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass             Pass   
38-2 When applicable, use 
available collision avoidance 
instruments and understand 
their associated procedures. 
The pilot demonstrates 




of the applicable collision 
avoidance procedures. 
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 
Not observed. No DAA 
equipment 
installed 




Pass   N/A 
38-3 If an automated detect and 
avoid system is used, it must 
give way to other air traffic 
in a manner that is 
consistent with 14 CFR 
91.113. 
The pilot monitors the 
automated detect and 
avoid system (if used) and 
ensure that the 
automated detect and 
avoid system commands 
an avoidance maneuver 
consistent with 14 CFR 
91.113. 
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 
Not observed. No DAA 
equipment 
installed 




Pass   N/A 
38-4 Monitor DAA system to 
maintain safe distance from 
other aircraft. 
The pilot monitors the 
DAA system (if used) and 
ensure that the DAA 
system maintains safe 
distance from other 
aircraft. 
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 
Not observed. No DAA 
equipment 
installed 




Pass   N/A 
38-5 Execute evasive maneuvers 
when required. 
The pilot uses the CS to 
execute evasive 
maneuvers when 
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 
Not observed. No DAA 
equipment 
installed 
N/A Met or 
exceeded 
expected 
Pass   N/A 






38-6 When applicable, the pilot 
must monitor the execution 
of automated collision 
avoidance maneuvers. 
When applicable, the 
pilot uses the CS to 
monitor the execution of 
automated collision 
avoidance maneuvers. 
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 
Not observed. No DAA 
equipment 
installed 




Pass   N/A 
38-7 Override autonomous DAA 
system, if required. 
If required, the pilot 
demonstrates the 
capability to use the CS to 
override autonomous 
DAA system. 
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 
Not observed. No DAA 
equipment 
installed 




Pass   N/A 
38-8 Notify ATC of intentions 
when able. 
The pilot notifies ATC of 
intentions when able  
N/A Not capable with 
simulator. 




Pass   N/A 
46-1 Perform any abnormal 
operations procedures as 
they are published for the 
given system.  
The pilot is performs any 
abnormal operations 
procedures as they are 
published for the given 
system. 
Pass Not capable with 
simulator. 








Pass   N/A 
46-2 Report any failures of 
instrumentation, reversion 
to backup or standby 
systems, or any other 
failure/abnormal operation 
that may impact safety of 
flight to ATC. 
The pilot reports any 
failures of 
instrumentation, 
reversion to backup or 
standby systems, or any 
other failure/abnormal 
operation that may 
impact safety of flight to 
ATC. 
Pass Met or exceeded 
expected results 




Pass   Pass   
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
E-1 
APPENDIX E—VALIDATION RESULTS 
The validation process during research task PC-3 demonstrated procedures from the operational 
requirements identified in research phases PC-1 and PC-2. Not all operational requirements or 
procedures were validated using the UGCS because they were independent of control stations. 
These requirements or procedures were compared to reasonableness during PC-1 consisting of 
manned and unmanned aircraft requirements and procedures. PC-1 analyzed these requirements 
and recommended procedures from multiple sources, including federal aviation regulations, 
Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM) and Pilots Operating Handbooks (POH). Additionally, by 
comparing a common set of UAS tasks to various representative UAS platforms' procedures 
commonality was determined. These requirements and procedures were also compared to 
manned tasks as given by the FAA Commercial Practical Test Standards (PTS) and the Airman 
Certification Standards (ACS) for a typical single-engine airplane (C-172). Relevant tasks from 
the Instrument ACS were considered for comparison as appropriate. 
 
The recommended minimum operational requirements and procedures focused on high-level 
requirements for UAS pilots such as roles and responsibilities, duty requirements, rest 
requirements, and minimum requirements served by the role of PIC. Minimum operational 
requirements and procedures related to flight operations were also contained within this section, 
organized by phase of flight. Since they were foundational in nature, they formed the basis for 
addressing all operational scenarios, from normal flight operations, to emergency, and abnormal 
scenarios. The intent with these requirements and procedures was to provide minimum 
recommended procedures to the FAA. Recommended requirements and procedures for 
additional crewmembers, such as crew chiefs, visual observers (VOs), and other essential crew 
were not included in this document. 









Requirements and Procedures Related to UAS Pilots Not Validated 
2 
 
Pilot Duty Requirements Not Validated 
3 
 
Pilot Rest Requirements Not Validated 
4 
 
Minimum Flight Crew Not Validated 
 
1 Before Entering GCS Not Validated 
 
THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW. 
 
E-2 








2 Presets Pass 
 
3 Pre-Flight Pass 
 
4 Engine Start Pass 
 
5 Pre-Taxi Pass 
 
6 Taxi - General Pass 
 
7 Taxi - Communications Pass 
 
8 Pre-Takeoff Checks Pass 
 
9 Takeoff Communications Pass 
 
10 Takeoff Run/ Launch Pass 
 
11 Initial Climb Out Pass 
 
12 Aborted Takeoff Pass 
 
13 Climb to Altitude - General Pass 
 
14a En-route Operations - General Pass 
 
14b En-route Operations - Navigation Pass 
 
15 En-route Operations - Climb Pass 
 
16 En-route Operations - Course Change Pass 
 
17 En-route Operations - Descents Pass 
 
18 Cruise Power Settings Pass 
 
19 Weather Monitoring Pass 
 
20 Descent From Cruise - General Pass 
 
21 Approach - General Pass 
 
22 Landing - Communications Pass 
 
23 Approach and Landing - (Human in the Loop) Pass 
 
24 Go Arounds Pass 
 
25 Ground Support Pass 
 
26 Approach and Landing (Automated) Pass 
 
27 Post-Landing - Communications Pass 
 
28 Post-Landing - Taxi Pass 
 
29 Post-Landing - Ground Support Pass 
 
30 Control Station Handoff - General Pass 
 
31 Lost-Link Control Procedures - General Pass 
 
32 Lost-Link Troubleshooting Procedures - General Pass 
 
33 
Operations During Command and Control Degradation 
and Loss - General Pass 
 
34 
Operations During Periods of Decreased Sensory 
Cues from Aircraft and Environment Pass 
 
35 In-Flight Emergencies - Propulsion Failure Pass 









In-Flight Emergencies - Navigation Failure - GPS or 
Other System Pass 
 
38 In-Flight Emergencies - Detect and Avoid Pass 
 
39 In-Flight Emergencies -Uncontrolled Flight Pass 
 
40 In-Flight Emergencies - Emergency Descent Pass 
 
41 Emergency Landing - Communication Pass 
 
42 Emergency Landing - Approach Pass 
 
43 Emergency Landing - Touchdown Pass 
 
44 Emergency Landing - Ditching Site Selection Pass 
 
45 Emergency Landing - Flight Termination Pass 
 
46 Abnormal Operating Procedures - General Pass 
 
